"Recourse to the People" in the Event of Legislative Failure to Enact Essential Laws: A Necessity in the Iranian Legal Order

Document Type : Research Article

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Department of Public and International Law, Faculty of Law, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran.

2 PhD Student in Public Law, Faculty of Law, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran.

Abstract

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
Legal systems play a crucial role in maintaining societal stability by enacting laws that embody principles of justice and fairness, thereby regulating interpersonal and institutional relationships. In many jurisdictions, this core function is entrusted to legislatures or parliaments, highlighting the importance of legislation in governance. The primary responsibility of the legislature is not only to pass laws that address pressing societal issues but also to ensure that such legislation is timely and effective. In practice, the performance of an assembly in this regard directly influences perceptions of the overall efficiency of the political system.
     In the Iranian legal framework, the legislature's monopoly on lawmaking entails a dual responsibility: the power to enact legislation and the obligation to do so in response to public interest. This duty aligns with the public's right to an effective and responsive legislature—one that promptly addresses critical legal gaps and safeguards citizens' rights. However, when the legislative process becomes bogged down by political disagreements or conflicts of interest, essential bills may be stalled or neglected, resulting in detrimental gaps within the legal system. Over time, such stalemates can erode public trust in governance and cause tangible harm to society.
     This issue is particularly pronounced in Iran, where there is often consensus on the need to enact or amend specific laws, yet actual legislative progress is hindered by divergent agendas. For example, while the Constitution of Iran provides mechanisms for addressing emergencies, as outlined in principle 79, these measures focus on imposing necessary restrictions during crises rather than offering solutions to legislative voids. In this context, a central question arises: does the public, through referendums, electoral channels, or other forms of direct involvement, possess a constitutionally recognized capacity to intervene and remedy legislative failures? Furthermore, this article explores whether such intervention aligns with or diverges from the existing principles of the Islamic Republic’s “semi-direct democracy” model, which attributes ultimate sovereignty to God while relying on popular will for practical governance.

‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
The principal question guiding this study is: To what extent, if any, can the Iranian populace, under the current constitutional framework, exercise direct legislative powers to address the legislature’s failure to enact essential and urgently needed laws? Subsidiary questions arise regarding potential constitutional mechanisms—such as referenda, electoral processes, or newly proposed models like the “popular initiative”—that might enable citizens to break legislative deadlocks. Specifically, the research examines whether the Supreme Leader’s authority to issue certain decrees provides a viable avenue for mitigating legislative inaction, and if so, how this authority intersects with the public’s right to a timely and effective legislative process. Ultimately, this investigation probes whether direct public participation is a permissible remedy or whether the existing constitutional architecture restricts such recourse.
 
‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
The working hypothesis of this research posits that the current constitutional framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran does not fully allow for comprehensive direct public participation in legislative processes when the legislature fails to enact critical legislation. While the Constitution acknowledges the role of the public’s vote and outlines specific instances for referenda, these provisions are limited by extensive procedural prerequisites and political considerations. Consequently, the realization of the public’s right to timely legislation remains constrained. However, the analysis further hypothesizes that, through interpretive expansion or amendments, the Constitution could be read or reformed to recognize a more robust participatory mechanism—such as a formal “popular initiative”—that would help resolve legislative deadlocks without unduly compromising constitutional principles. Simultaneously, the hypothesis recognizes that the Supreme Leader’s prerogatives, while broad, are primarily intended to address extraordinary circumstances and may not serve as a fully adequate substitute for democratic involvement in legislation.
 
‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
Methodologically, this paper adopts a doctrinal research approach, drawing primarily on constitutional texts, legislative procedures, and scholarly commentaries within Iranian legal studies. The doctrinal analysis includes a close examination of the Constitution’s relevant articles—particularly those addressing the legislature’s obligations, the conditions for national referenda, and the Supreme Leader’s sphere of authority. Secondary sources, including interpretive judgments from Iran’s Guardian Council and judicial precedents, are utilized to contextualize potential constitutional interpretations.
 
‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The findings of this study underscore the complex interplay between legislative inaction and constitutional mechanisms designed to preserve public welfare. The constitutional structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, characterized by a semi-direct democratic model, places formal legislative power in the hands of the legislature while also providing limited channels for popular intervention, namely through electoral processes and referenda. An analysis of these mechanisms reveals that, while they offer some recourse to address legislative inefficiency, their applicability and effectiveness are constrained by procedural requirements, political will, and time-sensitive considerations.
     First, referenda emerge as a potential path for direct public engagement. In an ideal scenario where the legislature consistently fails to enact or amend urgently needed laws, a referendum can serve as a decisive measure, capturing the electorate’s stance on the necessity or specific content of the legislation in question. This direct approach has the advantage of bypassing legislative deadlocks by vesting decision-making power in the populace. However, the viability of this remedy is limited by constitutional constraints and practical considerations: referenda are time-consuming, require specialized public understanding of complex legal matters, and may not be well-suited to crises needing immediate resolution. Moreover, the advisory nature of some referenda procedures can dilute their binding effect, diminishing their role as a strong remedy for legislative impasse.
     Second, an alternative mechanism involves the structural design of the legislature. In bicameral systems, legislative impasses might be overcome through joint committees or repeated rounds of deliberation, and, in extreme cases, through the dissolution of one or both chambers. In the Iranian unicameral context, however, such solutions do not seamlessly translate. While the idea of dissolving the legislature and holding new elections could, in theory, break a deadlock, it introduces political and practical uncertainties. Notably, the Supreme Leader’s constitutional power to call for a “political referendum” regarding the legislature’s dissolution constitutes a unique remedy, but deploying such a potent measure for issues of legislative inaction remains a matter of constitutional debate.
     Third, from a doctrinal standpoint, the Supreme Leader’s authority under Article 110 of the Constitution to address systemic crises provides another safety valve. This might entail directing the Expediency Discernment Council to formulate or adopt a legislative measure in urgent cases, thereby filling voids that threaten public welfare. Yet, this approach raises questions about balancing swift executive or supreme authority interventions with the principles of popular sovereignty and legislative autonomy.
     Finally, the discussion highlights that long-term solutions may require constitutional reforms to incorporate a “popular initiative” mechanism. Unlike referenda initiated from above, popular initiatives would grant citizens the right to propose legislation directly. If designed with sufficient procedural safeguards, such initiatives could ensure that critical public concerns are addressed promptly without undermining established institutions.

‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
In conclusion, while theoretical avenues exist for the public to intervene in legislative failings—primarily through referenda or by relying on the Supreme Leader’s constitutional authority—these routes face significant practical and procedural hurdles. The semi-direct democratic system of Iran, as currently constituted, limits formal opportunities for citizens to initiate and shape legislation. This limitation is particularly evident when legislative stagnation arises from factors such as political disputes, time-consuming deliberations, or a lack of consensus among representatives.
     Referenda, although potentially decisive, often prove cumbersome in urgent situations due to the time required for organization and the specialized expertise needed from the public. Similarly, dissolving the legislature to address every instance of inaction may be an extreme measure that destabilizes governance. The Supreme Leader’s authority to issue a decree under Article 110—mandating the Expediency Discernment Council to pass required legislation—can offer a swift solution, but it risks bypassing the representative framework and curtailing the legislature’s central role.
     Thus, this research concludes that while direct public engagement through referenda might theoretically resolve legislative deadlocks, its effectiveness is questionable given the constitutional and practical limitations. Above all, such recourse should remain a last resort; more fundamental reforms are needed to harness popular will consistently and constructively. Introducing a legally recognized “popular initiative”—whereby citizens could propose and vote on urgent legislative measures—would represent a forward-looking approach, bridging the gap between prolonged legislative deadlock and the immediate societal need for effective legal responses, thereby upholding the broader principles of public interest and constitutional order.

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Main Subjects


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