Manifestations of Corrupt Interactions among Judicial Actors in Iran’s Criminal Justice System

Type : Research Article

Authors

1 PhD Student in Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.

2 Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

Context & Objective: Corrupt interactions among judicial actors within the criminal justice system can severely undermine the system's legitimacy in guaranteeing the implementation of justice and combating crime. Judicial corruption is recognized as one of the most destructive forms of institutional corruption, bearing direct consequences on citizens' rights, the legitimacy of the justice framework, and the stability of democratic structures. When the judicial apparatus, intended to ensure justice, becomes entangled in corrupt practices, it ceases its primary function and transforms into an impediment to justice. Such interactions often involve two or more individuals agreeing to violate legal procedures for mutual benefit, frequently remaining concealed due to the participants' self-interest and lack of reporting. In Iran, prevalent judicial corruption instances involve immoral communications and financial corruption based on explicit agreement. This research sought to meticulously investigate the corrupt interactions and relationships established between authorized officials and beneficiaries during criminal proceedings. The primary objective was to analyze the most significant manifestations of these interactions across various criminal procedural stages, articulate their diversity, and identify the specific legal authorities and existing laws that enable the formation of such environments.
Method & Approach: This study employed a qualitative research method focusing on the content analysis of documents and evidence. The documentary review included judicial and police rulings, discourse analysis of specific criminal justice officials, and content analysis of reports gathered from official domestic and foreign news agencies regarding publicized judicial corruption cases. Furthermore, the methodology incorporated deep, semi-structured interviews. The interview process continued until theoretical saturation was reached, involving a sample of 30 participants. Interviewees included 10 judicial authorities (judges, investigators, assistant prosecutors), 5 judicial enforcement officers, 10 bar association lawyers, and 5 judicial administrative staff. Interviews were conducted across various locations, including specialized complexes for government employees and economic crimes, and general prosecutor’s offices in Tehran and two provinces in the northwest of the country.
Findings: The findings demonstrated that the manifestation and nature of corrupt interactions vary significantly depending on the stage of the criminal process and the specific powers granted to the officials involved. In the preliminary investigation stage (prosecution), corrupt interactions largely focus on avoiding the formation of a criminal case, eliminating evidence of the crime, issuing disproportionate or lenient criminal guarantee orders, or closing the case entirely. Examples include the abuse of authority to decline case formation by providing non-objective information or through collusion with judicial enforcement officers to alter official reports or destroy evidence. Officials, particularly prosecutors, utilize broad discretion in determining the legal grounds for initiating prosecution. In the trial stage, interactions aim to improve the defendant’s standing relative to the preliminary phase, leading to the rejection of prosecution decisions or evidence. Specific goals include securing acquittal, altering criminal guarantee orders, or ensuring conviction results in a more favorable or lenient sentence. Judges, possessing extensive discretion in sentencing and interpretation, may, for instance, refuse to record unfavorable statements from witnesses or experts or reduce the classification of the crime in the final ruling following corrupt agreements.
Conclusion: The research confirms that the preliminary investigation and prosecution stage is the most vulnerable environment for widespread corrupt interactions, primarily due to the vast, unsupervised authority vested in officials regarding evidence collection and case trajectory. However, court judges maintain significant power to shift the legal status of the accused by conducting new investigations, rejecting previous evidence, or utilizing judicial mechanisms like commutation, conditional release, or suspended sentences to achieve corrupt outcomes. The analysis underscores that the legal provisions granting wide discretionary powers facilitate the conditions necessary for these interactions. Consequently, the findings emphasize the critical necessity of providing suitable accountability mechanisms within the context of legal authorities to curb judicial corruption and maintain the system's integrity.

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