پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی

پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی

هوش مصنوعی در مقام داور؛ صورت‌بندی چالش‌های حقوقی و اخلاقی کاربست هوش مصنوعی در فرایند داوری

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده
دانش‌آموخته دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه علم و فرهنگ، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
ظهور گونه‌های مختلف مدل‌های زبانی بزرگ نظیر اقسام هوش مصنوعی، حوزه‌های متعدد حقوقی را تحت‌تأثیر خود قرار داده است که «داوری» نیز از آن مصون نبوده است. جایگاه هوش مصنوعی در مقام «داور» و به‌هنگام ارزیابی ادله طرفین داوری، می‌تواند به‌عنوان صلاحیت مساعدتی و چه‌بسا به‌صورت مستقل مورد بررسی قرار گیرد. نوشتار حاضر با روش توصیفی تحلیلی بر آن است تا به تبیین و صورت‌بندی دقیق چالش‌های حقوقی و اخلاقی به‌کارگیری این فناوری نوین در مقام داور و یا کاربست آن در دیوان‌های داوری بپردازد. یافته‌ها حاکی است که‌ این فناوری، علی‌رغم تمام دستاوردهایی که می‌تواند برای فرایند داوری به‌همراه داشته باشد، در اموری همچون استدلال حقوقی، رعایت بی‌طرفی و پذیرش عمومی، با چالش‌های اساسی مواجه است. البته، کاربست هوش مصنوعی در صلاحیت مساعدتی دیوان‌های داوری به‌عنوان ابزار تسهیل‌گر، با چالش‌های اساسی پیش‌گفته مواجه نخواهد بود، چه‌اینکه صرفا تحلیلی از داده‌ها یا مدارکی را در اختیار داور انسانی قرار می‌دهد و اتخاذ تصمیم داورانه با عامل انسانی خواهد بود. علیرغم چالش‌های مطروحه در مقاله، در انتها پیشنهاد شده است چنانچه هوش مصنوعی در فرایند داوری به‌کار گرفته شد، بدواً چالش‌ها و محدودیت‌های هوش مصنوعی به استحضار طرفین داوری برسد و ضمناً به‌منظور جبران خسارات احتمالی ناشی از عملکرد هوش مصنوعی در این فرایند، دولت‌ها و دیوان‌های داوری تمهیدات بیمه‌ای لازم را جهت جبران خسارات مذکور در نظر بگیرند.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات

عنوان مقاله English

Artificial Intelligence as an Arbitrator: Formulating the Legal and Ethical Challenges of Applying Artificial Intelligence in the Arbitration Process

نویسنده English

Mohammad Amin Esmaeil Pour
PhD in Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Science and Culture, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده English

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies has significantly impacted the practice of arbitration, prompting legal scholars and practitioners to reassess fundamental principles of dispute resolution. In particular, the application of AI as an arbitrator—rather than merely as a supportive tool—has raised complex legal and ethical questions. While traditional dispute resolution methods rely on human adjudicators to evaluate evidence, the increased efficiency and predictive capabilities of AI have made it an appealing alternative for arbitration tribunals aiming to reduce costs and time. However, the notion of granting an AI system autonomous authority challenges established arbitration norms, such as impartiality, fairness, and accountability.
Current debates in AI-related scholarship demonstrate both optimism and caution. On one hand, AI’s capacity for rapid data processing and pattern recognition could enhance the arbitral process by streamlining the review of voluminous documentation and evidence. On the other hand, scholars point to inherent limitations of AI, notably the risk that algorithmic decision-making systems might reproduce biases present in their training data and operate opaquely, undermining the transparency crucial for a fair legal process. As the sophistication of AI grows, some commentators wonder whether machines could evolve into entities comparable to human intelligence—capable of recognizing emotional nuances or developing self-awareness—while others contend that these prospects remain largely theoretical.
Within this context, the distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic (connectionist) AI is pivotal. Symbolic AI systems rely on predefined rules that explain how they generate conclusions, providing a measure of transparency well suited to legal settings. In contrast, non-symbolic AI operates through inductive reasoning, often employing neural networks that “learn” from large datasets but offer limited insight into the reasoning process. This divergence raises practical and ethical questions when AI is tasked not merely with assisting in evidence evaluation but also with taking on a more autonomous role as the primary decision-maker.

‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
This study centers on a core inquiry: What legal and ethical challenges arise when AI is deployed as an arbitrator or in a supportive capacity for evaluating arbitration evidence? Specifically, it seeks to determine how AI-driven decision-making processes align with the foundational principles of arbitration—neutrality, procedural fairness, and due process—and whether current legal frameworks can address questions of liability and accountability. The question encompasses both the advanced scenario of fully autonomous AI arbitrators and the more common reality of AI tools aiding human arbitrators. By examining these distinct yet interrelated roles of AI, the research aims to clarify how emerging technologies might fit (or fail to fit) within existing arbitration norms.

‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
The central hypothesis posits that while AI in an assistive capacity can efficiently streamline arbitration procedures—reducing costs and shortening timeframes—its role as an independent arbitrator may present profound challenges that compromise the integrity of the arbitral process. Specifically, the research hypothesizes the following:
Ethical and Legal Vulnerabilities: If AI functions with minimal human oversight, biases, discrimination, and a lack of transparency may contravene essential arbitration principles of fairness and equality.
Liability and Accountability Complications: Assigning responsibility for AI-generated decisions in arbitration remains unsettled, particularly when no human agent actively supervises the system’s determinations.
Potential for Beneficial Complementarity: When integrated responsibly—under appropriate human guidance—AI can enhance the accuracy of evidence analysis without forfeiting the essential legal safeguards that human judgment provides.

‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
This research adopts a doctrinal methodology, focusing on an analytical review of existing legal instruments, ethical guidelines, and scholarly commentaries related to AI application in dispute resolution. By examining key arbitration laws, codes of ethics, and relevant court precedents, the study will identify areas in which AI fits seamlessly into established norms, as well as those in which regulatory gaps persist.

‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The research findings indicate that AI can significantly enhance the efficiency and objectivity of arbitration proceedings when deployed in an assistive capacity. Specifically, AI-driven tools excel at sorting large volumes of data, identifying relevant evidence, and conducting preliminary legal analysis with speed and precision. By minimizing human error and offering consistent results, AI systems reduce the likelihood of inconsistencies and procedural delays, thus lowering costs and expediting the resolution process. Moreover, parties involved in arbitration benefit from a more transparent workflow, as symbolic AI systems can provide explanations for their reasoning through predefined rules. This explainability aligns well with procedural fairness, offering clarity on how a conclusion or recommendation is reached.
However, the discussion reveals critical concerns regarding the use of AI as a fully autonomous arbitrator. Chief among these is the risk of bias, which arises when AI algorithms are trained on datasets containing discriminatory patterns. In such instances, prejudices embedded in the data may be amplified by AI-driven decisions, compromising the foundational principles of equality and impartiality in arbitration. Even in advanced neural network architectures, the “black box” nature of machine learning often obscures the rationale behind outcomes, challenging the transparency that is crucial for maintaining the credibility of the arbitral process. Furthermore, assigning liability for AI-based decisions remains a gray area: if an AI system misjudges or violates fundamental legal rights, determining whether fault rests with developers, owners, or arbitration institutions proves complex.
An additional consideration is the gap between formal legal reasoning and AI’s computational logic. Judicial or arbitral reasoning frequently involves normative judgment, subjective interpretation, and contextual evaluation—factors not easily distilled into a finite set of rules or training patterns. This gap is particularly stark when the arbitrator’s role extends beyond the mechanical application of law to include moral or equitable considerations, where rigid, data-driven mechanisms may falter. Thus, while the research underscores the utility of AI in procedural and administrative tasks, it also highlights inherent limitations when AI is expected to embody the nuanced reasoning typically associated with human arbitrators.

‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
In light of these findings, the study concludes that AI can play an instrumental role in assisting arbitration tribunals by swiftly evaluating evidence within clear, predefined parameters. Where the arbitrator’s role is largely passive—focused on applying established rules rather than exercising broad discretion—AI’s objective and rule-based functionality proves advantageous. It can reduce time and expense, offering a more streamlined resolution process. However, the aspiration to replicate the depth of judicial reasoning or to strive for substantive justice through AI alone remains unfulfilled. Legal judgments often rest on interpretive and moral determinations that cannot be uniformly codified into a single algorithmic framework, rendering current AI technology inadequate for this higher-level adjudicative function.
Moreover, reliance on AI as an independent arbitrator raises legal and ethical complexities, including the potential for bias or discrimination, insufficient transparency in decision-making processes, and challenges to the principle of arbitrator independence. These issues become especially pronounced when AI’s “learning” is shaped by datasets that reflect existing societal prejudices, potentially skewing outcomes in ways that undermine fundamental fairness. The absence of a robust liability framework further complicates matters, as arbitrating parties, developers, and institutional sponsors may dispute responsibility for any damages arising from erroneous AI-driven decisions.
To address these concerns, this paper recommends several measures. First, the limitations of AI in evidence evaluation should be clearly defined at the outset, ensuring that disputing parties understand both the advantages and risks. Second, developers and owners of AI systems must register their algorithms with relevant regulatory bodies and disclose any modifications to enhance transparency and accountability. Third, clear liability standards should be established to determine who bears responsibility if AI malfunctions or produces unjust outcomes—whether that liability rests with developers, owners, or the arbitration institutions themselves. Finally, governments and arbitral bodies should collaborate to formulate guidelines and require mandatory insurance coverage, ensuring that any damages arising from AI’s application in arbitration can be compensated. By taking these steps, arbitration systems can incorporate AI responsibly, striking a balance between technological innovation and the enduring principles of legal fairness.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Algorithmic Justice
Aristotelian Logic
Arbitration
Artificial Intelligence
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دوره 26، شماره 4 - شماره پیاپی 70
زمستان 1404
صفحه 1305-1330

  • دریافت 28 آذر 1403
  • پذیرش 16 دی 1403