An Exploration of Theoretical Foundations and Practical Procedures Constraining the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Audit Court of Iran

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
The modern democratic framework is underpinned by the concept of representation, particularly within the realm of public finance. Central to this concept is the principle that any imposition of taxation must be sanctioned by the representatives of the people, establishing a foundation for governmental accountability in financial and budgetary matters to the parliament. The role of parliamentary oversight, executed by supervisory organizations like the "National Supreme Audit Institutions," is pivotal in ensuring transparency and adherence to financial regulations. This study aims to unravel the intricate relationship between the theoretical foundations and practical procedures that delineate the jurisdiction of the Iranian Supreme Audit Court of Iran, tracing its historical origins and examining its evolution through legislative procedures.
‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
This research endeavors to address a fundamental question: what are the challenges and requirements constraining the Supreme Audit Court's oversight of the government's financial performance in the current legal system of Iran? By scrutinizing the legal constraints imposed on the court since the Iranian Constitutional Revolution [Asr-e-Mashrooteh] and exploring their impact on the Court's goals post the Islamic Revolution, this study seeks to uncover the nuanced dynamics shaping the institution's jurisdiction.
‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
The research is grounded in the hypothesis that misunderstandings inherited from the Constitutional Era regarding the functions and duties of the Supreme Audit Court, coupled with the post-revolutionary Constitutional Council's inability to rectify these misconceptions, have resulted in the exclusion of a significant portion of public treasury resources from the Court's oversight. This exclusion has relegated financial supervision to the considerations of the national budget. The overarching hypothesis posits that a comprehensive oversight role for the Supreme Audit Court over the entire public treasury is an imperative that has been neglected.
‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
The methodology employed in this research is primarily descriptive-analytical. Drawing on extensive library documents, legal texts, and scientific and legal procedures, the study meticulously examines the evolution of the Supreme Audit Court's jurisdiction from its establishment to the present. A thorough exploration of legislative procedures, both constitional and ordinary, is undertaken to unravel ambiguities and challenges in depicting the relationship between the Court's goals and the obligation of audited institutions. The framework of analysis is rooted in the examination of intellectual-legal backgrounds, with a focus on understanding the theoretical foundations and practical procedures that have shaped the court's jurisdiction.
     The study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the challenges and limitations faced by the Supreme Audit Court in its financial oversight activities. Notably, it seeks to identify essential requirements governing the court's jurisdiction and evaluate the impact of historical legal constraints on its ability to achieve the lofty goals envisioned by the framers of the Persian Constitutional Amendment of 1907 and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
     We will delve into the detailed results and discussions of the research findings, followed by a conclusive synthesis of the identified challenges and potential avenues for reform within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Audit Court of Iran.
‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The historical trajectory of the Supreme Audit Court of Iran reveals a complex evolution marked by significant jurisdictional fluctuations. Established under the principles (101) and (103) of the Persian Constitutional Amendment of 1907, the Court initially operated under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. However, the lack of expertise among its founders, coupled with inadequate awareness and the influence of translated texts and Western models, resulted in inefficiencies. Notably, the Court's supervisory position over the government's financial affairs was transferred to the internal auditor of the executive branch in the 1352 SH amendments to the Audit Court Law. The inefficiencies persisted due to the absence of systematic accountability and regular financial management responsiveness by the political-administrative currents of the time.
     Post the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1357 SH, the Court's fundamental role as the guardian of the public treasury was preserved within the Islamic framework. However, deficiencies in the regulatory text of Article (55) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran hindered the complete establishment of the Court's role. Challenges emerged, including the interpretative theory of the Guardian Council, leading to the exclusion of a significant portion of the public treasury's financial resources from the Court's oversight.
     Despite interpretative theories, it is argued that the term "approved credits" mentioned in Article (55) may be confined to the overall national budget, but limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Audit Court in addressing these matters is deemed unacceptable. This potential limitation not only casts doubt on the legal functions of the Court but fundamentally challenges its legal personality in safeguarding the public treasury. The conflict between constitutional principles and provisions of current Audit Court laws raises substantial concerns regarding the Court's ability to fulfill its supervisory role effectively.
‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
The journey of the Supreme Audit Court of Iran reflects the intricate interplay between historical developments, constitutional principles, and evolving legislative frameworks. While the Court's establishment aimed to be an independent and comprehensive supervisor of the country's income and expenditure, its early inefficiencies, rooted in a lack of expertise and awareness, led to jurisdictional adjustments over time. The post-revolution preservation of the Court's role as the guardian of the public treasury encountered challenges due to deficiencies in the constitutional text.
     The research underscores the need for clarity and precision in delineating the foundations and limits of the audit jurisdiction of the Supreme Audit Court. The recommendation is put forth that Article (55) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran be revised, transferring these matters to ordinary law. This move, it is argued, will enable a more specialized, detailed, and non-constitutional approach to defining the Court's audit jurisdiction. Such a step is imperative to address the identified challenges, ensuring the Court can effectively fulfill its role as a vital safeguard of the public treasury within the evolving legal landscape of Iran.