Context & Objective: Analyzing the structural relationship between šarṭ (contractual stipulation or condition) and ʿaqd (contract) represents a fundamental prerequisite for deducing the substantive legal rulings governing contractual conditions within Imami fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). The advanced development of these principles in Imami jurisprudence has significantly influenced contemporary legal frameworks; for instance, the Iranian Civil Code derives its general contract rules predominantly from French civil law, whereas its specific provisions on conditions are drawn directly from Imami jurisprudence. Practically, the doctrine of conditions holds paramount importance as contracting parties utilize stipulations to strategically manage agreements to their advantage. Despite various existing scholarly perspectives—such as categorizing the condition as a real component of the contract, an implicit or subjective part, a restriction on mutual consent, or viewing the contract merely as an independent container for the condition—the precise legal nexus remains contested. The primary objective is to critically examine the unique and highly influential theory proposed by the contemporary Imami jurist Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Khoei (1899–1992) regarding this relationship, outlining how his perspective systematically diverges from mainstream jurisprudential thought and applies across diverse legal transactions.
Method & Approach: The paper is conducted strictly utilizing the doctrinal method. This specific approach involves a systematic and analytical examination of established jurisprudential texts, foundational legal rules, and the underlying theories governing contractual obligations to precisely isolate, interpret, and subsequently critique the distinct conceptual framework established by Ayatollah Khoei regarding the structural intersection of contracts and their associated conditions.
Findings: Ayatollah Khoei posits that the relationship between a condition and a contract manifests in two distinct operational forms: first, the suspension of the principal contract upon the obligor's formal commitment to perform the condition; second, the suspension of the obligee's ultimate commitment to the contract upon the actual external realization of the condition. In a šarṭ-i fiʿl (condition of act, requiring a specific material or legal action) stipulated within a terminable contract such as a sale, standard customary perception incorporates both forms of suspension simultaneously. Conversely, when a šarṭ-i fiʿl is inserted into an inherently irrevocable contract like marriage, only the initial relationship applies. In the case of a šarṭ-i waṣf (condition of attribute, guaranteeing a specific quality of the subject matter), strictly the second relationship governs. Consequently, under this theoretical framework, a breach of an actionable condition grants the obligee the dual option to either terminate the underlying contract immediately or formally compel the obligor to perform the stipulation. Furthermore, this theory uniquely dictates that an impossible condition, an illegitimate condition, or a non-rational condition inherently remains valid; they do not void the underlying agreement but merely trigger a right of termination for the obligee if unfulfilled. Additionally, this framework renders the stipulation of a right of termination within an inherently permissible contract invalid.
Conclusion: While Ayatollah Khoei’s theory presents a cohesive approach to contractual conditions that yields significant legal implications for enforceability, breach, and the validity of otherwise problematic stipulations, it ultimately proves fundamentally unacceptable. The primary legal and doctrinal impediment to accepting this theory is that the overarching commitment to a finalized contract is dictated by immutable legal mandates. This binding commitment falls entirely outside the discretionary power of the contracting parties, meaning they lack the legal capacity to subjectively suspend their foundational commitment to an agreement upon external factors. Furthermore, from a practical and linguistic standpoint, the complex dual-suspension mechanism posited by Khoei—suspending either the contract itself or the commitment to the contract—directly contradicts standard ʿurf (custom or ordinary customary perception). The simplistic and direct mindset of ordinary individuals engaging in transactions does not conceptually perceive, intend, or construct such layered and intricate suspensions when establishing a standard condition within a contract. Therefore, the foundational premise of Khoei's theory contradicts both established mandatory legal principles and the customary reality of contract formation.