Validation of Objective Interpretation based on the Apparent Meaning of the Text, Versus Subjective Interpretation Relying on Speculative Clues

Document Type : Research Article

Author

Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Law, Faculty of Judicial Law, University of Judicial Sciences and Administrative Services, Tehran. Iran.

Abstract

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
Interpretation, as explored in both legal and religious scholarship, is an intricate process of uncovering and clarifying intended meanings embedded within language. Broadly, interpretation seeks to bridge the gap between the literal expression and the intent of the speaker or legislator. In Islamic jurisprudence, particularly within Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence), interpretation is viewed as an act of unveiling meanings when ambiguity exists. Here, the act is not merely reading words but understanding the intentions behind them, especially when these intentions may not align with the apparent meaning of the text. In cases where the text’s meaning aligns with a clear, apparent interpretation, some scholars do not categorize this as interpretation in the technical sense, as no unveiling is necessary.
     Within the legal field, interpretation similarly seeks to ascertain the intent behind legislative language, especially when the wording is ambiguous, capable of multiple interpretations, or may appear contradictory when viewed in a broader legislative framework. In both Islamic and legal interpretative traditions, the challenge lies in balancing apparent textual meaning with underlying intent, especially when dealing with terms with specific, restrictive applications or general, unrestricted meanings.
     The study presented here is motivated by a central question: Can an objective, singular interpretation of a text be determined based solely on its apparent meaning, or does each individual inevitably interpret texts subjectively based on personal knowledge, context, and cognitive framework? The exploration of this question is critical for both legal and theological discourse, as it touches upon whether interpretation is an act that can yield consistent meanings or if it is inherently subjective, shaped by individual perspectives and backgrounds.

‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
The primary question guiding this study is: Is it possible to derive an objective interpretation from a text based solely on its apparent, literal meaning, or is interpretation an inherently subjective process influenced by personal knowledge and cognitive frameworks? This inquiry has significant implications, especially within legal and religious contexts where an objective, standardized interpretation may impact the uniformity and consistency of judgments and beliefs. The study aims to investigate whether objective interpretation — based on the apparent textual meaning — can be definitively distinguished from subjective interpretation, which relies on speculative clues and individual perception.

‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
The hypothesis underpinning this research is that the meaning implied by a term is stable and does not vary significantly across individual interpreters, provided that they apply a methodologically sound approach. This implies that interpretation, when grounded in objective, apparent meaning, can yield a consistent result, not subject to the individual interpreter’s biases or contextual influences. However, while recognizing that alternative interpretations can exist, the hypothesis asserts that reasonable individuals in a shared linguistic and cognitive context will generally converge on a common understanding of a text’s meaning, thereby upholding the purpose of language as a medium for reliable communication.

‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
This research employs a doctrinal approach, analyzing classical and contemporary interpretations in Islamic jurisprudence, and legal philosophy. By examining the works of scholars who have shaped the foundational principles of Islamic law and interpretation, as well as those who have contributed to modern legal philosophy, the study identifies established interpretive methods and their implications on objective versus subjective interpretation. Textual sources are scrutinized to understand how scholars have historically balanced apparent meanings with speculative or contextual clues, especially when textual ambiguity arises.
     The framework of this study integrates linguistic theory, hermeneutics, and principles from Islamic jurisprudence to analyze interpretative acts in a structured manner. Linguistic theory aids in understanding how language inherently conveys meaning and how terms serve as the primary vehicles for communication. Hermeneutics provides a lens through which the process of interpretation, especially in legal contexts, is examined as an act that must reconcile both literal and contextual meanings.

‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
This study reveals a strong preference among Uṣūl al-Fiqh scholars for relying on the apparent meaning of words [ẓuhūr al-lafẓ] as the foundation for interpreting a speaker’s intent. The primary results indicate that defining ẓuhūr based on the structural composition of words provides an objective standard, enabling consistent interpretation across different audiences. The structural approach, grounded in linguistic conventions, posits that words have intrinsic meanings tied to their form, offering a universal interpretive framework that minimizes individual biases or subjective inferences. Scholars favoring this approach argue that words, as vessels of meaning, establish a communicative contract between speaker and audience; hence, the apparent meaning should be prioritized to maintain the communicative purpose of language.
     The results further highlight a divergence in scholarly views regarding the alternative approach that defines ẓuhūr based on the cognitive state it induces in the audience. This subjective approach accounts for extratextual factors and personal cognitive responses, suggesting that interpretation could vary among audiences based on their individual knowledge, experiences, and perceptions. While this method embraces a holistic understanding of communication, it also introduces challenges related to consistency and reliability. Relying on the cognitive state can lead to subjective interpretations, where each individual may arrive at different meanings influenced by personal context, thus potentially undermining the objective function of language as a tool for shared understanding.
     The discussion focuses on the advantages and limitations of each approach. The structural approach has the advantage of being objective and universally applicable, which promotes a standardized understanding of the speaker’s intent. However, it may fall short in scenarios where additional contextual factors are crucial for understanding nuanced meanings or culturally specific references. On the other hand, the cognitive state approach allows for a nuanced interpretation by incorporating context and intention beyond the apparent meaning, but its reliance on individual perspectives creates variability, making it challenging to establish a consistent interpretative outcome across different audiences. This approach can obscure the original communicative intent by allowing the interpreter’s context to overshadow the primary meaning embedded within the text.
     Furthermore, the study discusses the implications of each approach in legal and theological contexts. In legal interpretation, an objective approach based on the structure of language is generally favored, as it upholds the principle of fairness by providing a clear, uniform basis for understanding laws. This method enables courts to apply the law consistently, avoiding arbitrary judgments influenced by individual perspectives. In theological interpretation, particularly within Quranic studies, the structural approach also aligns with the goal of transmitting God’s intended message as accurately as possible. However, the cognitive approach remains relevant in cases requiring a more comprehensive understanding of complex or ambiguous texts, where contextual clues may provide insights beyond the apparent meaning.

‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
This study supports the argument that the apparent meaning of a word, grounded in its structural composition, provides a reliable foundation for interpreting a speaker's intent. This conclusion aligns with the view in Uṣūl al-Fiqh that the objective nature of word structure allows for a consistent transmission of meaning across different audiences, fulfilling the communicative purpose of language. The structural approach, or the concept of ẓuhūr based on linguistic form, is thus seen as superior to the cognitive state approach, which relies on subjective interpretation influenced by personal context and experience.
     This research highlights the limitations of relying on cognitive state as the basis for ẓuhūr, noting that it introduces unnecessary subjectivity that can obscure the original intent behind the text. By emphasizing the objectivity of word structure and its inherent meaning, the study suggests that apparent meanings are inherently aligned with the speaker’s intended meaning, as long as no explicit indication exists to contradict this. The structural approach promotes an objective standard that avoids the variability introduced by personal interpretation, ensuring that language functions effectively as a medium for conveying shared meaning.

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