Formulation of the Effects of the Mora'a Contract in Islamic Law and the Iranian Legal Order

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
The concept of the Mora’a contract in Islamic jurisprudence centers on a scenario where all the substantive elements of a contract have been fulfilled, yet its continued enforceability remains uncertain due to a legal barrier. This barrier often stems from a third party’s right attached to the contract’s subject matter, such as the mortgagee’s interest in mortgaged property. Unlike an unenforceable contract—where a deficiency in substantive elements renders the agreement incomplete—a Mora’a contract is substantively valid but temporarily obstructed from taking full effect. Traditionally, Islamic jurists and legal scholars offer divergent views: some characterize Mora’a as a subset of unenforceable contracts, while others regard it as a distinct category on par with valid, void, or unenforceable agreements. This dichotomy has significant legal implications regarding the rights of third parties and the parties to the contract. By examining these distinctions, it becomes clear that Mora’a raises fundamental questions not just about classification but also about the temporal effects of contractual obligations and remedies in Islamic and Iranian legal systems. The present discussion aims to clarify these nuances and build a foundation for deeper analysis of how third-party interests intersect with the otherwise complete formation of a contract.
 
‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
This study addresses several interrelated questions pivotal to understanding the legal nature and ramifications of a Mora’a contract. First, does Mora’a qualify as an independent legal status wholly separate from the categories of valid, void, or unenforceable contracts? If not, is it more accurately viewed as a specialized form of unenforceability, or perhaps somewhere between validity and unenforceability? Second, assuming Mora’a is not entirely distinct, what are its principal effects while the third party’s right remains unresolved? In other words, does the contract exert any force between the original parties during the period of uncertainty, or is it deemed legally inert? Finally, the inquiry extends to the ultimate outcome of Mora’a once the third party’s right is asserted or extinguished.
 
‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
Building upon the debates in classical and contemporary sources, the hypothesis of this research contends that Mora’a neither constitutes a fully independent legal status nor strictly corresponds to traditional notions of unenforceability within Islamic and Iranian law. Rather, the Mora’a contract is posited as a status that shares certain structural similarities with unenforceable contracts but diverges in key respects. Specifically, while the contract maintains a semblance of validity in its essential components, its capacity to produce enforceable legal obligations is postponed until the third party’s claim is resolved.
 
‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
The methodological approach employed in this study is primarily inductive, progressing from a comprehensive survey of authoritative Islamic jurisprudential texts to an examination of statutory provisions and judicial interpretations in Iran. Initially, relevant legal sources—both classical treatises and modern commentaries—are evaluated to extract the theoretical underpinnings of Mora’a and identify its conceptual boundaries relative to validity and unenforceability. Following this doctrinal analysis, illustrative legal cases and judicial precedents are scrutinized to ascertain patterns in how courts have treated contracts burdened by third-party rights.
 
‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The exploration of the Mora’a contract in Islamic jurisprudence and Iranian legal practice reveals nuanced outcomes once a third party’s right is involved. Central to the discussion is the recognition that while all substantive elements of the contract may be properly satisfied, the presence of a legal barrier gives rise to a state of uncertainty. This uncertainty, though, does not imply that the contract is inherently void or unenforceable from its inception. Rather, it underscores a delicate legal equilibrium between respecting the autonomy of the contracting parties and safeguarding the legitimate interests of third parties.
     A prominent strand of scholarly opinion posits that Mora’a belongs to the category of unenforceable contracts. According to this perspective, the contract is formed subject to the condition that the third party’s right either persists or is eliminated. During this suspended period, the contract is seen as lacking immediate effect. Should the third party decide to exercise their right—by foreclosing on the mortgaged property, for instance—the contract would be retroactively void. Conversely, if the impediment dissolves through repayment or release, the contract is deemed valid ab initio, thus reverting to a fully enforceable agreement from its original date.
     However, a persuasive line of reasoning, supported by a close reading of classical jurisprudence and judicial precedents, indicates that a Mora’a contract constitutes a validly formed agreement at the outset. The mere presence of a third party’s right does not nullify the core components of offer, acceptance, and the requisite legal capacity of the parties; thus, the contract exists with full legal form. It is only when the third party affirmatively moves to enforce their right that the continuation of the contract would cause tangible harm to them. Islamic legal theory places significant emphasis on the no-harm principle [lā ḍarar], which provides a doctrinal basis for resolving such conflicts. Under this principle, once the third party chooses to assert their right—for example, by insisting on the sale of the mortgaged property to satisfy a debt—the contract that burdens the property is dissolved at that very moment to prevent detriment to the third party. No retroactive voidness is implied, because prior to the exercise of the right, there was no actual harm inflicted upon the third party’s interest.
     This finding has several critical implications. First, it harmonizes the rights of original contracting parties with those of the third party. By recognizing the contract as valid from its inception, parties can transact with some degree of commercial confidence, thus mitigating the risk of economic stagnation where assets are in limbo. Second, the model aligns with real-world contractual practice, where transactions involving encumbered property are not uncommon. The threat of a third party’s intervention remains a possibility, yet that alone does not negate the contract’s existence or prevent its beneficial use as long as no direct harm is inflicted on the third party’s rights. Third, this interpretation advocates an outcome that is both principled and practical: if the third party never exercises the right, the contract proceeds unhindered; if the third party does act, then the dissolution occurs only from the time of that exercise, ensuring that no undue penalty is imposed on the contracting parties for a period during which they did not infringe upon third-party interests.
     Judicial Precedents Nos. 810 and 832 of the General Board of the Supreme Court of Iran further reinforce this approach. These rulings confirm that a Mora’a contract is to be treated as valid in the interval prior to the third party’s enforcement of rights. The dissolution, when it occurs, is effective only from the date of the third party’s claim, thus preserving the contract’s validity and legal consequences in the interim. In doing so, the judiciary implicitly endorses an interpretation that values commercial efficacy and economic stability, while also ensuring that the rightful interests of the third party are adequately protected.
 
‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
The findings of this study converge on a single coherent theme: the Mora’a contract, though burdened by the shadow of a third party’s interest, should not be conflated with traditional concepts of unenforceability or positioned as an independent legal status equivalent to valid, void, or unenforceable categories. Rather, it emerges as a contract that is substantively complete and initially effective. The mere existence of a legal impediment—such as a mortgage—does not negate the contract’s validity from its outset. Instead, the impediment introduces a contingent risk: the possibility of dissolution if and when the third party enforces their right.
     Under this view, the dissolving event arises at the moment the third party asserts their real right. Until that time, the contract produces its ordinary legal effects among the contracting parties, fostering an environment that curtails the economic inefficiencies of immobilized assets. Likewise, the interpretative reliance on the no-harm principle [lā Zarar] underscores an equitable balance: while parties retain the benefits of their transaction, the third party’s prerogative to protect their interest is not diminished, only actualized should they opt to invoke it.
     By conceptualizing Mora’a in this manner, Islamic jurisprudence and the Iranian legal system incorporate a flexible mechanism that simultaneously acknowledges the legitimacy of the contractual relationship and safeguards third-party rights.