دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Illegality of Seizing the Property and Spoils of Ahl al-Baġy in Islamic Jurisprudence: Evidence from Imam Ali’s Conduct and Shia-Sunni Schools مبانی فقهی حرمت تصرف اموال و غنایم اهل‌البغی در سیره امام علی (ع) و اندیشه فقهای فریقین 1521 1552 78243 10.30497/law.2026.249539.3941 FA اصغر قائدان دانشیار، گروه تاریخ و تمدن ملل اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2025 11 28  ‌Context & Objective: The legal status of the property and spoils associated with Ahl al-Baġy (armed rebels against an Islamic Ruler) constitutes a critical subject in Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh). The primary scriptural source, the Quran, dedicates only a single verse to the treatment of such groups, mandating mediation between warring factions of believers and authorizing armed conflict solely against the transgressing party until they submit to divine command. However, this foundational text provides no explicit guidelines regarding the mechanics of the conflict or the subsequent disposition of wartime spoils. Furthermore, the Prophetic tradition lacks direct precedent, as the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) engaged exclusively in conflicts against polytheists and disbelievers, whose property was subject to entirely different confiscation rules. Consequently, Islamic jurists formulate the legal framework for internal armed rebellion exclusively upon the established conduct and military precedent of Imam Ali (PBUH), who commanded the forces of the legitimate government during the internal conflicts of Jamal, Siffin, and Nahrawan. The purpose of this research is to comprehensively investigate the jurisprudential rulings governing the property of armed rebels and to determine the legality of appropriating their assets as wartime spoils. The primary research question examines the exact legal status of rebel property during and after conflict, analyzing the foundational principles of engagement derived from historical precedent to determine what distinct rulings govern the confiscation, preservation, or return of such wealth. ‌Method & Approach: The investigation employs a historical method combined with an analytical approach to examine the legal frameworks established by classical Islamic scholars. The research relies strictly on the foundational jurisprudential sources and texts from both major Islamic legal schools, encompassing Shiite and Sunni traditions. To execute this comparative analysis, the study systematically reviews classical literature specifically categorized under chapters concerning the conduct of war and the localized chapters dedicated to armed rebellion in early jurisprudential treatises. ‌Findings: There is a definitive consensus among the jurists of both schools regarding the absolute prohibition of seizing the personal property and spoils of armed rebels, though extensive divergence exists concerning specific applications and sub-rulings. All jurists derived their rulings from the precedent that treated rebels not as infidels, but as Muslims whose broader property rights remain protected. Confiscation is strictly limited to the weapons, armor, and mounts actively utilized within the military camp and battlefield. The appropriation of private property situated outside the military encampment, including residential assets and real estate, is unequivocally prohibited both during and after the cessation of hostilities. Assets left in the rebel camps, aside from active military equipment, cannot be distributed as spoils and are legally classified as inheritance that must be returned to the survivors of the deceased combatants. Furthermore, the enslavement of women and children or the sale of rebel captives is strictly forbidden by universal juristic consensus (Ijma'). Rulings differ based on the organizational structure of the rebel forces. For rebels possessing a backing force or base (Ḏī Fiʾah), confiscated military equipment is permanently retained as public spoils. Conversely, for rebel groups lacking a supporting base, seized weapons must ultimately be returned to the owners once the conflict concludes and the threat is neutralized. The forces of the legitimate Islamic government are explicitly prohibited from consuming the agricultural produce or destroying the property of the rebels without dire military necessity. If the government forces unlawfully destroy or consume rebel property outside the parameters of active combat, they are legally liable and mandated to pay compensation. If rebels repent and cease hostilities, their protected status is fully reaffirmed, provided they return any property they usurped from the government or citizens. ‌Conclusion: The jurisprudential frameworks governing internal armed conflict mandate a profound degree of restraint and adherence to property rights, fundamentally distinguishing the treatment of armed rebels from that of foreign belligerents. Despite their armed insurrection against a legitimate Islamic ruler, the rebels retain their legal status as Muslims, ensuring their lives and assets remain legally inviolable outside the immediate theater of war. The stringent limitations placed on the confiscation of property, restricted solely to active military equipment within the battlefield, underscore a legal doctrine prioritizing the preservation of human dignity and financial restitution. The obligation to return non-military assets as inheritance to rebel families, coupled with the strict liability imposed on government forces for unwarranted property destruction, demonstrates a remarkable commitment to justice and equity. Ultimately, the legal implications confirm that the primary objective of engaging armed rebels is strictly reformative and defensive, aiming to restore civic obedience rather than to penalize dissenters through economic deprivation, expropriation, or enslavement. یکی از مباحث مهم فقهی در خصوص اهل‌البغی، حکم اموال و غنایم آنان است. چنانکه می‌دانیم، در قرآن کریم تنها یک آیه به اهل‌البغی اختصاص دارد که خداوند صرفاً در آن به‌چگونگی برخورد با آنان در دو مرحله فرمان داده است؛ نخست، اصلاح بین دو گروه مومنی که با یکدیگر در حال جنگ هستند، و سپس جنگ با گروهی که به صلح تن نداده و تجاوز پیشه کرده؛ امّا در خصوص کیفیت و چگونگی این درگیری و نیز غنایم مترتب بر آن سخنی به‌میان نیامده است. به‌علاوه، از سنت نبوی (ص) نیز با توجه به این که آن حضرت تنها با کفار و مشرکان در جنگ بودند، مستنداتی در این خصوص موجود نیست. لذا اتکای فقیهان در موضع پیش‌گفته، صرفا سیره امیرالمومنین علی (ع) است؛ زیرا ایشان نخستین شخصی هستند که با اهل‌البغی وارد کارزار شده و می‌توان احکام و مبانی رفتار با این گروه، از جمله احکام ناظر بر اموال و غنایم آنان را از سیره ایشان روشن ساخت. در پژوهش حاضر بر آنیم تا با استناد به این سیره و اتکا بر آراء فقهی فریقین، به بررسی احکام مربوط به اموال اهل‌البغی بپردازیم و با روش تاریخی و رویکرد تحلیلی بدین سوال پاسخ دهیم که حکم اموال اهل‌البغی چیست و آیا می توان آن را به‌غنیمت گرفت؟ نتایج تحقیق حاکی است که به‌طور کلی در میان فقهای امامیه و عامه بر حرمت تصرف اموال و غنایم اهل‌البغی اتفاق‌نظر وجود دارد، مع‌هذا در جزئیات و مصادیق آن اختلاف‌نظر گسترده دیده می‌شود. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78243_2a5edea44bce7800c59200cd36f80736.