An Introduction to the Emergence and Classification of the Law of Obligations in the English Legal System: A Comparative Examination of Its Structure in Islamic Jurisprudence and the Iranian Legal System

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
The concept of obligations and their classification occupies a central position within legal theory, guiding the allocation of rights and duties among legal actors. Historically, in jurisdictions influenced by Romano-Germanic legal traditions, the notion of the “law of obligations” has long been recognized as a discrete and sophisticated domain of substantive law. From ancient Rome through the codifications of continental Europe, legal scholars endeavored to systematize obligations—primarily contractual and delictual—thereby offering a coherent framework through which courts could impose, interpret, and enforce obligations consistently. In contrast, the English common law tradition followed a markedly different historical trajectory. Emerging in the eleventh century, English common law was initially shaped by rigid procedural templates known as “forms of action.” Under these formalistic constraints, litigants had to mold their claims into predetermined procedural categories. This procedural rigidity effectively overshadowed the conceptual understanding of obligations themselves. Instead of theorizing the underlying legal relationships that gave rise to rights and duties, early English jurists focused on procedural mechanisms of enforcement. As a result, substantive notions of obligation remained obscured, buried beneath a myriad of procedural technicalities.
     It was not until the nineteenth century, with the abolition of the forms of action, that English law underwent what may be described as a renaissance, gradually recognizing and articulating the “law of obligations” as a substantive field. Legal scholars began to categorize obligations into broader substantive compartments, generally identifying three principal categories: obligations arising voluntarily (primarily contracts), those arising out of tortious wrongs, and those grounded in the principle of unjust enrichment (restitution). Despite these classifications, considerable debate persisted—and continues to persist—over whether English law should adopt a conceptual or contextual approach to the taxonomy of obligations. Conceptualists seek to root classification in theoretical principles and doctrinal coherence, while contextualists emphasize the fact-specific nature of disputes and the practical realities of adjudication.
     Turning to Islamic jurisprudence, and particularly the Shi'a jurisprudence, one finds a diverse range of perspectives on the sources and classification of obligations. Unlike European codifications that often address obligations systematically, Shi’a jurists did not originally designate a separate legal subdivision explicitly termed the “law of obligations.” Instead, obligations were scattered throughout various legal topics, with scholars identifying multiple sources—from bilateral agreements to unilateral undertakings—that generate enforceable duties. This pluralistic tradition, therefore, yields multiple classification models, ranging from relatively simple threefold schemes to complex typologies enumerating more than ten distinct categories of obligations.
     A similar scenario unfolds in Iranian law, which, though influenced by Islamic jurisprudence, also interacts with Western legal concepts. The Iranian Civil Code, largely modeled on the French Civil Code, does not explicitly enumerate sources of obligations, leaving much of their classification to the interpretive efforts of Iranian jurists and legal scholars. Drawing on French and Romanist traditions, these scholars have attempted to rationalize Iranian obligations law into conceptual frameworks that borrow from foreign models, while simultaneously reflecting Iran’s unique legal culture and religious heritage.
     This historical and theoretical backdrop reveals a subtle, often under-explored, relationship between Iranian law—steeped in Islamic jurisprudential thought—and the English law of obligations, which evolved from a procedural, form-driven tradition into a doctrinal field with its own sets of categories. It is against this comparative canvas that the present research sets its inquiry. On the one hand, Iranian legal scholars often presume that English law’s classification of obligations bears direct relevance to Iranian jurisprudence, pointing to a shared Roman heritage as evidence. On the other hand, the English approach, despite its relatively recent conceptual development, rests on assumptions about the origins and functions of obligations that may differ significantly from those in Islamic-influenced Iranian law.

‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
The central question guiding this inquiry is: To what extent does the classification and conceptualization of the law of obligations in the English legal system align with, or diverge from, the framework of obligations as understood and developed within Islamic jurisprudence and Iranian law? In other words, can the structure and rationale behind Iranian obligations—largely informed by Shi’a jurisprudential thought—be accurately described as congruent with the English classification of obligations, or does the relationship instead reflect only partial overlaps and historical coincidences rather than a meaningful conceptual similarity?

‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
This study operates under the hypothesis that the Iranian system of obligations, influenced by both Shi’a jurisprudence and civil law traditions, cannot be straightforwardly categorized as stemming from the English law of obligations framework. While both systems share certain overarching thematic elements—such as the significance of contractual undertakings, the recognition of non-contractual duties (akin to tort), and the role of unjust enrichment principles—their respective historical trajectories, doctrinal underpinnings, and methodological approaches to classification differ substantially. Hence, the research anticipates demonstrating that any correspondence between the English and Iranian frameworks is partial and contextual rather than a matter of direct derivation or conceptual uniformity.

‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
The research adopts a doctrinal methodology enriched by a critical comparative perspective. At its core, the doctrinal approach involves examining primary legal sources, commentaries, treatises, and judicial decisions to articulate the internal logic and classification structures of obligations within English, Islamic, and Iranian law. English legal sources—historical statutes, judicial opinions, and authoritative commentaries—will be scrutinized to trace the evolution of the law of obligations from its procedural origins to its conceptual maturity. Similarly, key Shi’a jurisprudential texts and Iranian legal scholarship will be analyzed to identify how obligations are defined, categorized, and rationalized in a context that draws heavily on religious principles and civil law models.
     Comparative methodology encourages a dialogue between legal systems, revealing how differences in religious, cultural, and historical contexts influence the emergence of particular classifications and their enduring doctrinal resonances. The framework for comparison will focus on three principal axes: (1) the historical development of obligations law, (2) the conceptual or contextual nature of obligations classification, and (3) the extent of influence exerted by Roman legal concepts, either directly or through intermediaries like the Napoleonic Code.

‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The results of this comparative inquiry highlight both the complexity and the nuanced interrelationships that arise when examining the law of obligations across distinct legal traditions. By situating English law of obligations within its historical and doctrinal evolution, the research demonstrates how the initial dominance of rigid procedural formulas—rooted in “forms of action” and procedural formalities—deferred substantive legal theorization for centuries. It was only after the nineteenth century, with the elimination of these procedural hurdles, that English legal thought shifted toward conceptualizing obligations as a coherent substantive field, ultimately coalescing around a threefold classification of contract, tort, and restitution (unjust enrichment). Over time, these principal categories encountered both refinement and contestation, with English jurists debating whether obligations should be classified through contextual or conceptual lenses. The “contextualists” grounded their taxonomy in observable social practices and integrated fields of activity, while “conceptualists” argued for a more doctrinal and principled structuring, centered on the internal logic of rights, duties, and remedies.
     When these insights are placed in dialogue with the Shi’a jurisprudential tradition and the Iranian legal framework, marked divergences and convergences emerge. Shi’a jurisprudence, rather than isolating a distinct branch formally termed the “law of obligations,” integrates obligations throughout various doctrinal spheres. This holistic but dispersed approach results in multiple taxonomies and classifications—some counting as few as three principal categories, others enumerating more than ten—reflecting both the depth and malleability of Islamic legal thought. Iranian law, influenced substantially by Shi’a jurisprudence and later Western codifications such as the French Civil Code, displays a similarly layered complexity. On the one hand, Iranian jurists have, over time, adopted theoretical constructs influenced by Roman-French legal taxonomies, particularly in recognizing contractual and non-contractual obligations. On the other hand, the Iranian Civil Code itself, while adopting a structure reminiscent of European civil codes, does not explicitly enumerate the “sources of obligations” or streamline non-contractual obligations into a single, coherent category. Instead, matters such as “destruction” [itlāf], “causation” [tasbīb], and concepts akin to unjust enrichment or quasi-delictual liability remain dispersed or codified separately under legislation like the Civil Liability Act of 1960, rather than consolidated within a single doctrinal category.
     This scattered approach stands in contrast to the more recent, conceptually refined English classification. While English law’s move to a tripartite structure of obligations—contract, tort, restitution—provided a conceptual template, attempts to identify a similar neatness in Iranian law remain elusive. Instead, Iranian classification often hinges on historically and religiously informed concepts, and the transposition of external frameworks (like the French or Romanist influences) can lead to incongruities. For example, where English law would place wrongful acts not amounting to breaches of contract under tort or restitution, Iranian law lacks a clearly demarcated “quasi-delict” category within its primary code and instead relies on separate enactments or inferred principles from jurisprudential traditions to address wrongful harms.
     The “partial overlap” revealed by this research is significant. At a broad structural level, both English and Iranian legal thought recognize the pivotal dichotomy between contractual and non-contractual obligations. Likewise, English restitutionary doctrines and certain Iranian remedies for unjust enrichment share conceptual resonances tracing back to Roman law. Yet these overlaps do not amount to a shared or uniform theoretical foundation. Within “contractual obligations,” for instance, the English emphasis on bilateral promises and bargained-for exchanges, enforced through a combination of common law tradition and equitable principles, does not entirely parallel the Iranian understanding, which is deeply informed by religiously sanctioned notions of promise, good faith, and the moral dimensions of agreements. Similarly, for “non-contractual” or extra-contractual obligations, the absence of a centralized category in Iranian law complicates direct analogy with English tort or unjust enrichment doctrines. The ultimate result is a comparative picture characterized by structural analogies but not a unidirectional borrowing or direct derivation of one system from the other.

‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
The examination of English and Iranian law of obligations through the prism of historical development, classification debates, and underlying jurisprudential influences leads to a central conclusion: The relationship between these two legal systems is not one of straightforward equivalence or direct lineage. Instead, the research reveals a “partial overlap” in their structures and sources of obligations, particularly regarding non-contractual obligations and the indirect Roman legal heritage discernible in both traditions. Nevertheless, the notion that the Iranian classification of obligations is derived from or directly modeled on English law cannot be sustained.
     In England, the collapse of procedural formalities in the nineteenth century allowed the substantive concept of the law of obligations to flourish. Over time, contract, tort, and restitution formed a tripartite framework that jurists and scholars continue to refine, debating whether to classify obligations according to conceptual logic or the contextual realities of human dealings. Iran, conversely, inherits a hybrid legal culture: deeply rooted in Shi’a jurisprudence—where obligations are not neatly compartmentalized—and influenced by Western civil law structures through the Iranian Civil Code and supplementary legislation. While the Iranian system acknowledges contractual and non-contractual obligations, it has not integrated these categories into a uniform, conceptually driven taxonomy akin to that found in contemporary English law.