امکان‌سنجی جواز «جعاله بر ترک فعل»

 ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
Juʿālah, understood traditionally as a unilateral contract for performing a specified act in exchange for remuneration, occupies a pivotal position in Islamic jurisprudence due to its general acceptance across various sects. Classical texts, however, present Juʿālah almost exclusively in scenarios involving positive acts—such as locating a lost item—leaving little explicit discussion of whether refraining from a specific act could also constitute a valid basis for this contract. Despite this focus on active performance, contemporary practice demonstrates an undeniable reality: in many situations, abstinence from certain actions is not only beneficial but often encouraged through tangible incentives. Examples abound in social customs and policies, where rewards or discounts are offered in exchange for refraining from overconsumption of resources like energy or water.
     Given these modern, practical manifestations, the question of whether a unilateral contract premised on refraining from an act aligns with the framework of Islamic jurisprudence takes on significant importance. This study contends that it is not inherently contradictory for Juʿālah to encompass such abstinence-based agreements, especially when rooted in rational objectives and prevailing customs.
‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
The primary question driving this study is: Is it permissible, from the standpoint of Islamic jurisprudence, to establish a unilateral contract (Juʿālah) whose subject is refraining from a specific act rather than performing a positive act? Subsidiary inquiries include whether prevailing juristic interpretations can be broadened to encompass abstinence-based obligations, and how such expansions might align with the spirit of Islamic law. Additionally, the research seeks to determine if customary legal practices that reward non-performance—such as incentivizing moderation or conservation—can be reconciled with traditional interpretations of Juʿālah.
‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
This study hypothesizes that Juʿālah contracts predicated on refraining from an act can be deemed valid and permissible within the overarching principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Although classical jurists predominantly reference positive acts in their foundational texts, the absence of explicit prohibitions against extending Juʿālah to abstention suggests that such an application may indeed be feasible. Furthermore, because modern societies routinely employ incentive structures to encourage responsible behavior—such as conserving resources, reducing waste, or maintaining public order—these contracts could logically be interpreted as aligned with the broader objectives of Sharia, particularly the preservation of wealth and public welfare.
‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
This research adopts a descriptive-analytical approach, bolstered by an inductive method. First, it systematically reviews classical jurisprudential sources across multiple Islamic schools (madhāhib) to establish the foundational contours of Juʿālah, focusing on how past scholars conceptualized performance-based obligations. Particular attention is paid to primary texts—Quranic exegeses, Prophetic traditions (aḥādīth), and jurisprudential treatises—to ascertain whether arguments for permissibility can be extended to cases involving abstention.
     Second, the study scrutinizes legal precedents and contemporary scholarly opinions that may support the broader interpretation of Juʿālah. For instance, documented cases of governments or private entities awarding financial incentives to individuals who refrain from certain detrimental practices—like smoking in public spaces or polluting the environment—are examined in the light of fiqh principles. This comparative angle enables an evaluation of how classical definitions might evolve to accommodate modern contractual realities.
     Lastly, the research framework employs customary practice (ʿurf) as a central analytical lens. Since Islamic jurisprudence often considers ʿurf in determining the scope and application of contractual forms, establishing the prevalence and acceptance of abstinence-based incentives within modern society becomes crucial.
‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The findings of this study highlight the nuanced nature of Juʿālah contracts in Islamic jurisprudence, particularly when the contract stipulates refraining from a certain action rather than performing a positive act. Initially, classical texts and juristic interpretations largely framed Juʿālah as involving a tangible deed—an act such as retrieving lost items or completing a specified task. However, the research reveals that this traditional focus on positive actions stems more from the examples provided by early scholars than from any explicit prohibition against abstinence-based obligations.
     A key result derived from analyzing primary sources is that several Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions utilize language broad enough to encompass contractual agreements where the desired outcome involves not doing something. While these texts do not always explicitly mention abstinence, their general permissibility clauses point to an inclusive understanding of Juʿālah. Additionally, narrations from the Ahl al-Bayt (PBUH) lend further support to the argument that a negative act (i.e., refraining from harm or misconduct) may be contractually rewarded in certain circumstances. This is particularly relevant in contemporary contexts where incentives—such as discounts for reduced consumption or financial rewards for abstaining from harmful behaviors—are widespread.
     Moreover, the study underscores the Sīrah ʿUqalāʾ (in the meaning of Custom of the Wise) as a critical interpretive tool. It demonstrates that many societies already utilize abstinence-based reward systems to prevent social and environmental harms. The alignment of Juʿālah with such customary practices strengthens the argument for its broader applicability. In practical terms, legal systems that encourage socially beneficial restraint—such as energy conservation or pollution reduction—can integrate these principles into valid, Sharia-compliant contractual frameworks.
‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
This research reaffirms that Juʿālah holds an important place among Islamic contractual forms, historically endorsed for tasks like finding lost items or completing physically measurable objectives. While classical jurists have primarily referenced examples of positive actions, the absence of any explicit prohibition against employing Juʿālah for refraining from an act suggests a broader scope than traditionally emphasized.
     Several crucial points emerge from this conclusion. First, certain Qur’anic verses, in a general sense, support the idea that Juʿālah may govern both active performance and conscious restraint. Second, narrations from the Prophet (PBUH) and the Ahl al-Bayt (PBUH) provide explicit indications of the validity of offering compensation for abstaining from specific behaviors. Third, reliance on the Sīrah ʿUqalāʾ unveils a longstanding custom in which incentives are strategically employed to deter harmful actions, further cementing the permissibility of this contractual application. Fourth, the widespread contemporary acceptance of agreements that reward abstinence—such as incentives for conserving water or electricity—highlights a customary practice (ʿurf) that aligns well with the underlying rationale of Juʿālah.
     Accordingly, the overarching purpose of Juʿālah—the attainment of a desired outcome—remains intact whether that outcome involves performing a beneficial act or refraining from a harmful one. As no fundamental Islamic principle precludes using negative acts as the subject matter of Juʿālah, the argument for permissibility stands on solid jurisprudential ground. This expanded understanding accommodates modern realities, where preventing negative outcomes is often as valuable as promoting positive actions. Hence, acknowledging Juʿālah in its broader form responds effectively to evolving social and economic contexts, thereby preserving the authenticity of this contractual institution within Islamic law.