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 The Imperatives of Constitutional Borrowing in Islamic Countries بایسته‌های اقتباس قانون اساسی در کشورهای اسلامی 1553 1586 78250 10.30497/law.2026.250250.4048 FA علی آریان‌نژاد دانشجوی دکتری حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. فیروز اصلانی دانشیار، گروه حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. 0000-0001-7178-2976 خیراله پروین استاد، گروه حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. 0009-0006-5886-3935 سیدمحمدحسین کاظمینی استادیار، گروه حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2026 05 07  ‌Context & Objective: Following the movement of constitutional codification, legal systems frequently utilize diverse sources to design their constitutions, prominently drawing upon the constitutional experiences of other nations. The transfer of legal ideas from a foreign jurisdiction requires a definitive framework to ensure accurate execution, a phenomenon identified conceptually as constitutional borrowing. Proper execution of constitutional borrowing necessitates strict adherence to foundational prerequisites. While certain general principles govern this practice universally across all legal frameworks, jurisdictions sharing a unified structural basis—specifically a foundation rooted in religion—require specialized principles. Islamic countries represent a prominent example of systems sharing this religious foundation. Given the globalization of the Islamic religion as a civilizational competitor and the contemporary efforts of various nations to Islamize their legal systems, establishing these specialized rules is critical. Historically, one of the vulnerabilities of modern Islamic revolutions has been the uncritical adoption of non-Islamic models without rigorous evaluation. Consequently, Islamic nations must observe specific mandates when borrowing from either Islamic or non-Islamic foreign constitutions. The primary objective is to conceptualize this phenomenon accurately and address the core question: What are the imperatives of constitutional borrowing in Islamic countries? ‌Method & Approach: A descriptive-analytical approach combined with a doctrinal methodology is utilized to address the central question. Library-based studies serve as the primary mechanism to systematically examine the concepts of constitutional borrowing and the defining characteristics of Islamic states, thereby establishing the precise normative framework governing the adoption of foreign constitutional elements in these jurisdictions. ‌Findings: The realization of functional constitutional borrowing in Islamic countries is contingent upon the strict observance of 16 specific imperatives. A primary imperative is the preservation of the structural identity of the ummah (the unified global Muslim community), ensuring that borrowed elements do not undermine Islamic solidarity. Borrowing is exclusively permissible within the manṭaqat al-farāgh (the sphere of discretionary matters where Islamic jurisprudence permits human legislative choice), prohibiting the adoption of foreign rules where definitive Islamic mandates exist. The process requires a committee of religious experts and committed jurists operating under the supervision of Islamic scholars. Decision-makers must verify the authenticity of purportedly Islamic propositions to prevent the infiltration of alien ideologies. The framework expressly prohibits extreme imitation of secular models, mandating the pursuit of an independent socio-economic paradigm. Borrowing must not impede the globalization of Islam or facilitate foreign domination, aligning with the principle of nafī-e sabīl (the prohibition of non-Muslim authority over Muslims). Islamic states must avoid rigid adherence to existing colonial infrastructures. The centrality of Sharīʿat (Islamic law) must remain intact, and constitutional architects must reject the wholesale adoption of foreign structural totalities. Borrowed elements must be meticulously aligned with the muḥkamāt (the clear, foundational principles) of Islam. The foundational ideals of the political system must be generated internally, and drafters must actively engage in lexical innovation rather than relying on foreign terminology. Adopted elements must simultaneously secure both religious legitimacy and popular acceptability. Finally, mandatory indicators of an Islamic constitution—such as the recognition of Islam as the official religion, the requirement that the head of state be Muslim, and the designation of Islam as the supreme source of legislation—are fundamental identity markers entirely exempt from the borrowing mechanism. ‌Conclusion: The realization of the normative goals of any political system relies heavily on the precise formulation of constitutional rules. Constitutional borrowing is not a mechanical imitation; rather, it constitutes an intentional mechanism that demands the active contextualization of foreign ideas. For a state to be genuinely classified as Islamic, it must fully base its political structure and governance on Islamic teachings rather than relying merely on demographic majorities. The application of the identified imperatives ensures that Islamic countries can benefit from accumulated human experience without compromising their ideological integrity. By adhering to these guidelines, states can prevent structural deviations, maintain the centrality of Islamic law, and actively facilitate the broader strategic objective of establishing a modern Islamic civilization. پیرو نهضت تدوین قانون اساسی، نظام‌های حقوقی برای طراحی قانون اساسی کشور خود از منابع متعددی بهره می‌گیرند که یکی از این منابع، قانون اساسی سایر کشورها است. به عبارت دیگر، تدوین‌کنندگان قانون اساسی در یک نظام حقوقی، یکی از مهم‌ترین منابع قابل مراجعه برای خود را تجربه‌ای می‌دانند که سایر کشورها در انجام همین تکلیف - یعنی تدوین قانون اساسی - سابقاً به‌کار بسته‌اند. برای آنکه عملیات انتقال یک ایده از قانون اساسی یک کشور بیگانه به‌درستی صورت گیرد، باید ضمن توجه به ابعاد مختلف این فرایند، چهارچوبی مشخص برای آن تدوین گردد. از این روی حقوقدانان با شناسایی این پدیده در قالب مفهومی تحت عنوان «اقتباس قانون اساسی» در پی تحقق این مهم بوده‌اند. اقتباس صحیح قانون اساسی در صورتی رخ می‌دهد که بایسته‌های مربوط به آن رعایت شود. علاوه بر آنکه اصول حاکم بر اقتباس به‌صورت عمومی برای همه نظام‌های حقوقی قابل طرح است، برای برخی از نظام‌های حقوقی که وجهی مشترک دارند نیز می‌توان اصولی اختصاصی مطرح کرد؛ یکی از این وجوه مشترک، ابتناء بر دین است که نمونه آن در کشورهای اسلامی قابل مشاهده است. بدین منظور، پژوهش حاضر با روش توصیفی تحلیلی در صدد پاسخ به این پرسش است که «بایسته‌های اقتباس قانون اساسی در کشورهای اسلامی چیست؟». در نتیجه این پژوهش، مفهومی دقیق از اقتباس قانون اساسی ارائه می‌شود که تحقق کارکرد صحیح آن در کشورهای اسلامی منوط به رعایت 16 بایسته است. از جمله بایسته‌های مذکور می‌توان به رعایت اولویت راهبردی در نظام‌سازی اسلامی، تطبیق عناصر مورد اقتباس با مبانی و محکمات اسلام و تأمین تؤامان مشروعیت دینی و مقبولیت برای عناصر مورد اقتباس اشاره کرد. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78250_e4ff7ba3efc54e14577ea7939acf1e25.