‌Context & Objective: The family is the cornerstone of human society, and its instability leads to social deviance. In Islam, family formation regulates sexual relations within legal and religious boundaries, preserves lineage, and facilitates socialization. Reflecting this emphasis, the Iranian legislator prioritized family preservation in Principle 10 of the Constitution, the Seventh Development Plan, and the 2016 General Policies on the Family System. Nevertheless, the contemporary Iranian family faces severe crises, including a transition from extended to nuclear households, rising marriage age, declining marriage rates, increasing definitive celibacy, rising divorce rates, and growing non-religious cohabitation. Because Iran's legal system rests on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), enacting effective family legislation requires understanding the nature of ʿaqd-e nikāḥ (the Islamic marriage contract). Scholars categorize marriage variously as commutative, non-commutative, quasi-commutative, devotional, or partnership-based. This study clarifies the nature of marriage, evaluates how each theory affects family stability, and investigates which theory aligns with Quranic teachings, which approach underlies Iranian legislation, and how legislative policy correlates with current family statistics.
 ‌Method & Approach: This research employs a doctrinal methodology. After clarifying the conceptual definitions of marriage and family, the study examines the perspectives and arguments of Shia and Sunni jurists alongside legal scholars regarding the nature of the marriage contract across three axes: Quranic verses and traditions, subsidiary legal rulings governing marital obligations, and the philosophy of family formation. By evaluating these competing theories and their impact on strengthening the family, the study identifies the optimal framework and analyzes Articles 1031 to 1206 of the Iranian Civil Code, the Family Protection Law of 2012, and judicial precedent to propose legislative reforms under Clause 7 of the General Policies on the Family System.
 ‌Findings: Although many classical Imami jurists and some Sunni scholars classify marriage as a commutative contract exchanging mahr (dower, a financial obligation payable to the wife) or nafaqeh (spousal maintenance) for conjugal enjoyment, their arguments are insufficient. Scriptural references to dower as a reward or price are metaphorical rather than literal, as marriage cannot be contracted using lease terms and grants the husband no ownership over the wife. Furthermore, dower is not a constitutive pillar of permanent marriage; the contract remains valid without specifying dower or when the dower is void, contractual rescission options do not apply to marriage itself, and dower is halved upon pre-consummation divorce, demonstrating that dower is a symbolic gift honoring the wife. Similarly, ḥaqq-e ḥabs (the wife's right of retention to withhold conjugal fulfillment until receiving full dower) does not prove bilateral exchange, as it belongs exclusively to the wife as an exceptional protective measure from early Islam. The devotional theory also fails because marriage validity does not require qaṣd-e qorbat (the intention of seeking divine proximity) and marriage exists across all societies, while the quasi-commutative view relies on an invalid tripartite contract division. Instead, marriage is a non-commutative contract grounded in partnership, where financial aspects are secondary to emotional and social dimensions. Unlike commutative views that foster individualistic self-interest, a partnership model promotes collective decision-making for family welfare. However, the Iranian legislator has pursued an inconsistent, hybrid approach: it adopts a non-commutative view by validating marriage without specified dower, enforces a commutative view by preserving the wife's right of retention despite the husband's proven insolvency under Supreme Court Unification of Precedent Decision No. 708, and undermines its mandate of spousal cooperation by granting the husband unilateral divorce rights and permission to take four permanent and unlimited temporary wives.
 ‌Conclusion: The Iranian legislator's hybrid policy in regulating marriage has weakened family foundations and discouraged youth from marrying by placing family members in opposition rather than cooperation. Notably, families demand heavy dowers as a defensive instrument to deter the husband from abusing his unilateral divorce and polygamy rights. Because disregarding the partnership-based nature of marriage drives current demographic and family crises, Iranian family law governing marriage formation, administration, and dissolution must be revised around a non-commutative, partnership-centered framework prioritizing mutual cooperation and collective family interest.