Scope and Legal Obligations of Financial Audit by the Supreme Audit Court of Iran in Light of the Opinions of the Guardian Council

Document Type : Research Article

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Judicial Law, University of Judicial Sciences and Administrative Services, Tehran. Iran.

2 LLM in Public Law, Faculty of Law, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran.

Abstract

 ∴ Introduction ∴ 
The financial framework of a nation plays a crucial role in its overall health, akin to the function of a circulatory system in a living organism. An effective financial structure is essential for achieving the lofty goals set by a legal system. Central to this effectiveness is the systematic supervision of the annual budget execution, a responsibility primarily vested in the legislative branch. However, this oversight requires a dedicated entity to scrutinize actions, align them with plans, rectify deviations, and prevent potential financial misconduct. In Iran, this responsibility is bestowed upon the supreme audit court, as stipulated in articles 54 and 55 of the constitution. The court's duty, according to article 55, encompasses auditing and reviewing all accounts of budgetary entities nationwide, ensuring adherence to approved funds and proper fund utilization, and preparing and submitting the budget's fate report to the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Given the passage of time since the court's establishment and legal developments, a reevaluation of its scope and obligations, especially in light of the opinions of the Guardian Council, is imperative.
 ∴ Research Question ∴ 
The primary inquiry of this research centers on the "legal analysis and examination of the jurisdictional scope of financial oversight by the Supreme Audit Court of Iran and the obligations imposed by the opinions of the Guardian Council." This research aims to shed light on the limits outlined for financial oversight by the court after considering the opinions of the Guardian Council. Specifically, it seeks to discern what restrictions are set to prevent unauthorized transgressions in the court's oversight role.
 ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ 
The authors posit that the Guardian Council, entrusted with safeguarding Islamic principles and constitutional provisions, may narrow the scope and obligations of the Supreme Audit Court in its opinions. This potential narrowing, driven by the Guardian Council's commitment to Islamic law and constitutional principles, could pose a risk to the oversight competence of the court. The hypothesis suggests that the opinions of the Guardian Council might set stringent parameters, potentially limiting the effectiveness of the Supreme Audit Court in fulfilling its financial supervision responsibilities.
 ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ 
To test the hypothesis and address the research question, a critical analytical method will be employed. The research will comprehensively study and analyze the opinions of the Guardian Council, particularly focusing on their implications for the jurisdiction and obligations of the Supreme Audit Court. The critical analysis will involve evaluating the Guardian Council's opinions in comparison to the constitutional mandates outlined in articles 54 and 55. Additionally, the study will scrutinize the potential risks and challenges posed by any perceived narrowing of the court's oversight scope.
     This comprehensive approach, examining the legal scope and obligations of financial auditing by the Supreme Audit Court through the lens of the Guardian Council's opinions, distinguishes this research as innovative and pioneering in its field. The aim is to provide nuanced insights into the intricate balance between the legal mandates, Islamic principles, and constitutional obligations shaping financial oversight in the Iranian legal system.
 ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ 
The comprehensive supervision conducted by the Iranian Supreme Audit Court aligns with the emphasized responsibilities of the Guardian Council in supervising parliamentary decisions. The court's duty to audit all budget allocations returning to the national budget is evident. However, the interpretative opinion of the Guardian Council, as outlined in article 55 of the Iranian constitution, imposes limitations on the Supreme Audit Court's authority. The council's stance restricts the court's auditing scope to allocations specified in the national budget, excluding matters beyond this purview. This restrictive interpretation, advocating for all-encompassing oversight, appears inconsistent with some ordinary laws. 
     Establishing a coherent and independent supervision mechanism for non-budgetary financial transactions or developing internal oversight structures within the organization emerges as potential solutions to enhance supervision and auditing effectiveness. The need for a balance between the court's oversight authority and the explicitness of the Guardian Council's opinion becomes apparent in ensuring comprehensive financial scrutiny without unnecessary constraints.
 ∴ Conclusion ∴ 
In conclusion, while the Guardian Council's interpretative opinion appears overly restrictive, it serves to maintain the clarity and specificity of the Supreme Audit Court's oversight authority. The council's stance, rooted in a desire for an idealistic interpretation of the constitution, underscores the necessity of the court's supervision over all financial matters of budgetary entities. However, its explicit limitations prevent unintended extensions of the Court's authority.
     Specific obligations further shape the oversight and auditing scope of the Supreme Audit Court. The accurate disclosure of expenses and allocations in the budget document remains paramount, provided it aligns with the institution's authority and financial independence. Prohibitions on delegating unrelated authorities, emphasis on utilizing private auditors and approved budgetary capacities, and the exclusivity of the court in performing its duties under article 55 all contribute to defining the Court's responsibilities.
     Moving forward, a delicate balance between upholding constitutional principles, meeting the Guardian Council's expectations, and ensuring the effectiveness of financial oversight is crucial. Adapting to evolving legal landscapes and interpreting regulations in alignment with the Guardian Council's opinions will be key in preserving the integrity and purposefulness of the Supreme Audit Court's role in safeguarding the financial health of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Keywords

Main Subjects


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