Context & Objective: Context & Objective: The principle of the irrevocability of contracts, recognized in Islamic jurisprudence as Aṣālat al-Luzūm (the foundational assumption that contracts are binding), is one of the most important principles of Islamic contract law. Traditionally, jurisprudential and legal treatises have primarily focused on the application of this principle in instances of legal ambiguity, referred to as Šubhah Ḥukmīyah (uncertainty regarding the overarching legal ruling of a specific contract type). In such scenarios, if it is unclear whether a particular category of contract is inherently binding or revocable, the presumption dictates that it is binding. Nevertheless, a limited number of prominent jurists, notably following the trajectory of Shaykh Murtaza al-Ansari (1799–1864), have briefly noted the potential application of this principle in instances of factual ambiguity, known as Šubhah Mawżūʿīyah (uncertainty concerning the factual circumstances or specific nature of an executed contract). Despite its significance, this specific dimension of the principle remains substantially underexplored within the contemporary literature of Iranian private law. Consequently, the primary objective of this research is to thoroughly investigate and evaluate the feasibility of applying the principle of the irrevocability of contracts in cases characterized by factual ambiguity.
Method & Approach: This research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology to examine the applicability of the principle of the irrevocability of contracts in cases of factual ambiguity. Utilizing a doctrinal approach, the study evaluates this specific legal issue within the frameworks of Imami jurisprudence and Iranian civil law to address the existing gap in private law literature.
Findings: The analytical investigation reveals that if one accepts the jurisprudential validity of invoking a general rule during instances of substantive doubt, termed Šubhah Miṣdāqīyah (uncertainty regarding whether a specific instance falls under a general rule or its exception), a judge can legitimately apply the principle of irrevocability in cases of factual ambiguity. Specifically, when a dispute arises over whether the parties executed an irrevocable contract, such as a sale, or a revocable contract, such as a gift (Hiba), the judge can utilize this principle to affirmatively determine the title of the irrevocable contract. Conversely, if invoking the general rule is deemed impermissible, the court must rely on the presumption of continuity, known as Istiṣḥāb (the legal principle of presuming the continuation of a previously established state). Applying this presumption to the generated legal effect, which is the transfer of ownership, results in the practical irrevocability of the contract. This means the transfer of ownership becomes binding and irrevocable, even without explicitly determining the specific title of the underlying contract.
Conclusion: The practical implications of these findings demonstrate a clear bifurcation in the utility of the principle of irrevocability based on the nature of the ambiguity. While jurists and legal scholars remain the primary users of this principle in resolving legal ambiguities to deduce general laws, trial judges and the judiciary are the principal users when resolving factual ambiguities to settle specific disputes. Ultimately, recognizing these judicial applications enhances the efficiency of dispute resolution in contract law. Based on these systemic insights, this analysis culminates in a legislative proposal to amend Article 219 of the Iranian Civil Code, aiming to explicitly codify the principle's application in factual ambiguities and thereby ensure greater legal certainty in contractual adjudications.