نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق کیفری و جرم‌شناسی، گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق، الهیات و علوم سیاسی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران.
2 استادیار، گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شاهد، تهران، ایران.
3 استادیار، گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران.
4 استادیار، گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق، الهیات و علوم سیاسی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
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عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
In moral duties, in order for an action to be characterized by morality, it requires free will, and by imposing and threatening punishment, there can be no moral consequence. This view, which has a solid theoretical basis, is largely attributed to Kant. But the consequentialist approach, considering the consequences (good) of the action, allows the government to compel. However, the Machiavellian spirit and the dryness and, of course, the objective inefficiency of such views have led some Consequentialism thinkers to return to the status quo of the will, such as those who, while emphasizing the role of free will in accepting moral matters, believe that the contemplative position should be distinguished from current position. The current situation has changed. However, in science, when we look at the main record of legal ethics in creating good and developing morality through punishment and coercion, it certainly can not be possible as a result, because it is better to do it by accepting the difficult path of conscientiousness. Strengthen the moral will, which, ironically, will result in consistency and durability.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
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