نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Response to stock exchange crimes is a function of the relationship between the government and the economy. In this regard, with the shift in the theory of government intervention in the economy—from welfare states to regulatory governments—and given the differences in the level and mode of such intervention, two models can be identified. The first is the traditional model of response and repression, characterized by full government intervention. This model is criticized because it fails to address complex stock market crimes effectively; excessive state intervention and reliance on criminal justice measures not only fail to achieve the desired results but also harm the national economy and obstruct parts of it.
In the traditional criminal justice model, the response is limited to specific penalties which, due to the complexity of stock exchange crimes and violations, do not compensate the victims—typically investors and shareholders—for their losses. The second model is the economic adjustment model, which bases its response on maintaining economic order. Along with monitoring and controlling offenders to recover and repair damages inflicted on the economy, this model emphasizes the prevention of further losses caused by stock exchange crimes.
According to the descriptive-analytical approach, the application of criminal law in response to stock and securities crimes should be regarded as a regulatory mechanism used only as a last resort. In this article, by examining the principles governing the economic regulatory system and its instruments, traditional criminal justice methods and economic regulatory approaches to responding to stock exchange crimes are evaluated.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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