نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Context & Objective: Mandated credit allocation, known in economic literature as directed lending or compulsory credit allocation, is a recurring state intervention in Iran's banking network. Through annual budget laws, executive decrees, and Central Bank circulars, authorities compel banks to allocate resources to designated social uses at preferential rates and fixed terms, notably unfunded qarż al-ḥasaneh (interest-free benevolent loans) for marriage, childbearing, housing, dowries, and needy prisoners. International evidence links directed lending to credit-pricing distortions, higher credit risk, and weakened banking soundness. In Iran, these mandates conflict with core principles of the 1983 Law on Usury-Free Banking Operations and the 2023 Central Bank Law, namely transparency, risk management, regulatory independence, and depositor protection, creating multi-layered conflicts of interest among the government, banks, the Central Bank, and customers. Because domestic studies primarily address macroeconomic effects like inflation, investment, and overdrafts rather than legal consumer protection, this study analyzes the legal roots and consequences of these conflicts to determine how, and through which pathways, conflicts of interest in mandated credit allocation reduce the protection of banking customers' rights under Iranian law.
Method & Approach: Employing a doctrinal methodology and an analytical-legal approach, the research combines three primary methods. First, it conducts content analysis of domestic legal texts, including annual budget laws, the 1983 Law on Usury-Free Banking Operations, the 2023 Central Bank Law, and related Central Bank executive circulars. Second, it relies on library research reviewing books, scholarly articles, and official domestic and international reports, notably those published by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Third, it performs a comparative examination of directed-credit conflict management in India, Brazil, and Malaysia to evaluate institutional and regulatory benchmarks alongside Iranian banking law.
Findings: Mandated credit allocation generates four interconnected conflicts of interest. First, imposing unfunded credit mandates through temporary annual budget laws contradicts permanent banking statutes, breaches legislative hierarchy and separation of powers, and compels non-commercial lending that erodes bank profitability, liquidity, and capital adequacy. Second, bank-depositor conflicts arise when mandated lending violates informed consent and fiduciary duties, though legal obligations vary by deposit type. Under Iranian law, qarż al-ḥasaneh deposits transfer ownership to banks under a loan contract, making separate allocation consent unnecessary while preserving on-demand repayment, liquidity limits, and accurate disclosure duties. Conversely, term investment deposits rest on vekālat (contractual agency) for pooled investment, binding banks to agency boundaries, depositors' best interests, accounting duties, and prudential risk management. Although Article 20 of the 2023 Central Bank Law requires supervisory reporting and public disclosure of large exposures, a statutory gap persists regarding customer-facing disclosure of mandated-credit shares and risk-return impacts. Third, executive and budgetary mandates undermine the Central Bank's statutory independence and depositor-protection duties, including under Article 33 resolution rules. Fourth, bypassing professional credit scoring, collateral adequacy, and unified reporting inflates non-performing loans, strains liquidity, weakens deposit security, depresses real returns, increases customer complaints, and leaves harmed depositors without effective civil compensation. Comparative analysis of India's Priority Sector Lending, Brazil's development bank (BNDES), and Malaysia's post-1997 reforms confirms that directed credit preserves banking soundness only when paired with refinancing lines, limited state guarantees, separate accounting, transparent reporting, and distinct commercial and development mandates.
Conclusion: The core defect is not credit targeting itself, but designing mandates misaligned with depositor interests and prudential standards. While regulated interest rates, chronic inflation, toxic assets, and weak governance also drive banking imbalances, unfunded mandates accelerate financial distress and erode public trust. Effective financial consumer protection therefore requires coordinated reforms across three levels. Legislatively, credit mandates should shift from temporary budget laws to permanent statutes imposing annual caps, fiscal funding estimates, state repayment guarantees consistent with Principle 75 of the Constitution, public portfolio disclosures, and alternative instruments such as interest-rate subsidies, capital-market support bonds, and refinancing facilities. Institutionally, developmental obligations should be transferred to specialized development banks and funds, while the Central Bank enforces standardized credit-assessment directives and monitoring dashboards. Operationally, banks must segregate deposit pools, require explicit consent or penalty-free exit when allocations exceed agency terms, issue quarterly aggregate disclosures, build tailored risk models, and establish board-level conflict-of-interest committees.
واژگان کلیدی English