تحلیل شرطیت اجتهاد در امر قضاوت با تأکید بر عنصر قانون

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
The necessity of Ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) for judicial decision-making is a subject of traditional disagreement among jurists, with the prevailing (famous) view affirming it as a prerequisite, while a minority permits adjudication by non-Mujtahid (non-jurist) judges. Both sides traditionally base their arguments on reasoning derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah. However, these established jurisprudential arguments have been criticized for neglecting the practical process of adjudication and failing to account for the crucial role of 'codified law'. The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its legislative process, anchored in Sharia standards, signifies a significant transformation in the subject matter of adjudication. This transformation necessitates a reconsideration of the requirement of Ijtihad in light of the modern legal framework.

‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
The core research question addresses whether Ijtihad remains a necessary prerequisite for a judge (Qazi) in adjudication. Specifically, the article asks how the dependency of adjudication on Ijtihad is affected by a process-oriented view of judicial resolution, coupled with the introduction and institutionalization of codified law (Qanun-e Mudawwan) within the Islamic judicial system. The study seeks to investigate the quality of reliance of judicial resolution on Ijtihad, emphasizing the extent to which religious rulings influence codified law and human legal measures (tadābīr-e basharī).

‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
The article hypothesizes that the institutionalization of codified law and the subsequent transformation of the subject of adjudication negate the traditional necessity of Ijtihad as a formal requirement for judges. The perspective reinforced by this study is "in favor of non-necessity of Ijtihad in making judicial decisions". The hypothesis posits that Ijtihad is conceptually distinct from the operational processes of adjudication, and furthermore, that insistence upon individual Ijtihad by judges poses a threat to judicial uniformity and order, which are essential requirements of the modern judicial system.

‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
The research methodology involves reviewing and analyzing the common jurisprudential arguments put forth by both proponents and opponents of the Ijtihad requirement for judges. The article adopts a process-oriented approach to adjudication, analyzing its stages and nature. The principal framework for analysis involves three main pillars: 1) a conceptual analysis distinguishing Ijtihad from adjudication; 2) an assessment of the role and scope of codified law and its lack of full overlap with Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in dispute resolution; and 3) considering the necessity of preserving judicial order (hifz al-nizām) within the existing judicial system. The article strengthens the claim of non-necessity of Ijtihad by demonstrating how the codification of law, derived partly from human measures and overseen by constitutional review (for non-contravention of Sharia), reduces the operational need for judicial Ijtihad.

‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The discussion reveals that Ijtihad and adjudication possess distinct natures; Ijtihad involves the inference of general rulings, while adjudication is the application of pre-determined rules to specific, external cases. Ijtihad ends when a ruling is inferred, and adjudication begins with applying the rule to the facts of the case, meaning Ijtihad is, at best, a preliminary step, not part of the operational process of adjudication. The critical requirement for a judge is knowledge of the ruling, which can be satisfied through codified law or qualified taqlid (following a Mujtahid’s decree). Furthermore, the establishment of codified law—which encompasses many human measures and administrative laws not originally derived from Fiqh—renders the individual Ijtihad of a judge often irrelevant for resolving disputes based on these statutory rules. Most importantly, requiring judges to rely on their individual Ijtihad fundamentally clashes with crucial judicial system requirements such as uniformity of judicial practices and the preservation of judicial order. The potential for divergent judicial decisions on similar cases undermines public confidence, challenges judicial fairness, and risks causing chaos and confusion.

‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
The article concludes that the jurisprudential requirement of Ijtihad for adjudication is not necessary in the context of the codified legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Conceptual clarity reveals that while knowledge of rulings ('ilm bi al-ahkām) is a necessary precondition, it is not synonymous with Ijtihad, and this knowledge can be obtained through the established codified law. The transformation in the subject of adjudication means that failure to consider the element of codified law leads to a methodological flaw in analyzing the condition of Ijtihad. Adjudication based on statutory law (which has undergone Sharia review) and the paramount need to maintain judicial order and uniformity—a requirement sanctioned by the rule of preserving the system (Qā‘idat Ḥifẓ al-Nizām)—strongly support the view that Ijtihad is not a prerequisite for judicial decision-making.