امکان‌سنجی استناد مستقل قضات به قانون اساسی در حقوق ایران

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
Constitutions form the foundational legal framework of nations, establishing the principles that govern state affairs and defining the relationship between the government and its citizens. Adherence to constitutional provisions is crucial for protecting individual freedoms, upholding human dignity, and promoting political and social justice. A key mechanism in enforcing constitutional supremacy is the judiciary's ability to invoke constitutional provisions when adjudicating cases, especially those involving violations of constitutional rights.
     Globally, the extent to which courts rely on the constitution varies. In the United States and countries influenced by its legal system, judges frequently base their decisions directly on constitutional provisions, reinforcing the doctrine of constitutional supremacy. In contrast, many European countries with centralized constitutional review systems contest the practice of ordinary judges independently invoking the constitution. This divergence highlights differing views on the judiciary's role in constitutional interpretation and enforcement.
     In Iran, which follows a centralized model of constitutional oversight, there is significant debate about whether judges can independently rely on the constitution as the sole basis for their rulings. This study explores this issue, examining the legal and constitutional grounds that may permit or prohibit judges in the Iranian legal system from basing their decisions solely on constitutional principles.
‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
The primary research question guiding this study is:
     Can judges in the Iranian legal system independently rely on the constitution as the sole and sufficient legal basis for their judicial decisions, rather than merely using it to reinforce their reasoning? Specifically, does the Iranian Constitution permit judges to issue rulings based solely on constitutional provisions without recourse to statutory laws?
‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
The study hypothesizes that under Article 166 of the Iranian Constitution, judges have the authority to independently base their rulings on constitutional principles. Article 166 stipulates that judicial verdicts must be well-reasoned and documented with reference to legal codes. The hypothesis asserts that constitutional provisions qualify as "legal codes" within the meaning of this article.
‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
To investigate the research question and test the hypothesis, this study employs a doctrinal legal research methodology, focusing on a critical analysis of constitutional texts, statutory laws, judicial practices, and scholarly interpretations within the Iranian legal system.
‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The analysis conducted in this study centers on whether judges in the Iranian legal system can independently rely on the constitution as the sole basis for their judicial decisions, particularly under Article 166 of the Iranian Constitution. The findings support the hypothesis that judges do possess this authority. This conclusion emerges from a critical examination of both the textual interpretation of constitutional provisions and the evaluation of counterarguments that challenge this authority.
     Firstly, the term "principles" in Article 166 is pivotal. The article mandates that judicial verdicts must be well-reasoned and documented with reference to "principles and laws." The term "principles" can be reasonably interpreted to include constitutional principles. This interpretation is bolstered by the textual analysis of the constitution, where the broad language suggests an inclusive approach to legal sources that judges may reference. Even if one were to interpret "principles" as general legal principles rather than specifically constitutional ones, the constitution's supreme status in the legal hierarchy inherently grants it precedence. Given that constitutional provisions are the highest form of legal norms, they naturally qualify as foundational principles upon which judicial decisions can be based.
     Counterarguments suggest that the constitution's general nature renders it inapplicable without specific legislative elaboration. Critics argue that judges should rely solely on statutory laws for detailed guidance, relegating the constitution to a supportive role in legal reasoning. However, this study finds this argument unpersuasive. The distinction between judicial reliance on the constitution and the implementation of its provisions is significant. Judges can interpret and apply constitutional principles to specific cases without overstepping their mandates, especially when statutory laws are silent, ambiguous, or in conflict with constitutional mandates.
     Moreover, concerns about infringing upon the Iranian Guardian Council's authority to interpret the constitution are addressed. The Guardian Council holds the power to provide definitive interpretations of constitutional provisions, which are binding and general in nature. However, the judiciary's reliance on the constitution in individual cases does not necessarily encroach upon this jurisdiction. Judges are tasked with applying the law to the facts before them, and in instances where the Guardian Council has not provided a specific interpretation, judges can and should turn to the constitution to guide their decisions. This practice ensures that constitutional rights and principles are actively upheld within the judiciary, rather than remaining theoretical ideals.
     The discussion also highlights that judicial reliance on the constitution enhances the protection of individual rights and reinforces the principle of constitutional supremacy. By allowing judges to base their decisions solely on constitutional provisions, the legal system ensures that all laws and regulations are consistently measured against the highest legal standards. This approach prevents the possibility of statutory laws undermining constitutional guarantees and promotes a more cohesive and just legal system.
‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
The term "principles" in Article 166 encompasses constitutional principles, affirming that judges can reference the constitution directly in their verdicts. Even if "principles" were interpreted to mean general legal principles, the constitution's superior status and specific provisions on various issues strengthen the case for its independent use in judicial decisions. The constitution, being a codified legal document, inherently permits judicial reliance unless explicitly excluded.
     Arguments suggesting that the constitution's general nature precludes its direct application are found to be unconvincing. Judicial reliance on the constitution is distinct from the legislative process of implementing its provisions. The absence of detailed legislation does not inhibit judges from applying constitutional principles to specific cases. Each constitutional provision addresses particular issues, often providing sufficient detail to guide judicial reasoning and uphold legislative intent.
     Furthermore, judges invoking the constitution do not infringe upon the Guardian Council's jurisdiction to interpret constitutional provisions. The Guardian Council provides general interpretations that are binding across all cases. However, judges retain the authority to apply these provisions to the cases before them, especially in situations where the Council has not addressed specific matters, or new evidence emerges that necessitates judicial consideration of constitutional principles.