«مراجعه به مردم» در فرض شکست قوه مقننه در وضع قانون دارای ضرورت

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
Legal systems maintain societal stability by enacting laws that reflect justice and fairness, thereby regulating interpersonal and institutional relationships. In many jurisdictions, legislatures or parliaments are charged with this core function, underscoring the centrality of legislation in governance. The legislature’s primary responsibility is not only to pass laws that address pressing societal issues but also to ensure the timeliness and effectiveness of such legislation. In practice, an assembly’s performance in this area directly influences perceptions of the broader political system’s efficiency.
     Within the Iranian legal framework, the legislature’s monopoly over lawmaking carries a dual responsibility: the power to enact legislation and the obligation to do so when public interest demands it. The duty to legislate aligns with the public’s right to an effective and responsive legislature—one that promptly addresses crucial legal voids and upholds citizens’ rights. However, if the legislative process becomes mired in political disagreements or conflicts of interest, essential bills may be stalled or neglected, leading to detrimental gaps in the legal system. Over time, such stalemates erode public trust in governance and may cause tangible harm to society.
     In the Iranian context, this problem emerges sharply where there is consensus on the necessity of enacting or amending specific laws, yet actual legislative progress is thwarted by divergent agendas. For instance, while Iran’s Constitution provides mechanisms for addressing emergencies, as outlined in Article 79, these measures are aimed at imposing necessary restrictions in crisis situations rather than offering solutions to fill legislative voids. Against this backdrop, the central inquiry is whether the public, either by referendum, through electoral channels, or by some other form of direct involvement, possesses a constitutionally recognized capacity to intervene and remedy legislative failure. Additionally, this article explores whether such intervention aligns with or departs from the existing principles of the Islamic Republic’s “semi-direct democracy” model, wherein ultimate sovereignty is attributed to God, yet practical governance relies on popular will.
‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
The principal question guiding this study is: To what extent, if any, can the Iranian populace, under the current constitutional framework, exercise direct legislative powers to address the legislature’s failure to enact essential and urgently needed laws? Subsidiary questions arise regarding the potential constitutional mechanisms—such as referenda, electoral processes, or newly proposed models like the “popular initiative”—that might enable citizens to break legislative deadlocks. In particular, the research examines whether the Supreme Leader’s authority to issue certain decrees provides a viable avenue for mitigating legislative inaction, and if so, how this authority intersects with the public’s right to a timely and effective legislative process. Ultimately, this investigation probes whether direct public participation is a permissible remedy or whether the existing constitutional architecture restricts such recourse.
‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
The working hypothesis of this research posits that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current constitutional framework does not fully allow for comprehensive direct public participation in legislative processes when the legislature fails to enact critical legislation. While the Constitution alludes to the role of the public’s vote and outlines certain instances for referenda, these provisions are circumscribed by extensive procedural prerequisites and political considerations. Consequently, actualizing the public’s right to timely legislation remains limited. Yet, the analysis further hypothesizes that, through interpretive expansion or amendments, the Constitution could be read or reformed to acknowledge a more robust participatory mechanism—such as a formal “popular initiative”—that would help resolve legislative deadlocks without unduly compromising constitutional principles. Simultaneously, the hypothesis recognizes that the Supreme Leader’s prerogatives, while broad, are primarily intended to address extraordinary circumstances and might not serve as a fully adequate replacement for democratic involvement in legislation.
‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
Methodologically, this article adopts a doctrinal research approach, drawing primarily on constitutional texts, legislative procedures, and scholarly commentaries within Iranian legal studies. The doctrinal analysis includes close examination of the Constitution’s relevant articles—most notably, those addressing the legislature’s obligations, the conditions for national referenda, and the Supreme Leader’s sphere of authority. Secondary sources, including interpretive judgments from Iran’s Guardian Council and judicial precedent, are employed to contextualize potential constitutional interpretations.
‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The findings of this study underscore the complex interplay between legislative inaction and constitutional mechanisms designed to preserve public welfare. The constitutional structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, characterized by a semi-direct democratic model, places the formal power of legislation in the hands of the legislature but also provides channels—albeit limited—for popular intervention, namely through electoral processes and referenda. An analysis of these mechanisms reveals that while they offer some recourse to address legislative inefficiency, their applicability and efficiency are constrained by procedural requirements, political will, and time-sensitive considerations.
     First, referenda emerge as a potential path for direct public engagement. In an ideal scenario where the legislature consistently fails to enact or amend an urgently needed law, a referendum can serve as a decisive measure, capturing the electorate’s stance on the necessity or specific content of the legislation in question. This direct approach has the advantage of bypassing legislative deadlocks by vesting decision-making power in the populace. However, the viability of this remedy is limited by both constitutional constraints and practical considerations: referenda are time-consuming, require specialized public understanding of complex legal matters, and may not be well-suited to crises needing immediate resolution. Moreover, the advisory nature of some referenda procedures can dilute their binding effect, thereby diminishing their role as a strong remedy for legislative impasse.
     Second, an alternative mechanism involves the structural design of the legislature. In bicameral systems, legislative impasses might be overcome through joint committees or repeated rounds of deliberation, and, in extreme cases, through dissolution of one or both chambers. In the Iranian unicameral context, however, such solutions do not seamlessly translate. While the idea of dissolving the legislature and holding new elections could, in theory, break a deadlock, it introduces political and practical uncertainties. Notably, the Supreme Leader’s constitutional power to call for a “political referendum” regarding the legislature’s dissolution constitutes a unique remedy, but deploying such a potent measure for issues of legislative inaction remains a matter of constitutional debate.
     Third, from a doctrinal standpoint, the Supreme Leader’s authority under Article 110 of the Constitution to address systemic crises provides another safety valve. This might entail directing the Expediency Discernment Council to formulate or adopt a legislative measure in urgent cases, thereby filling voids that threaten public welfare. Yet, this approach raises questions about balancing swift executive or supreme authority interventions with the principles of popular sovereignty and legislative autonomy.
     Finally, the discussion highlights that long-term solutions may require constitutional reforms to incorporate a “popular initiative” mechanism. Unlike referenda initiated from above, popular initiatives would grant citizens the right to propose legislation directly. If designed with sufficient procedural safeguards, such initiatives could ensure that critical public concerns are addressed promptly, without undermining established institutions.
‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
In conclusion, while theoretical avenues exist for the public to intervene in legislative failings—primarily through referenda or by relying on the Supreme Leader’s constitutional authority—these routes face significant practical and procedural hurdles. The semi-direct democratic system of Iran, as currently constituted, limits formal opportunities for citizens to initiate and shape legislation. This limitation is particularly evident when legislative stagnation arises from factors such as political disputes, time-consuming deliberations, or a lack of consensus among representatives.
     Referenda, although potentially decisive, often prove cumbersome in urgent situations, both because of the time needed to organize them and the specialized expertise required of the public. Likewise, dissolving the legislature to address every instance of inaction may be an extreme measure that destabilizes governance. The Supreme Leader’s authority to issue a decree under Article 110—mandating the Expediency Discernment Council to pass required legislation—can offer a swift solution, but it risks bypassing the representative framework and curtailing the legislature’s central role.
     The research thus concludes that while direct public engagement through referenda might theoretically resolve legislative deadlocks, its effectiveness is questionable given the constitutional and practical limitations. Above all, such recourse should remain a last resort; more fundamental reforms are needed if popular will is to be harnessed consistently and constructively. Introducing a legally recognized “popular initiative”—whereby citizens themselves could propose and vote on urgent legislative measures—would represent a forward-looking approach. It could bridge the gap between prolonged legislative deadlock and the immediate societal need for effective legal responses, ensuring that the broader principles of public interest and constitutional order are upheld.