‌Context & Objective: In Shia Islamic jurisprudence, the agency contract [Wakalah] is traditionally considered a revocable contract, subject to automatic termination upon the death of the principal or agent. This prevailing interpretation rests on the rationale that the agent’s authority is derived directly from the principal’s personal will, which ceases to exist upon death. However, contemporary developments in Islamic legal thought and Iranian statutory law have prompted re-evaluation of this principle. This article aims to challenge the dominant consensus by exploring theoretical and legislative grounds for agency continuity. The central research question explores whether, and under what conditions, the continuity of agency after the principal’s death can be legitimized within Shia jurisprudence and Iranian legal practice.
 ‌Method & Approach: The paper employs a doctrinal legal methodology, grounded in analytical and interpretative examination of primary religious texts—the Qur'an and the Sunnah—alongside juristic commentaries, logical reasoning, and statutory provisions. Through this method, traditional and contemporary juristic opinions are critically assessed, with particular attention to the structure of revocable contracts and their legal implications in post-mortem contexts. Iranian civil legislation is also analyzed to identify provisions and legal precedents that may support the survival of agency beyond the principal’s death, especially in cases involving continuous obligations or transferability of authorization.
 ‌Findings: This study finds that the dominant juristic view—automatic termination of agency upon the principal’s death—is not binding nor fully substantiated by scriptural or logical reasoning. It reveals significant inadequacies in the conventional arguments, including reliance on juristic consensus, presumptions about revoked permissions, and assumptions concerning the immediate transfer of the principal's rights to heirs. By contrast, this research identifies legal scenarios—such as agencies embedded in transferable rights or those related to enduring obligations—where continuation post-mortem is both logically coherent and jurisprudentially defensible. Furthermore, the Iranian Civil Code provides implicit legislative support for such exceptions, indicating a potential pathway for reconciling traditional jurisprudence with contemporary legal needs.
 ‌Conclusion: The rule of automatic termination of agency upon the death of the principal is not absolute within Shia jurisprudence. Instead, a nuanced and conditional approach is warranted, recognizing that agency may validly continue in certain circumstances. This has important implications for legal reform, suggesting that both Islamic jurisprudence and Iranian civil law can accommodate the survival of agency in well-defined contexts. The findings advocate for a reconsideration of the prevailing legal doctrine and offer a framework for future legislative revisions in Iran and similarly structured Islamic legal systems.