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 A New Perspective on the Modification or Transformation of Islamic Inheritance Rules (Irth) نگاهی نو به تعدیل یا تغییر قواعد ارث 1587 1612 78185 10.30497/law.2026.250123.4018 FA حمید مسجدسرایی استاد، گروه حقوق، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه سمنان، سمنان، ایران. مصطفی جباری دانشیار، گروه حقوق، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه سمنان، سمنان، ایران. Journal Article 2026 04 12  ‌Context & Objective: The passage of time necessitates the exploration of emergent legal issues (Masa’il Mustahdatha) to find suitable solutions for modern societal challenges. In the specific context of Islamic inheritance law (Irth), it is necessary to question whether the ancient rules remain applicable in their original form or if the underlying nature of the subject has fundamentally shifted over the centuries. This article outlines the historical background of inheritance rules and investigates the potential for their modification or transformation within a contemporary legal framework. The research purpose is to demonstrate that such adjustments are conceptually possible and practically acceptable when guided by jurisprudential insight and an understanding of evolving social structures. The central research question examines whether inheritance rules should remain identical to those of the early Islamic period or if they can be adapted to meet the exigencies of time (Muqtadiyat-e Zaman). ‌Method & Approach: The study utilizes a doctrinal method to investigate the nature of inheritance rulings through the lens of both traditional jurisprudence and modern civil law. By examining the distinction between original (Ta’ssisi) and confirmatory (Imda’i) rulings, the authors analyze historical shifts in inheritance practices as documented in classical texts. The approach further involves assessing modern legal examples, such as the Iranian Civil Code and state regulations concerning inheritance tax and social security, to identify existing patterns of legislative intervention. Finally, the methodology includes a semantic analysis of the jurisprudential "Text" (Nass) to determine if its definitive nature inherently precludes evolutionary change. ‌Findings: The research findings indicate that inheritance rules are confirmatory (Ahkam Imda’i) in nature, having been adopted and modified from pre-Islamic customs to suit the needs of the early Muslim community. Because these rules were established based on the social rationality and tribal structures of that era, they are not considered strictly "divinely fixed" (Tawqifi) acts of worship that are immune to the influence of time and place. Historical evidence confirms that inheritance shares were frequently adjusted during the Prophet's time—such as the transitions between the alliance of brotherhood and kinship-based distribution—to support the economic stability of the nascent state. Furthermore, modern state practices, including the imposition of inheritance taxes and the selective distribution of pension benefits, already serve as functional modifications of traditional shares. The study also finds that the nature of a legal "Text" (Nass) does not philosophically forbid modification, as the prohibition against "interpretation in the face of text" is primarily a procedural safeguard for legislative order rather than an ontological barrier to legal evolution. ‌Conclusion: The paper asserts that a comprehensive review of inheritance rules is required to bridge the gap between historical religious dictates and modern social realities. Since the original rules were grounded in the specific emotional and tribal bonds of a past age, the dissolution of those structures in contemporary society justifies a jurisprudential revision. The article concludes that the modification or "tempering" of inheritance rules is not only conceptually plausible but essential for maintaining social justice and the relevance of the legal system. Such changes should be implemented by legal and religious authorities through the lens of traditional jurisprudence (Fiqh) while accounting for the changing economic roles and social positions of modern heirs. Ultimately, aligning inheritance law with the actualities of contemporary life ensures that the spirit of justice within the Sharia remains vibrant and effective. گذر زمان، موضوعات و پرسش‌هایی نو پیش‌روی انسان و اندیشمندان هر جامعه خواهد گذاشت تا درباره آن بیاندیشند، پاسخ های درخور بیابند و در نهایت مشکلات جامعه خویش را چاره‌جویی کنند. مسلمانان از این امر به دور نبوده و نیستند و هماره، با مسائلی که فقیهان آن را «مسائل مستحدثه» می‌نامند رویاروی بوده‌اند. از دیگر سوی، برخی موضوعات از بدو ظهور اسلام - یا به‌عبارت دقیق‌تر، پیش از اسلام - هم در دیگر ادیان و هم در جامعه عرب وجود داشته، اما امروز می‌توان چنین پرسید که آیا موضوعی که اکنون با همان نام دیروز از آن یاد می‌شود، واقعاً همان موضوع است با همه ویژگی‌ها و عناصر سازنده آن، یا چنین نیست و از آن موضوع فقط نام یا بخشی از نام آن باقی مانده است و نه جمله آن با تمام ویژگی‌ها و عناصر سازنده آن؟ از شمار این موضوعات، «ارث» و قواعد آن است. آیا امروزه قواعد و احکام ارث باید عیناً همان باشد که در صدر اسلام بوده است؟ یا می‌توان شیوه‌ای متفاوت، هرچند اندک تصور کرد؟ یافته اصلی نوشتار حاضر این است که امضائی بودن احکام ارث و دگرگونی احکام آن در صدر اسلام، هکذا امکان تغییر در ماهیت و مفهوم نصّ، به‌علاوه ادعای توقیفی نبودن احکام ارث که تأثیر زمان و مکان را در آن ممکن می‌سازد، گواه آن است که تعدیل و حتی اندکی تغییر در قواعد ارث - البته طی زمان و با درایت فقهی، حقوقی و ملاحظه شرایط زمان و مکان - هم قابل تصور است و هم قابل پذیرش و اجراء. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78185_150b82b725629347bf5f2573ab94bdb6.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Methodology of Maxim Formulation in Imāmī Jurisprudence روش‌شناسی قاعده‌انگاری در فقه امامیه 1613 1640 78217 10.30497/law.2026.249377.3918 FA احسان حسانی دانشجوی دکتری فقه و حقوق جزا، گروه فقه و مبانی حقوق اسلامی، دانشگاه شهید مطهری، تهران، ایران. 0000-0003-1008-3674 حسنعلی مؤذن‌زادگان استاد، گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران. سیدمنصور میرسعیدی دانشیار، گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران. مصطفی نصیری استادیار، گروه فقه و حقوق، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهید مطهری، تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2025 11 04  ‌Context & Objective: Methodology plays a critical role in structuring scientific discourse and fostering the dynamic evolution of its foundational issues. Despite the unparalleled utility and influence of jurisprudential maxims (qawāʿid fiqhiyyah, foundational legal principles that govern numerous secondary rulings) within substantive Islamic law (fiqh), the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh, the methodology of legal deduction), and the broader realm of law, a definitive framework for the formulation of these maxims has remained conspicuously absent. The primary objective of this research is to establish a methodology for maxim formulation in Imāmī jurisprudence. Consequently, this study seeks to systematically organize existing jurisprudential maxims, delineate them from analogous legal concepts, and propose a standardized model for deriving novel jurisprudential maxims that have not yet been formally recognized within