The Right to Boycott Israel: From Normative Justification to Procedural Challenges in the United States and the European Union

‌Context & Objective: The concept of the right to boycott—defined as the refusal to engage in economic, cultural, or political relations with a particular entity—challenges prevailing assumptions that the private sphere is devoid of power dynamics. By politicizing individual and collective choices, boycotts serve as instruments of democratic expression and autonomy. Historically, boycotts have been used to influence state policies, including those supporting the Zionist regime. Yet, their normative legitimacy, particularly when directed at Israel, has provoked legal and political resistance in various jurisdictions. This article investigates the extent to which the right to boycott is recognized within the human rights framework and examines the procedural obstacles it encounters in the United States and the European Union. The research seeks to assess how Western legal systems interpret and respond to this form of political activism and to explore the broader implications for international solidarity movements and Palestinian rights advocacy.
Method & Approach: This study employs a doctrinal and case-based analytical methodology, drawing on legal theory, human rights instruments, and judicial decisions from both the U.S. and the EU. By synthesizing legal texts and court rulings, the research evaluates how the right to boycott is conceptualized and regulated. The approach includes a comparative analysis to highlight convergences and divergences in the legal treatment of boycotts across jurisdictions. Emphasis is placed on interpretive frameworks used by courts, legislative bodies, and administrative authorities when addressing the balance between political expression and state interests.
Findings: The analysis reveals that the right to boycott is grounded in several normative frameworks, including microeconomic theory, the responsibility to protect doctrine, the marketplace of ideas, and principles of self-governance. It intersects with fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, the right to petition, and personal autonomy. Despite these foundations, significant procedural challenges persist. In the European Union, while the right may enjoy legislative backing at the supranational level, member states often impose restrictive conditions. In the U.S., although the judiciary has occasionally recognized the boycott as a form of political expression, limitations arise from interpretations of the First Amendment, particularly when boycotts are not deemed “pure speech.” Other barriers include national security concerns, state sovereignty claims, and judicial classifications—such as France’s treatment of boycotts as incitement to hatred—that restrict the practical exercise of this right.
Conclusion: The study concludes that while the right to boycott can be normatively justified within liberal democratic and human rights traditions, its procedural enforcement remains fragmented and contested in Western legal systems. These legal inconsistencies hinder the global development of a unified stance on political boycotts and undermine the capacity of international civil society to mobilize against state aggression, particularly concerning the Palestinian struggle. Therefore, greater legal clarity and judicial consistency are necessary to safeguard this right and affirm its legitimacy as a tool of peaceful political resistance.