‌Context & Objective: Legal systems validate contracts based on their foundational understanding of contractual agreements. In Iranian civil law, the legal validity and exact status of the conditional contract (ʿaqd-i muʿallaq, an agreement where the legal effect is contingent upon the occurrence of a future event) remain explicitly unaddressed and subject to enduring doctrinal disputes among legal scholars. The primary cause of this systemic ambiguity is legislative hesitation regarding critical philosophical foundations, including the precise definition of a contract, the permissible boundaries of contractual freedom, and the inherent nature of contracts as either customary instruments or divinely prescribed institutions. Consequently, the statutory provisions are drafted ambiguously, transferring this uncertainty directly into legal doctrine. This foundational inconsistency arises from a deep-rooted conflict between the two primary historical sources of the Iranian Civil Code: traditional Islamic jurisprudence and modern French law. The primary objective is to investigate the exact legal ruling governing conditional contracts in Iranian law, uncover the philosophical reasons behind the current statutory ambiguity, and explore viable theoretical and practical avenues for improving this disjointed legal framework.
 ‌Method & Approach: The research employs a doctrinal, library, and documentary methodology, engaging in a fundamental and critical analysis of data grounded in legal and jurisprudential themes. The investigative process involves a comprehensive review of classical and contemporary Islamic jurisprudential sources, alongside an extensive examination of modern French and Iranian legal doctrines.
 ‌Findings: The analysis reveals an irreconcilable foundational divergence between the two constituent sources of Iranian law. In Shi'a Imami jurisprudence (Fiqh), the conditional contract is deemed absolutely void, a position upheld by the consensus of traditional jurists. This invalidation is rooted in the perspective that contracts are tawqīfī (strictly prescribed religious frameworks where the divine legislator dictates the parameters). In this framework, the relationship between contract formation and its legal effect is viewed as a necessary, causal bond, meaning the contracting parties lack the free will to artificially separate the cause from its immediate effect. Conversely, in modern French law, the conditional contract is recognized as entirely valid. The French legal system treats the contract as a purely conventional and subjective construct born of the free will of autonomous individuals. Under the principle of freedom of contract, these independent wills possess the unrestricted authority to separate any component of the agreement. Due to its reliance on both contradictory paradigms, the Iranian legal system suffers from a structural disarray, preventing a coherent interpretation of conditional obligations.
 ‌Conclusion: Achieving a permanent resolution to the statutory contradictions surrounding conditional contracts is impossible until the Iranian legal framework establishes a unified theoretical foundation regarding the limits of free will and the essential nature of contractual agreements. Reconciling the strictly prescribed religious viewpoint with the modern liberal approach to contractual autonomy remains a profound structural challenge that precludes immediate legislative reform. However, to validate commercial agreements negotiated by individuals, an innovative interpretative mechanism must be utilized by the judiciary. When parties subject a legal effect to an external condition, judges must interpret their declarative intent in a manner that altogether avoids the formation of a problematic conditional contract. Specifically, the ambiguous contractual phrasing should be legally construed either as an unconditional "obligation to create a contract" in the future, or as a present, unconditional contract containing a "commitment to execute the terms" where only the physical performance is delayed. This interpretative strategy legally circumvents the doctrinal obstacles of the conditional contract while preserving the practical intentions of the contracting parties.