the legal canon. ‌Method & Approach: This research employs a descriptive-exploratory framework grounded in a doctrinal legal methodology. The investigation is conducted through a comprehensive examination of primary Islamic jurisprudential texts, legal treatises, and historical library documents. By critically analyzing the unwritten paradigms historically utilized by jurists in their compilations of legal maxims, the study synthesizes a structured, theoretical model for the systematic extraction and validation of legal propositions within the Islamic legal tradition. ‌Findings: The doctrinal analysis reveals that Imāmī jurists implicitly require a jurisprudential proposition to fulfill three distinct criteria to be officially recognized and extracted as a foundational legal maxim. First, the proposition must possess a practical jurisprudential application; it must either affirm or negate a general secondary statutory ruling (ḥukm taklīfī, a directive defining a legal obligation) or a declaratory ruling (ḥukm waḍʿī, a ruling defining a legal situation, condition, or relationship), or it must act as a general proposition with a predicate rooted in substantive law, even if the proposition itself is not a direct ruling. Second, the proposition must demonstrate universality and expansive applicability (iṭṭirād) across all chapters of substantive law, across multiple chapters within various legal compendia, or at least across numerous sections of a single comprehensive volume. Third, the proposition must be substantiated by robust and sufficient jurisprudential evidence derived from primary legal sources. ‌Conclusion: The articulation of this tripartite methodology provides a rigorous standard for evaluating and filtering propositions currently classified as jurisprudential maxims. By distinguishing genuine legal maxims from theological doctrines, rational principles, or methodological rules that have been historically conflated with them, this framework facilitates a critical refinement of the existing legal corpus. Ultimately, the systematic application of this methodology promotes the independence of jurisprudential maxims from the broader discussions of substantive law and legal methodology, thereby laying the groundwork for establishing the science of jurisprudential maxims as an independent and coherent entity. روش‌شناسی در علوم مختلف باعث سازماندهی هر چه بیشتر مباحث علم و نیز کمک به توسعه و پویایی مسائل آن می‌گردد. علی‌رغم کاربرد و نقش بی‌بدیل قواعد فقهیه در علم فقه، علم اصول و به تبع آن در دانش حقوق، اما روش و سازوکاری مشخص برای قاعده‌انگاری در فقه ارائه نگردیده است. بنابراین، هدف این پژوهش، روش‌شناسی قاعده‌انگاری فقهی است تا به سازماندهی هر چه بیشتر قواعد فقهیه و پالایش این قواعد از مفاهیم مشابه کمک نموده و نیز الگویی برای استخراج قواعد فقهیه جدیدی که تاکنون تحت عنوان قاعده فقهی شناخته نشده، به دست دهد. یافته‌های این پژوهش که با روش توصیفی تحلیلی سامان گرفته، نشان می‌دهد که تبیین و اثبات برخورداری یک قضیه فقهی از سه امر به عنوان روشی برای استخراج و معرفی یک قاعده فقهی از سوی فقیهان امامیه دنبال شده است: (یک) کاربرد فقهی داشتن، به این معنی که مثبت یا نافی حکم شرعی فرعی تکلیفی یا وضعی عام بوده یا گزاره‌ای عام باشد که محمول آن از فقه است، هر چند خودش یک حکم فقهی نباشد؛ (دو) اطراد و گستردگی این قواعد در جمیع ابواب فقه یا ابواب متعدده از کتب مختلف فقهی یا ابواب متعدده از یک کتاب واحد؛ و (سه) برخورداری از مستندات فقهی کافی. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78217_0a082673917b3270194af59fca08c7d4.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Delineating the Status of the Golden Rule in Islamic Jurisprudence تبیین جایگاه قاعده طلایی در فقه 1641 1684 78213 10.30497/law.2026.249532.3937 FA فاطمه رمضانی دانش‌آموخته دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. عباس میرشکاری دانشیار، گروه حقوق خصوصی و اسلامی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. 0000-0002-4927-1720 Journal Article 2025 11 26  ‌Context & Objective: The Golden Rule is a fundamental moral principle advocating that one should treat others as one wishes to be treated. Although this ethical standard appears in numerous pre-Islamic religions and Islamic texts Islamic jurists have not formally recognized it as a jurisprudential maxim. This research investigates the possibility of identifying the Golden Rule as a jurisprudential maxim and explores the reasons behind its historical exclusion from this categorization. The study questions whether the Golden Rule can function within Islamic jurisprudence and under what specific legal title it might operate. The objective is to delineate the exact status of this rule in jurisprudence by analyzing its core elements and structural compatibility with established jurisprudential criteria. ‌Method & Approach: This study utilizes a doctrinal research method relying on library-based sources and deductive analysis. The approach is structured into three main sections. The first section identifies the constituent elements of the Golden Rule and evaluates its binding normative level. The second section compares the characteristics of standard jurisprudential maxims with the Golden Rule to test for structural alignment. The final section examines the position of the Golden Rule under the specific legal category of independent rational proofs evaluating its associated legal rulings implementation conflicts and potential to generate civil liability. ‌Findings: The research reveals that the Golden Rule bridges theoretical and practical rationality through its core element of consistency which comprises the dual principles of conscientiousness and impartiality. This structural alignment allows the rule to qualify as an independent rational proof within Islamic jurisprudence. Rulings derived from this rule involve formal legal obligations and prohibitions regarding societal behavior which are established through the jurisprudential principle of correlation between rational and religious edicts. The rule inherently lacks conflict with other established legal maxims in theory. Whenever practical implementation clashes occur the Golden Rule takes precedence as the governing and more significant directive. Furthermore, disregarding this rule serves as a necessary but insufficient condition for establishing strict civil liability since actual damages or other specific legal triggers must also be present. ‌Conclusion: Most Islamic jurists historically declined to adopt the Golden Rule as a formal jurisprudential maxim due to concerns about its reliance on human imagination and the variance in individual preferences. The analysis demonstrates however that the strict application of the consistency element nullifies these subjective variables and successfully guides legal reasoning toward definitive rulings based on universal human principles. The Golden Rule successfully transforms individual subjective desires into an objective and rational framework for social regulation. Recognizing this rule as an independent rational proof empowers jurists to enforce equitable social relations and prioritize public interest over arbitrary personal preferences in Islamic legal practice. قاعده طلایی، یک اصل اخلاقی است که مقرر می‌دارد «هر آنچه برای خود می‌پسندی، برای