درنگی در جایگاه اعتبارنامه نمایندگان مجلس در نظرات شورای نگهبان

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
The process of reviewing and validating the credentials of representatives is widely recognized as a core component of parliamentary oversight. By determining whether each elected candidate properly meets the legal and constitutional requirements for membership, legislative assemblies can uphold the integrity of the electoral process and ensure public trust. In many jurisdictions, the authority to oversee election validity is divided between specialized bodies, such as constitutional courts, and the parliament itself. For example, Germany’s legal system provides a bifurcated mechanism: a specialized committee within the Bundestag initially reviews electoral validity, while the Federal Constitutional Court adjudicates subsequent appeals. Through such a dual-track procedure, the scope of each body’s authority is precisely delineated, thereby promoting checks and balances in the electoral oversight process.
     In the Islamic Republic of Iran, however, the issue of how far the parliament can go in reviewing its own members’ credentials is intimately connected to the interpretative role of the Guardian Council. Article 99 of the Iranian Constitution vests the Guardian Council with the responsibility of supervising elections. This creates a dynamic relationship between the Guardian Council and the Islamic Consultative Assembly [Majles] in determining the legitimacy of electoral outcomes. Over various parliamentary terms, the Council’s interpretations have significantly impacted how the Majles reviews and approves its members’ credentials. Indeed, the extent of parliamentary review has fluctuated, reflecting the ongoing dialogue between legislative practice and constitutional oversight.
     Historically, the Persian Constitution of 1906 [Qānun-e Asāsi-ye Mashruteh] did not explicitly address the credentials validation of representatives. Nonetheless, in early parliamentary sessions following the announcement of election results, the elected candidates were only recognized as representatives once their credentials were officially reviewed and approved by the parliament. This process later found explicit mention in the 1909 internal regulations of the National Consultative Assembly, setting a precedent for parliamentary validation. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran offers a more direct nod to credential review in Article 93, stating that the Islamic Consultative Assembly does not possess legal legitimacy without the Guardian Council’s presence, except when approving representatives’ credentials and in the election of legal experts of the Guardian Council.
     Despite the apparent constitutional acknowledgement of the Majles’s role in verifying credentials, the specifics of this function have evolved over time through amendments to the internal regulations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, notably in 2000 and 2018. The Guardian Council’s position on these changes has not been entirely uniform; in some instances, it has upheld the parliamentary authority to validate credentials, while in other cases, it has contested certain procedural or substantive elements, suggesting a tension between constitutional interpretation and legislative practices.
     Against this backdrop, an essential inquiry emerges about the overall legal status and practical processes concerning the parliament’s role in validating its members’ credentials, given that the Guardian Council holds primary electoral oversight authority. This article seeks to delve into the matter by analyzing constitutional provisions, historical developments, internal assembly regulations, and the pivotal interplay with the Guardian Council’s opinions. 
‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
Drawing upon the above historical and constitutional context, this article aims to answer the core question:
     “What is the status of the credentials of the Islamic Consultative Assembly’s representatives in Iran’s legal system in light of the opinions of the Guardian Council?”
     This guiding inquiry underscores how constitutional mandates and interpretive practices intertwine to shape the scope and efficacy of parliament’s authority in credential validation. 
‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
In light of the documented evolution of internal parliamentary regulations and the explicit constitutional competence granted to the Guardian Council over electoral matters, the central hypothesis is that the Majles’s authority to validate representatives’ credentials is constitutionally recognized but is subject to a degree of Guardian Council oversight that may potentially restrict or redefine its scope. Consequently, the hypothesis posits that the Guardian Council’s interpretive stance—occasionally shifting in response to political and legal pressures—has led to inconsistencies in the practical application of parliament’s credential review authority. Thus, while the Majles is vested with certain powers to scrutinize and ratify representatives’ credentials, it is neither absolute nor free from external checks, particularly where the Guardian Council perceives a conflict with its constitutionally mandated supervisory role. 
‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
Methodologically, this research employs a doctrinal approach, scrutinizing constitutional text, statutory provisions (most notably the “Internal Regulations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly”), and scholarly commentaries to trace how the mandate of credential review is defined and practiced. Primary sources include the Iranian Constitution, official reports and debates from the drafting sessions of the Constitution, and subsequent interpretations issued by the Guardian Council. Secondary sources consist of academic commentaries, expert analyses, and historical records that illustrate the trajectory of the legal debate on credential validation. 
‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The findings of this study underscore the multifaceted interplay between the Islamic Consultative Assembly [Majles] and the Guardian Council in establishing and maintaining the validity of parliamentary credentials. Despite the Assembly’s explicit authority to oversee credential review, as set forth in its internal regulations, the Guardian Council’s constitutional mandate to supervise elections under Article 99 creates a dynamic where the Council’s interpretations can enhance or constrain the parliament’s role. In practice, the Council has issued numerous opinions that shape procedural nuances, sometimes aligning with parliamentary initiatives to expedite or formalize the validation process, while at other times criticizing or modifying legislative provisions. A key observation is that although the Guardian Council generally accepts the concept of parliamentary credential review, it often emphasizes adherence to foundational constitutional principles—particularly those relating to its own supervisory remit.
     Over time, these shifting interpretations have translated into varied degrees of practical impact on the Majles’s ability to uphold or reject elected representatives’ credentials. While earlier stances of the Guardian Council occasionally cast doubt on the Assembly’s power to decide independently on such matters, more recent pronouncements reveal a willingness to approve legislative measures designed to streamline credential review. Nevertheless, this flexibility does not imply a wholesale delegation of authority to the parliament. The Council continues to maintain that final oversight should remain consistent with constitutional guidelines and within its own interpretive framework. Hence, although the process can be prolonged or complicated by repeated reviews, the number of actual rejections or cancellations resulting from such scrutiny remains relatively small. By restricting overly broad delegation of the review process to a limited group of representatives and by distinguishing credential validation from broader electoral disputes, both the Assembly and the Council seek to preserve institutional checks and balances within Iran’s constitutional structure. 
‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
This research comprehensively examined the Guardian Council’s remarks concerning the credentials of representatives in the Islamic Consultative Assembly and reveals that the Council has not adopted a strictly uniform stance. On some occasions, it has reinforced the parliamentary process by endorsing modifications intended to clarify or expedite credential reviews; on other occasions, it has expressed concerns or objections regarding procedural measures that, in its view, might undermine constitutional principles. Significantly, these changing perspectives should not be deemed outright contradictions of Article 93 of the Constitution, which underscores the Assembly’s capacity to validate its members. Nevertheless, the Council’s evolving stance has resulted in minimal tangible effect on the rejection of credentials, as any revocation merely leads to the disqualification of the representative in question, whereas, until that point, all representative prerogatives remain intact.
     One of the core reasons behind this minimal practical effect is the mutual, albeit evolving, interpretation by the parliament and the Guardian Council of the procedures that govern credential approval. While the Guardian Council steadfastly insists on a formal vote in the plenary Assembly, it remains reluctant to extend this authority to smaller subsets of representatives. Moreover, although the Constitution and the election-related legal framework treat credentials as an issue separate from election validity, persistent attempts to conflate them—such as by linking the Assembly’s credential review to the candidate qualifications set out in electoral statutes—have surfaced in both the parliamentary regulations and the Guardian Council’s reflections. These efforts signal an ongoing pursuit of structured oversight, ultimately highlighting the intricate balance of powers that characterizes the Iranian constitutional order.