‌Context & Objective: In recent decades, numerous legal systems have encountered the inflation of criminal law, defined as the exponential proliferation of statutes, expanded criminalization, and unprecedented growth in prison populations. This shift indicates that criminal law frequently functions as a mechanism of power to maintain social order and manage marginalized populations. The primary objective of this research is to trace the philosophical roots of this phenomenon within the epistemic and ethical frameworks of modernity. The central research question investigates whether the inflation of criminal law constitutes an unintended policy-making error, or if it represents an inevitable outcome of modern rationality. Specifically, the study explores how the two dominant currents of modern Western moral philosophy—retributivism, derived from Kantian deontology, and utilitarianism, rooted in Benthamite consequentialism—have practically facilitated the unbridled expansion of penal interventions.
 ‌Method & Approach: The research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology, utilizing a library and documentary approach for data collection. Disciplinarily situated within the philosophy of law, with a specific focus on the philosophy of punishment, the study adopts an interdisciplinary framework. It integrates concepts and empirical data from penal sociology and critical criminology to address the multifaceted nature of penal inflation. The level of analysis focuses on philosophical root-tracing rather than purely empirical sociology or abstract ethical theorization, striving to link philosophical argumentation with institutional and historical evidence. The analytical framework is structured across three layers: describing the concrete manifestations of penal inflation, reconstructing the intra-discursive arguments of retributivism and utilitarianism, and analyzing the relationship between these philosophical traditions and their institutional applications within the modern state.
 ‌Findings: The inflation of criminal law materializes across three interconnected institutional levels: economic, racial, and technological. Economically, it manifests as a transition from a welfare state to a carceral state, where public resources are diverted from social support to penal infrastructure, effectively criminalizing poverty. Racially, the phenomenon reproduces structural discrimination, functioning as a continuous institutional bias from initial policing to sentencing, disproportionately impacting minority groups. Technologically, penal inflation transcends the physical boundaries of the prison through the pervasive expansion of digital surveillance, electronic monitoring, and predictive algorithms. Philosophically, these manifestations are rooted in the fundamental dichotomies of modern ethics. Kantian retributivism emphasizes the absolute duty and intrinsic necessity of punishment. When transposed into the modern state apparatus, the concept of autonomy is reduced to absolute penal responsibility, providing legitimacy for stringent penal enforcement in the name of respecting free will. Conversely, Benthamite utilitarianism, operating on the logic of maximizing collective utility and employing law as an instrument of social engineering, justifies the continuous expansion of preventative control mechanisms under the guise of efficiency.
 ‌Conclusion: Criminal law inflation is not a transient legislative error, but rather the concrete manifestation of the internal paradox of modernity. This paradox is situated in the perpetual tension between freedom and control, autonomy and social engineering, and deontological duty and utilitarian consequentialism. The modern state simultaneously enacts punitive strictness in the name of individual freedom and expands pervasive surveillance networks in the name of collective security. Consequently, retributivism and utilitarianism function as a structural duality that mutually reinforces the expansion of the penal apparatus. A fundamental critique of penal inflation cannot be reduced to technical policy reforms; it necessitates a profound reexamination of the epistemic foundations of modern ethics and the institutional mechanisms of the contemporary state, requiring a redefinition of human freedom beyond the inherent crises of modern rationality.