دیگران بپسند و هر آنچه برای خود نمی‌پسندی، برای دیگران مپسند». اگر چه در ادیان مختلف پیش از اسلام و سپس در آیات و روایات به مفهوم این اصل اخلاقی اشاره شده است، اما فقیهان اسلامی آن را به‌عنوان یک قاعده فقهی شناسایی نکرده‌اند. لذا در این مقاله سعی شده است که از طریق روش توصیفی تحلیلی و رجوع به مصادر کتابخانه‌ای، امکان شناسایی آن به عنوان قاعده فقهی، و دلیل عدم شناسایی آن تحت این عنوان، بررسی و به ایرادات پاسخ داده شود. نوشتار بدین برآیند رسیده است که این قاعده، به دلیل وجود عنصر سازگاری متشکل از دو اصل باوجدان بودن و بی‌طرفی، حلقه اتصال عقلانیت نظری به عقلانیت عملی بوده و منطبق با عنوان «مستقلات عقلی» در فقه است. احکام استنباطی آن با توجه به مصلحت و مفسده نوعی، ناشی از اعمال و عدم اعمال آن در جامعه، جزء احکام تکلیفی وجوب و حرمت است که از طریق اعمال قاعده ملازمه بین حکم عقل و شرع به‌دست می‎آید. بعث و زجر آن در مکلّف، از طریق ایجاد اراده در نظر گرفتن حقوق دیگران همراه با حقوق خود در رفتار اجتماعی است. این قاعده، با دیگر قواعد فقهی تعارضی ندارد، لکن امکان تزاحم با آن‌ها در مقام اجرا وجود دارد که در این‎صورت، قاعده طلایی به عنوان قاعده اهّم بر مهم اولویت می‌یابد. همچنین عدم رعایت این قاعده، شرط لازم و نه کافی برای اعمال حکم وضعیِ ضمان بوده و اکثر فقها، آن را به دلیل وجود عنصرتخیّل و تفاوت علایق و سلایق اشخاص به عنوان قاعده فقهی شناسایی نکرده‌اند؛ این درحالی است که اعمال عنصر سازگاری آن، عامل رسیدن به احکام قطعی و اصول مشترک انسانی است. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78213_a1da1017ebf6216754eb4f11864733fb.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Contracts are Subject to the Parties' Intentions: An Islamic Jurisprudential Reexamination of the Principle of Contractual Freedom Based on the Views of Mir Abd al-Fattah Maraghi (d. 1834 CE) العقود تابعه للقصود؛ بازخوانی فقهی اصل آزادی قراردادی با تکیه بر دیدگاه محقق مراغی 1685 1718 77857 10.30497/law.2025.248411.3789 FA محمد امینی دانش‌آموخته دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده علوم اداری و اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران. مهدی شهابی دانشیار، گروه حقوق، دانشکده علوم اداری و اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.‌‌‌‌ سید محمدصادق طباطبایی دانشیار، گروه حقوق، دانشکده علوم اداری و اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.‌‌‌ 0000-0002-6076-7268 Journal Article 2025 06 01  ‌Context & Objective: The principle of the sovereignty of intention and contractual freedom plays a significant role in Iranian positive law, notably referenced in Article 10 of the Iranian Civil Code. The rule "al-'uqūd tābi‘ah lil-quṣūd" (contracts are subject to the intentions) is frequently discussed within Shi'a Islamic jurisprudence as an embodiment of this principle. While this rule appears to reflect the centrality of intention in contract formation, the key issue arises in determining the extent to which the intentions of the contracting parties are recognized within Iranian law as the foundation for the validity of contracts. This study investigates the weight given to the intentions of the parties under Iranian law and explores the perspectives of Sayyid Mir Abd al-Fattah Maraghi (d. 1834), a jurist who advocated for individual freedom in rational contract formation. ‌Method & Approach: The authors employed a doctrinal approach, analyzing Islamic jurisprudential works alongside Iranian legal doctrine. By examining the views of Maraghi and other jurists, the study delves into the application of the principle of the sovereignty of intention in Shiite jurisprudence and its impact on Iranian legal practices, particularly concerning contract validity and the legal consequences tied to contractual declarations. ‌Findings: The study found that in the Iranian legal system, the intention of the contracting parties is crucial for determining the legal nature of a contract. However, it is ultimately the intention of the Islamic legislator [Sha're] that underpins the obligation and validity of the contract. Additionally, the research highlighted two primary consequences of this legal framework: first, that the legal consequences of a contract can apply solely based on its declaration, without necessitating an independent intention from the parties involved, and second, that the principle of no harm and the negation of hardship takes precedence over other contractual principles—a viewpoint shared by Maraghi. ‌Conclusion: The research concludes that while the sovereignty of intention is recognized in Iranian law, it is balanced by the overarching authority of the Islamic legislator's intent. This highlights a nuanced approach to contractual freedom in Iranian jurisprudence, where party intention influences the legal status of contracts but does not solely determine their validity. Maraghi's perspective aligns with this framework, emphasizing the protection of individual freedom within the boundaries set by Islamic law. اصل حاکمیت اراده و آزادی قراردادی از جمله اصول مهم و پرکاربرد در حقوق موضوعه ایران است که ماده دهم قانون مدنی نیز به‌نوعی دلالت بر آن دارد. قاعده «العقود تابعه للقصود»، یکی از قواعدی است که در نگاه اول می‌توان آن را تجلّی‌ اصل حاکمیت اراده در فقه امامیه قلمداد نمود؛ همان‌طور که بسیاری از حقوق‌دانان نیز در آثار و تالیفات خود بدان اشاره کرده‌اند. چنان‌چه از قاعده اخیر بتوان به‌عنوان مستند اصل حاکمیت اراده نام برد، سوال اساسی آن است که در حقوق ایران، اصل حاکمیت اراده و قاعده «العقود تابعه للقصود» تا چه میزان به قصد و اراده طرفین اعتبار می‌دهند و آیا می‌توان این دو را به عنوان مبنای اعتبار عقود و قراردادها معرفی کرد؟ آنگاه، دیدگاه صاحب «العناوین»، سیدمیرعبدالفتاح مراغی، به‌عنوان یکی از فقیهان متأخر قائل به آزادی افراد در انعقاد عقود و قراردادهای عقلایی، در این مورد چیست؟ نگارندگان با اتخاذ روش توصیفی تحلیلی، دریافتند که هر چند در نظام حقوقی ایران، قصد متعاقدین، خالق ماهیت حقوقی است، اما مبنای التزام و اعتباربخشی به عقد، اراده شارع است. از جمله ثمرات این مبنا، عبارتند از (1) جریان احکام مترتب بر عقد به‌صرف انشاء و بدون نیاز به اراده مستقل متعاقدین در ایجاد آن و (2) حاکم شدن اصل لاضرر و نفی عسر و حرج بر دیگر اصول قراردادی؛ دیدگاهی که محقق مراغی نیز بر آن است. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_77857_3c45ea1247ef9a03d3eaada60e320a02.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 The Inflation of Criminal Law as a Reflection of the Paradox of Freedom and Control in Modern Thought تورم کیفری به‌مثابه بازتاب پارادوکس آزادی و کنترل در اندیشه متجدد 1719 1756 78249 10.30497/law.2026.250129.4026 FA مریم طالبی‌علی دانشجوی دکتری فقه و مبانی حقوق اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران. مجتبی جاویدی دانشیار، گروه فقه و حقوق اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران. صبورا حاجی‌علی اورک‌پور استادیار، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران. Journal Article 2026 04 16  ‌Context & Objective: In recent decades, numerous legal systems have encountered the inflation of criminal law, defined as the exponential proliferation of statutes, expanded criminalization, and unprecedented growth in prison populations. This shift indicates that criminal law frequently functions as a mechanism of power to maintain social order and manage marginalized populations. The primary objective of this research is to trace the philosophical roots of this phenomenon within the epistemic and ethical frameworks of