‌Context & Objective: Market making has emerged as a pivotal regulatory instrument within capital markets to ensure liquidity, mitigate price volatility, and maintain transaction equilibrium. Despite the rapid expansion of Islamic capital markets, the jurisprudential characterization of market making remains insufficiently explored within the Islamic legal and financial framework. This research addresses the fundamental question of the legal nature of market-making contracts under Islamic law and seeks to determine their validity relative to established doctrinal categories. The objective is to define the legal nature of this financial institution, establish its Shari'ah legitimacy, and identify the jurisprudential requirements necessary for its operation.
 ‌Method & Approach: The study utilizes a fundamental doctrinal research method with an Islamic legal approach. Data collection is library-based and documentary, drawing from Iranian capital market regulations, civil law principles, and Shi’a jurisprudential sources. The methodology involves a comparative analysis of market making against classical nominate contracts—including Ju’alah, Wakalah, Mudarabah, and Ijarah al-A’mal—to discern its distinct legal features. The research further evaluates the legitimacy of the contract through primary Islamic sources such as the Quran and Sunnah as well as rational principles including the No-Harm (La-Darar) rule and the principle of contractual freedom.
 ‌Findings: The research demonstrates that the market-making contract does not strictly conform to any classical nominate contract because it requires continuous commitment, the employment of personal capital, and the inherent acceptance of market risk. Consequently, market making is characterized as an innominate (Aqd-e-Nāmo’ayyan) and emerging rational contract. Its legitimacy is supported by the Quranic mandates to fulfill all contracts and trade by mutual consent, alongside the legal principle that the default state of contracts is validity. The findings indicate that the validity of these contracts depends on adherence to fundamental Islamic financial prohibitions, including the ban on Riba, Gharar, and Maysir. Furthermore, legitimate market making must involve actual risk-sharing and must be backed by real assets rather than purely speculative or fixed-return mechanisms.
 ‌Conclusion: The research concludes that market making is a legitimate and binding institution within Islamic jurisprudence that facilitates market stability and prevents excessive uncertainty. It serves as a practical application of the No-Harm rule by preventing destructive fluctuations and market illiquidity. The study recommends a hybrid market-making model that combines designated obligations with competitive incentives. Policy recommendations include the formulation of specific Shari'ah standards by regulatory bodies, the implementation of continuous Shari'ah supervision, and the restructuring of market-maker rewards to be based on actual performance and risk-taking rather than guaranteed fixed fees. Such a framework ensures that the market-making institution remains consistent with the ethical and legal pillars of the Islamic financial system.