Explaining the Scope of Validity of the Prima Facie Meaning of the Legislator's Words, Considering Superior Interpretative Elements in Civil and Criminal Law

Document Type : Research Article

Authors

1 PhD in Private Law, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.

2 Associate Professor, Department of Law, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.‌

3 Associate Professor, Department of Law, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.‌‌‌‌

4 Associate Professor, Department of Law, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.‌‌‌

Abstract

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
The interpretation of legal texts is a structured and regulated process essential for maintaining consistency with the legislator's intended purpose and preventing subjective interpretations. This process employs specific tools that serve as guiding principles for interpreters, ensuring that the application of the law aligns with its original objectives. Many of these interpretative tools are rooted in conventional understanding—trusted by rational individuals in communication and not opposed by foundational legal principles—and are shared between the disciplines of Uṣūl al-Fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence) and contemporary legal scholarship. Over time, additional tools have evolved within legal practice, such as the principle of interpreting laws in harmony with their underlying spirit.
     Linguistic principles are particularly critical in the interpretation of legal texts, as they aid in discerning the intent of the legislator. Central to these principles is the "Isalat al-Zohur" [Principle of Apparent Meaning], which posits that when a word or phrase holds multiple potential meanings, it should be interpreted according to the meaning favored among rational individuals. In jurisprudential terms, texts with such characteristics are referred to as "Zahir" [Prima Facie], while the preferred interpretation is termed "Zohur" [Apparent].
     This study focuses on situations where the legislative language is ambiguous or vague, and the apparent meaning does not sufficiently indicate the intended purpose. It explores the extent to which interpreters can consider superior interpretative elements—such as the spirit of the law, legislative intent, and rationality—to deviate from the prima facie meaning. The analysis extends to both civil and criminal law, examining whether distinctions exist between the two in terms of permissible interpretative strategies.

‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
The primary questions this study seeks to address are:
     In the context of legal interpretation where multiple meanings are possible, can interpreters legitimately consider the spirit of the law, legislative intent, and rationality as tools to deviate from the prima facie meaning of the legislator's words?
     If affirmative, does the permissible extent of such deviation differ between civil and criminal law?
     Specifically, within criminal law, what are the limitations imposed by interpretative principles on relying upon legislative intent to move beyond the prima facie meaning of the legislator’s language?

‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
The study hypothesizes that:
     Superior interpretative elements can and should be employed to move beyond the prima facie meaning of legislative texts when ambiguity or vagueness is present.
     The extent to which interpreters may rely on these elements varies between civil and criminal law due to the differing underlying principles and objectives of these legal domains.
     In civil law, there is greater flexibility to consider legislative intent and the spirit of the law to achieve equitable outcomes.
     In contrast, criminal law, governed by the principle of legality and the need for legal certainty, imposes stricter limitations on deviating from the text's prima facie meaning, thereby restricting the use of superior interpretative elements.

‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
This research adopts a doctrinal methodology complemented by a comparative approach. It involves a thorough analysis of legal texts, jurisprudential principles, and scholarly interpretations within both Islamic jurisprudence and contemporary legal systems. The study examines primary sources, including legislative texts, judicial decisions, and authoritative legal commentaries, to understand the application of the Principle of Apparent Meaning and its exceptions.
     The theoretical framework is built upon legal hermeneutics and the philosophy of law, focusing on the balance between textualism and purposivism in legal interpretation. By comparing civil and criminal law, the research highlights how different legal fields prioritize various interpretative tools based on their unique objectives and the values they seek to protect.

‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The study reveals that the interpretative possibilities for the meaning of a legal or jurisprudential text can be categorized into three distinct types: "Nass" (explicit), "Ijmal" (ambiguity), and "Zohur" (apparent meaning). When the text is explicit [Nass], its meaning is clear, leaving no room for alternative interpretations. In cases of ambiguity [Ijmal], multiple meanings exist without any taking precedence, requiring the interpreter to resolve the uncertainty. The primary focus of this study, however, is on texts where one meaning is favored over others [Zohur], and how to achieve a stable and definitive interpretation of this apparent meaning.
     Despite the legislator's efforts to draft clear and unambiguous laws, ambiguities inevitably arise due to the complexities of language and the evolving nature of societal contexts. These ambiguities necessitate that interpreters play an active role in resolving them. The study emphasizes that interpreters should not rely on personal or unstable prima facie interpretations but should instead seek out the stable apparent meaning that aligns with the legislator's true intent. This approach ensures that interpretations remain consistent with the purpose and spirit of the law.
     The spirit of the law, legislative intent, rationality, and established interpretative principles emerge as crucial tools in guiding interpreters toward stable apparent meanings. By considering these superior interpretative elements, interpreters can move beyond the prima facie meaning when it contradicts the legislator's true objectives. This process allows for a more nuanced understanding of the law that aligns with its intended purpose rather than a superficial reading of its text.
     In civil law, the flexibility to consider these interpretative tools is more pronounced. Interpreters are encouraged to conduct narrow interpretations that ensure alignment with the legislative purpose. By doing so, they can reach conclusions that reflect the legislator's true intent, promoting justice and equity within the legal system. The use of superior interpretative elements in civil law supports the dynamic application of legal principles to complex and evolving societal situations.
     Conversely, in criminal law, the study highlights a stricter approach due to the principles of legality and legal certainty. Expanding the scope of criminal liability based on personal or unstable prima facie interpretations is categorically forbidden. This prohibition is grounded in the need to protect individual rights and prevent unjust punishment for behaviors not explicitly prohibited by law. The principle of narrow interpretation in criminal law mandates that when there is a conflict between the spirit of the law and established interpretative principles, the latter must take precedence to uphold the rule of law and protect against arbitrary interpretations.
     An important exception in criminal law is identified in the context of leniency and moderation provisions. The principle of "interpretation in favor of the accused" allows interpreters to expand the scope of certain criminal provisions to benefit the defendant. By keeping in mind, the purpose behind leniency and mitigating provisions, interpreters can support the legislator's goal of providing relief, thereby enhancing the fairness and humanity of the criminal justice system.
     The study also underscores the need for civil and criminal laws to incorporate guidelines for structured interpretation based on legal logic. Such guidelines would address the critical need for consistent judicial interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. By establishing clear interpretative frameworks, the legal system can reduce judicial disparity and promote uniformity in rulings across courts.

‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
The findings of this study affirm that superior interpretative elements—such as the spirit of the law, legislative intent, rationality, and established principles—are essential in achieving stable and definitive interpretations of legal texts when ambiguities arise. In civil law, these tools provide interpreters with the flexibility to align their interpretations closely with the legislator's true intent, fostering equitable outcomes and reflecting the dynamic nature of societal needs.
     In criminal law, however, the application of these interpretative elements is more constrained to uphold the principles of legality and legal certainty. Except in cases involving leniency and moderation provisions, interpreters must adhere strictly to the established interpretative principles, avoiding any expansion of criminal liability beyond what is explicitly stated in the law. This approach safeguards individual rights and maintains the integrity of the legal system.
     The study concludes that incorporating structured interpretative guidelines into civil and criminal laws is imperative. Such guidelines would enhance consistency in judicial interpretations, reduce disparities across courts, and ensure that the application of the law remains faithful to its intended purpose. By embracing a methodological approach to legal interpretation, the legal system can better navigate the complexities of ambiguous language and evolving societal contexts.

Keywords

Main Subjects


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