modernity. The central research question investigates whether the inflation of criminal law constitutes an unintended policy-making error, or if it represents an inevitable outcome of modern rationality. Specifically, the study explores how the two dominant currents of modern Western moral philosophy—retributivism, derived from Kantian deontology, and utilitarianism, rooted in Benthamite consequentialism—have practically facilitated the unbridled expansion of penal interventions. ‌Method & Approach: The research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology, utilizing a library and documentary approach for data collection. Disciplinarily situated within the philosophy of law, with a specific focus on the philosophy of punishment, the study adopts an interdisciplinary framework. It integrates concepts and empirical data from penal sociology and critical criminology to address the multifaceted nature of penal inflation. The level of analysis focuses on philosophical root-tracing rather than purely empirical sociology or abstract ethical theorization, striving to link philosophical argumentation with institutional and historical evidence. The analytical framework is structured across three layers: describing the concrete manifestations of penal inflation, reconstructing the intra-discursive arguments of retributivism and utilitarianism, and analyzing the relationship between these philosophical traditions and their institutional applications within the modern state. ‌Findings: The inflation of criminal law materializes across three interconnected institutional levels: economic, racial, and technological. Economically, it manifests as a transition from a welfare state to a carceral state, where public resources are diverted from social support to penal infrastructure, effectively criminalizing poverty. Racially, the phenomenon reproduces structural discrimination, functioning as a continuous institutional bias from initial policing to sentencing, disproportionately impacting minority groups. Technologically, penal inflation transcends the physical boundaries of the prison through the pervasive expansion of digital surveillance, electronic monitoring, and predictive algorithms. Philosophically, these manifestations are rooted in the fundamental dichotomies of modern ethics. Kantian retributivism emphasizes the absolute duty and intrinsic necessity of punishment. When transposed into the modern state apparatus, the concept of autonomy is reduced to absolute penal responsibility, providing legitimacy for stringent penal enforcement in the name of respecting free will. Conversely, Benthamite utilitarianism, operating on the logic of maximizing collective utility and employing law as an instrument of social engineering, justifies the continuous expansion of preventative control mechanisms under the guise of efficiency. ‌Conclusion: Criminal law inflation is not a transient legislative error, but rather the concrete manifestation of the internal paradox of modernity. This paradox is situated in the perpetual tension between freedom and control, autonomy and social engineering, and deontological duty and utilitarian consequentialism. The modern state simultaneously enacts punitive strictness in the name of individual freedom and expands pervasive surveillance networks in the name of collective security. Consequently, retributivism and utilitarianism function as a structural duality that mutually reinforces the expansion of the penal apparatus. A fundamental critique of penal inflation cannot be reduced to technical policy reforms; it necessitates a profound reexamination of the epistemic foundations of modern ethics and the institutional mechanisms of the contemporary state, requiring a redefinition of human freedom beyond the inherent crises of modern rationality. «تورم کیفری» به وضعیتی اطلاق می‌شود که در آن، افزون بر افزایش چشم‌گیر تعداد قوانین کیفری و موارد جرم‌انگاری، جمعیت زندانیان نیز رشد بی‌سابقه‌ای می‌یابد. این پدیده که در دهه‌های اخیر بسیاری از نظام‌های حقوقی غرب را متأثر ساخته، فراتر از یک مسأله حقوقی، بازتابی از بحران‌های ساختاری در دل متجدد است. پژوهش حاضر با هدف ریشه‌یابی فلسفی این پدیده و با استفاده از روش توصیفی تحلیلی، این پرسش را پی‌می‌گیرد که آیا تورم کیفری نتیجه‌ای ناخواسته و خطایی در سیاست‌گذاری است، یا پیامد اجتناب‌ناپذیر عقلانیت مدرن؟ یافته‌های نوشتار حکایت می‌کند که تورم کیفری در سه سطحِ اقتصادی (گذار از دولت رفاه به دولت کیفری)، نژادی (بازتولید تبعیض ساختاری) و تکنولوژیک (گسترش نظارت دیجیتال) نمود یافته و ریشه‌های آن را باید در دوگان‌های بنیادین فلسفه اخلاق تجدد جستجو کرد: سزاگرایی کانتی با تأکید بر «تکلیف محوری» و ضرورت ذاتی مجازات، زمینه‌ساز سخت‌گیری کیفری می‌شود؛ و فایده‌گرایی بنتامی با منطق «بیشینه‌سازی سود جمعی»، به گسترش ابزارهای کنترلی به‌نام کارآمدی دامن می‌زند. مقاله نتیجه می‌گیرد که تورم کیفری نه یک خطای گذرا، بلکه تجلی پارادوکس درونی مدرنیته در کشاکش میان «آزادی» و «کنترل»، خودآیینی و مهندسی اجتماعی، و وظیفه‌گرایی و نتیجه‌گرایی است. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78249_c13ef8d418c19de034d14d0f0864ff2e.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Feasibility of ‘Relative Legal Incapacity’: From the Perspective of the Concept of Incapacity (Hajr) and the Exemplary Nature of Its Enumerated Grounds in Shia Jurisprudence and Iranian Law امکان‌سنجی «حجر نسبی» از زاویه مفهوم حجر و تمثیلی بودن موجبات احصائی آن در فقه امامیه و حقوق ایران 1757 1802 77878 10.30497/law.2025.248713.3831 FA محمدحسین آسیم دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده معارف اسلامی و حقوق، دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام، تهران، ایران. مهدی محمدزاده استادیار، گروه حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده معارف اسلامی و حقوق، دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام، تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2025 08 07  ‌‌Context & Objective: This research addresses the concept of Hajr (legal incapacity) within Shia jurisprudence and Iranian law, prompted by the complexities of modern economic life. In specialized fields like financial markets, individuals who are legally competent [Rashid] may still lack the specific expertise to identify and avoid detrimental transactions, raising the question of whether legal protection can be extended to them. This study explores the foundational possibility of establishing a form of "relative Hajr" [Hajr Nesbi], which would apply only to specific domains where an individual is vulnerable. The research aims to answer whether the concept of Hajr can be interpreted in an exemplary (non-exhaustive) manner and if the legally recognized causes of incapacity are strictly limited to those explicitly listed in legal and jurisprudential texts, or if new causes can be identified to meet contemporary needs. ‌Method & Approach: The study employs a doctrinal and library-based methodology, utilizing a hermeneutic-analytical approach to examine primary sources. The research begins by establishing a conceptual framework through a lexical and terminological analysis of Hajr and its prerequisite, legal capacity [Ahliyyat]. It then critically assesses the definitions and causes of Hajr presented by both jurists [Fuqaha] and modern legal scholars, highlighting