Clarifying the Utilization of "Legal Principles" for Preservation of Legal System Integrity, against Utilization of "Literal Principles" for Discovering Legislators’ Intention

Document Type : Research Article

Author

Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Law, Faculty of Judicial Law, University of Judicial Sciences and Administrative Services, Tehran. Iran.

Abstract

‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌
In the realm of legal interpretation, the application of "literal principles" has long been considered a cornerstone for deciphering the intentions behind legal texts. These principles serve as tools to uncover the intended meaning of the speaker or writer, particularly in cases where the text carries legal ramifications. However, the efficacy of literal principles comes under scrutiny when texts are composed by multiple individuals with varying intentions. This complexity is especially pronounced in legislative texts and contracts, where the confluence of different wills complicates the attribution of meaning solely through literal interpretation. Moreover, the imposition of "legal principles" concerning justice and fairness can further complicate the application of literal principles in legislative contexts, potentially hindering their efficacy. This article delves into the nuanced interplay between literal and legal principles in legal interpretation, aiming to elucidate the challenges posed by multiple intentions in textual composition and the implications for maintaining the integrity of legal systems.
‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌
The main question of this paper is how do literal principles of interpretation fare in discerning legislative intent when confronted with texts shaped by multiple intentions, and how do legal principles intersect with and potentially impede the application of literal principles?
‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌
We hypothesize that the efficacy of literal principles in uncovering legislative intent diminishes when texts are composed by multiple individuals, each with divergent intentions. Additionally, we posit that the imposition of legal principles, particularly those pertaining to justice and fairness, may serve as barriers to the application of literal principles in legislative interpretation.
‌ ∴ Methodology & Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌
The methodology employed in this study utilizes a doctrinal approach, focusing on the works of Islamic jurists and legal scholars to critically analyze their perspectives on the interplay between literal and legal principles in legal interpretation. Through a comparative examination of diverse opinions within the legal discourse, we aim to elucidate the complexities inherent in attributing meaning to legislative texts and navigating the tensions between literal and legal principles. This analysis is framed within the context of both parliamentary laws and contract interpretation, offering insights into the practical implications of the theoretical discussion on legal interpretation.
‌ ∴ Results & Discussion ∴ ‌
The examination of literal principles in the context of legal interpretation unveils several key findings and prompts nuanced discussions. Firstly, the pillars upon which literal principles rest—namely, the principle of non-precedent [Asl-e Adam-e Gharineh], doctrine of ordinary meaning [Asalat al-Zuhoor], and doctrine of literal meaning [Asalat al-Haghighah]—underscore the normative nature of these tools. While literal principles are instrumental in attributing semantic meaning to speakers, their efficacy is contingent upon the existence of an intended meaning and doubts surrounding it. However, in scenarios involving texts shaped by multiple intentions, such as contractual agreements and legislative enactments, the presumption of a unified intention underlying the text becomes tenuous. This challenges the applicability of literal principles in uncovering legislative intent, as the integrity of the legal system takes precedence over individual intentions.
     The interplay between literal and legal principles further complicates the landscape of legal interpretation. While literal principles aim to discern the speaker's intention, legal principles—rooted in justice, fairness, and the overarching integrity of the legal system—may impose constraints on the application of literal interpretation. Particularly in the realm of parliamentary laws, where texts embody the collective will of multiple representatives, safeguarding the integrity of the legal system necessitates prioritizing legal principles over the pursuit of individual intentions. Thus, the application of literal principles must be tempered by the overarching framework of legal principles to ensure coherence and fidelity to the underlying ethos of the legal system.
     Moreover, the tension between literal and legal principles underscores the dynamic nature of legal interpretation, which requires a delicate balance between textual fidelity and contextual considerations. While literal principles offer a structured approach to uncovering meaning, their limitations become apparent in contexts characterized by multifaceted intentions and divergent interpretations. In such scenarios, a holistic approach that integrates both literal and legal principles emerges as imperative to navigate the complexities of legal interpretation and uphold the integrity of the legal system.
‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌
In conclusion, the examination of literal and legal principles in legal interpretation elucidates the intricate dynamics at play in attributing meaning to legal texts. While literal principles serve as valuable tools for discerning the speaker's intention, their efficacy is contingent upon the existence of a unified intention underlying the text. In cases involving texts shaped by multiple intentions, such as legislative enactments and contractual agreements, the applicability of literal principles becomes fraught with challenges. Moreover, the imposition of legal principles, rooted in the overarching integrity of the legal system, may constrain the application of literal interpretation. Consequently, a nuanced approach that balances literal and legal principles is essential to navigate the complexities of legal interpretation and safeguard the integrity of the legal system. By integrating both approaches, legal interpreters can uphold coherence and fidelity to the underlying ethos of the legal system, ensuring equitable outcomes and fostering trust in the administration of justice.

Keywords

Main Subjects


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