‌Context & Objective: Contracts transferring usufructuary rights frequently raise complex questions regarding the legal status of the underlying property when the original owner transfers its title. A prominent example in Islamic law is the contract of Soknā (the right of habitation), commonly utilized alongside ʿOmrā (a right of use restricted to the lifespan of the owner, user, or a third party) and Roqbā (a right of use established for a strictly specified duration). In Islamic Fiqh, Soknā grants the resident authority to derive benefit through habitation without transferring the property's physical corpus. Consequently, the owner retains the title and can execute legal transactions over the asset. Soknā occurs in three forms: a right restricted to a specified time, a right restricted to a lifespan, and an absolute right where no temporal boundary is designated. While selling a property encumbered by a time-specified Soknā faces no legal opposition, the life-restricted and absolute forms generate significant theoretical challenges.
 ‌Method & Approach: This research is conducted through a doctrinal method, relying entirely on library resources. It employs a descriptive and analytical approach to systematically evaluate the existing legal texts and jurisprudential literature relevant to the subject matter.
 ‌Findings: The evaluation of jurisprudential literature reveals three distinct perspectives regarding the sale of a property encumbered by a life-restricted Soknā: absolute validity, absolute nullity, and a distinction differentiating between selling to the current resident versus a third party. Scholars arguing for nullity assert the transaction constitutes Gharar (a prohibited contractual uncertainty or unacceptable risk). They contend a life-restricted right conceals the exact delivery time, creating an ignorance that invalidates the contract. Conversely, jurists advocating for validity dismiss these concerns, relying on specific traditions and arguing human lifespan operates within predictable customary limits. Regarding absolute Soknā, while a minority of jurists raise doubts due to potential Gharar, the vast majority maintain its definitive validity, despite disagreements over the supporting analytical framework. In Iranian civil law, transferring properties subject to usufructuary rights is recognized through general provisions. However, legal doctrine exhibits debates concerning the potential contagion of ignorance regarding the delivery time directly to the contractual consideration, which some argue could undermine the fundamental validity of the exchange.
 ‌Conclusion: Critical analysis demonstrates that concerning the life-restricted Soknā, the doctrine asserting absolute validity of the sale is legally justified. Although linking habitation to a lifespan introduces initial ignorance regarding the precise delivery moment, this duration inevitably concludes at a definitive terminal event. Because human lifespan falls within a predictable customary threshold, the strict definition of Gharar does not materialize to invalidate the transaction. Furthermore, concerning absolute Soknā, the prevailing consensus affirming its validity is structurally sound, although traditional justifications require refinement. The conventional analysis, positing the mere execution of an obligatory contract automatically nullifies the permissible contract of habitation, lacks a robust intentional basis. Instead, the validity of selling a property subject to an absolute Soknā is accurately sustained through the owner's overriding obligation to deliver the sold corpus. Because the owner must deliver the property to the buyer, revoking the permissible contract becomes a mandatory preliminary step. Consequently, concerns regarding the materialization of Gharar or the theoretical emergence of a termination right for a buyer ignorant of the absolute Soknā are deemed analytically unfounded.