divergences between the broader jurisprudential understanding and the narrower interpretation often found in Iranian positive law, particularly concerning Article 1207 of the Civil Code. The paper contrasts these views, proposes a refined definition of Hajr, and briefly compares the concept with laws on legal incapacity in several U.S. states to demonstrate the viability of a more flexible approach in contemporary legal systems. ‌Findings: The research finds a significant distinction between the definitions of Hajr in Iranian legal scholarship and Shia jurisprudence. While many legal scholars link Hajr to a lack of capacity for legal execution [Ahliyyat al-Istifa'], jurisprudential sources define it more fundamentally as a "prohibition" [Man'] imposed by the Lawgiver on a person's ability to dispose of their property, whether partially or totally. This jurisprudential view supports a more expansive application. Regarding its causes, the study argues that the common legal assumption of an exhaustive list (minority, insanity, and prodigality as per Article 1207) is a misinterpretation. Analysis of classical jurisprudential texts reveals that the enumerated causes were often considered exemplary or conventional for pedagogical purposes, not strictly exhaustive [Hasri]. Therefore, the findings suggest that any condition leading to a legally mandated prohibition on financial disposition, consistent with the Islamic Fiqh, can foundationally be recognized as a cause of Hajr. ‌Conclusion: The study concludes that the restrictive interpretation of Hajr in Iranian positive law is not mandated by its Islamic jurisprudential foundations. Shia jurisprudence allows for a more flexible and expansive understanding, where the causes of legal incapacity are not exhaustively enumerated. Consequently, there is no fundamental jurisprudential barrier preventing the legislator from establishing new forms of Hajr, including "relative Hajr," to protect individuals in specific, complex situations, provided such measures align with a precise definition of the concept. While this research establishes the foundational possibility, it emphasizes that the actual implementation of such a law would require a comprehensive evaluation of competing principles, such as the freedom of contracts versus the protective aims of the law. This paper serves as a crucial first step, inviting further research into the practical and theoretical implications of modernizing the application of Hajr. این نوشتار، تلاشی است برای پاسخ بدین پرسش که اگر اشخاصی رشید، نسبت به پاره‌ای از حوزه‌های اقتصادی، به‌دلایلی نظیر پیچیدگی‌های خاص آن حوزه، قادر به تشخیص سود و زیان خویش نباشند، آیا قانون‌گذار از نظر مبنایی، امکان حمایت از ایشان با سازوکار حجر نسبی یعنی حجر ایشان نسبت به همان حوزه‌ها را دارد؟ پاسخ به این مسأله، در گرو بررسی ابعاد و زوایای فقهی و حقوقی بسیاری است که از میان آن ابعاد، واکاوی و بررسی تنها دو مورد «مفهوم‌شناسی حجر» و «تمثیلی بودن اسباب احصاء شده از حجر» در دستور کار این مقاله است؛ بنابراین، پژوهش حاضر را می‌توان فتح بابی برای تحقیقاتی دیگر جهت رسیدن به پاسخ نهایی پرسش فوق‌الذکر دانست. این پژوهش، با روش تحلیلی توصیفی و با بررسی مصادر لغت‌شناسی و مطالعه وسیع در متون فقهی اسلام و حقوق ایران انجام گرفته و بدین سرانجام منتهی شده است که بر اساس ریشه‌ها و معنای لغوی حجر و مبانی فقهی آن، و توجه به این نکته که قوانین موضوعه ایران در باب حجر، بر بنیان فقهی استوار است؛ اولاً تعریف مناسب از حجر، چنین است: «ممنوعیتی جزئی یا کلی، به‌نحو مادی و یا حکم وضعی که قانون‌گذار، فقط برای دسته‌ای خاص از اشخاص، بر تصرف آزادانه‌ای از آنان در اموال خود، اعم از تصرف حقوقی، مادی، مستقیم و غیرمستقیم وضع می‌کند؛ در حالی که انجام مستقیم آن تصرف توسط دیگر اشخاص، فی‌نفسه مجاز، صحیح و واجد نفوذ حقوقی است». ثانیاً، چنان‌چه قانون‌گذار، با در نظر گرفتن تمام جوانب فقهی حقوقی، لازم ببیند که ممنوعیتی جدید با ویژگی‌های گفته‌شده در تعریف حجر وضع نماید، ماده 1207 قانون مدنی ایران و احصائاتی که نسبت به اسباب حجر در دکترین فقه امامیه انجام گرفته، اشکال مبنایی برای قانون‎گذار ایجاد نمی‌نماید و این ممنوعیت، مصداقی دیگر از حجر قلمداد خواهد شد. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_77878_9d6985efe7ef5efb8b050da76758a79f.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Selling Properties Subject to Usufructuary Rights of Soknā (Habitation): Legal Status in Imami Jurisprudence and Iranian Law بیع «عین دارای حق سکنی» در فقه امامیه و حقوق ایران 1803 1842 78244 10.30497/law.2026.249594.3948 FA محمد بهرامی خوشکار دانشیار، گروه فقه و حقوق، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهید مطهری، تهران، ایران. 0009-0007-7454-582X مهدی نریمان‌پور دانش‌آموخته دکتری فقه و حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهید مطهری، تهران، ایران. 0000-0002-9773-4064 مسعود نریمان‌پور دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده حقوق، دانشکدگان فارابی، دانشگاه تهران، قم، ایران. 0009-0006-7770-4630 Journal Article 2025 12 08  ‌Context & Objective: Contracts transferring usufructuary rights frequently raise complex questions regarding the legal status of the underlying property when the original owner transfers its title. A prominent example in Islamic law is the contract of Soknā (the right of habitation), commonly utilized alongside ʿOmrā (a right of use restricted to the lifespan of the owner, user, or a third party) and Roqbā (a right of use established for a strictly specified duration). In Islamic Fiqh, Soknā grants the resident authority to derive benefit through habitation without transferring the property's physical corpus. Consequently, the owner retains the title and can execute legal transactions over the asset. Soknā occurs in three forms: a right restricted to a specified time, a right restricted to a lifespan, and an absolute right where no temporal boundary is designated. While selling a property encumbered by a time-specified Soknā faces no legal opposition, the life-restricted and absolute forms generate significant theoretical challenges. ‌Method & Approach: This research is conducted through a doctrinal method, relying entirely on library resources. It employs a descriptive and analytical approach to systematically evaluate the existing legal texts and jurisprudential literature relevant to the subject matter. ‌Findings: The evaluation of jurisprudential literature reveals three distinct perspectives regarding the sale of a property encumbered by a life-restricted Soknā: absolute validity, absolute nullity, and a distinction differentiating between selling to the current resident versus a third party. Scholars arguing for nullity assert the transaction constitutes Gharar (a prohibited contractual uncertainty or unacceptable risk). They contend a life-restricted right conceals the exact delivery time, creating an ignorance that invalidates the contract. Conversely, jurists advocating for validity dismiss these concerns, relying on specific traditions and arguing human lifespan operates within predictable customary limits. Regarding absolute Soknā, while a minority of jurists raise doubts due to potential Gharar, the vast majority maintain its definitive validity, despite disagreements over the supporting analytical framework. In Iranian civil law, transferring properties subject to usufructuary rights is recognized through general provisions. However, legal doctrine exhibits debates concerning the potential contagion of ignorance regarding the delivery time directly to the contractual consideration, which some argue could undermine the fundamental validity of the exchange. ‌Conclusion: Critical analysis demonstrates that concerning the life-restricted Soknā, the doctrine asserting absolute validity of the sale is legally justified. Although linking habitation to a lifespan introduces initial ignorance regarding the precise delivery moment, this duration inevitably concludes at a definitive terminal event. Because human lifespan falls within a predictable customary threshold, the strict definition of Gharar does not materialize to invalidate the transaction. Furthermore, concerning absolute Soknā, the prevailing consensus affirming its validity is structurally sound, although traditional justifications require refinement. The conventional analysis, positing the mere execution of an obligatory contract automatically nullifies the permissible contract of habitation, lacks a robust intentional basis. Instead, the validity of selling a property subject to an absolute Soknā is accurately sustained through the owner's overriding obligation to deliver the sold corpus. Because the owner must deliver the property to the buyer, revoking the permissible contract becomes a mandatory preliminary step. Consequently, concerns regarding the materialization of Gharar or the theoretical emergence of a termination right for a buyer ignorant of the absolute Soknā are deemed analytically unfounded. پژوهش حاضر به ارزیابی وضعیت حقوقی بیع عین دارای حق سکنی می‌پردازد. بحث از بیع عین سکنی در سه صورت مطرح می‌شود: (1) سکنایی که زمان انتفاع آن مشخص است، (2) سکنای مقید به عمر و (3) سکنای مطلق. نسبت به صورت نخست، ضمن اینکه اختلاف‌نظری وجود ندارد، چالش فقهی و حقوقی نیز مطرح نیست؛ لکن نسبت به دو صورت اخیر مناقشاتی جدی مطرح است. این پژوهش که با روش توصیفی تحلیلی صورت گرفته، در پی پاسخ به این سوال است که بیع عین دارای حق سکنای مقید به عمر و مطلق با چه وضعیت حقوقی مواجه است؟ نتایج نشان می‌دهد که نسبت به بیع سکنای مقید به عمر سه دیدگاه مطرح شده است: صحت بیع، بطلان بیع و تفصیل میان بیع عین سکنی به منتفع (ساکن) و شخص ثالث. نسبت به بیع سکنای مطلق نیز برخی از فقیهان با طرح احتمال غرری بودن، در مقام تشکیک برآمدند؛ لکن مشهور و بلکه قریب‌به‌اتفاق فقیهان نسبت به صحت بیع سکنای مطلق تردیدی روا نداشتند؛ مع‌هذا، از حیث آثار مترتب بر صحت بیع و تحلیل‌های مطرح‌شده، اختلاف‌نظر جدی وجود دارد. به‌نظر می‌رسد نسبت به بیع سکنای مقید به عمر، از میان این سه دیدگاه مطرح‌شده، دیدگاه نخست - یعنی صحت بیع - موجه باشد؛ چرا که تقید به عمر هر چند مقرون به جهل به زمان تسلیم است، لکن منتهی به زمان قطعی (وفات) می‌شود؛ لذا غرر صدق نمی‌کند. نسبت به سکنای مطلق نیز، هرچند قول به صحت موجه است؛ لیکن تحلیل‌ها و آثار مطرح‌شده مقرون به واقع نیست. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78244_2343d7e33a725b61839dd72e72987c6c.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 A Discourse on "Social Justice" Through the Lens of Intellectual Property Law: From Delineating a General Theory to the Necessity of Future Governance گفتاری در باب «عدالت اجتماعی» در آیینه حقوق مالکیت فکری: از ترسیم نظریه عمومی تا ضرورت حکمرانی آتی 1843 1874 78248 10.30497/law.2026.249869.3983 FA عمید محمدی استادیار، گروه حقوق، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه جهرم، جهرم، ایران.‏ 0009-0009-8795-7625 Journal Article 2026 01 29  ‌Context & Objective: The intellectual property framework is traditionally conceptualized through an economic and technical lens, positioned as a market mechanism designed to rectify market failures and incentivize innovation. This utilitarian discourse neglects the profound distributive, cultural, and human consequences inherent in these regimes. As a legal institution regulating access to knowledge, health, and technology, intellectual property inherently influences equitable social ideals. The complexities of this influence have intensified amid the digital revolution, biotechnological advancements, and international legal demands, necessitating a reassessment of philosophical foundations. An exclusive economic focus has exacerbated structural inequalities, ranging from restricted access to essential medicines to the monopolization of indigenous knowledge. A central inquiry addresses whether social justice components are effectively institutionalized within the current architecture, or if the system itself acts as a structural impediment to equitable distribution. A theoretical framework is articulated for a balanced paradigm wherein the socio-economic interests of all groups—including asset holders, the public, and marginalized communities—are integrated fairly into the design and execution of these legal systems, moving beyond one-sided economic discourse toward equitable, capability-enhancing governance. ‌Method & Approach: A qualitative and doctrinal analytical methodology is utilized to evaluate the intersection of intellectual property and equitable resource distribution. The theoretical framework is anchored in two prominent theories within the liberal philosophical tradition: John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, and Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice. This foundational analysis is integrated with capability-centric social justice paradigms to construct a comprehensive evaluative mechanism. By juxtaposing Rawls’s structural, goal-oriented perspective—which relies on the veil of ignorance and the difference principle—with Nozick’s strict adherence to absolute private property and a minimal state, the analytical boundaries of legitimate monopoly rights are delineated. ‌Findings: Social justice considerations constitute an inherent element of the nature, normative legitimacy, and ultimate purpose of intellectual property, rather than merely existing as marginal constraints. A functional dependency exists between social justice and social utility; structural inequalities stemming from intellectual monopolies actively undermine long-term economic efficiency and normative legitimacy. Comparative theoretical analysis reveals that the Rawlsian framework, emphasizing the difference principle and equal opportunity, provides a robust justification for limiting intellectual property rights. Mechanisms such as reasonable protection terms, compulsory licensing, and fair use doctrines are validated as essential tools serving the public interest and disadvantaged populations. Conversely, the Nozickian approach, advocating absolute property rights, struggles to accommodate necessary regulatory limitations. An evaluative framework comprising three core criteria—equitable access, inclusivity, and human empowerment—emerges as necessary for reforming intellectual property architectures. Within the Iranian legal system, substantial deficiencies exist regarding these criteria. The current copyright framework features a narrowly defined scope for fair use, restricting it strictly to personal and non-commercial applications. Furthermore, judicial practice concerning compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical patents remains exceptionally limited, and the legal structure lacks mechanisms to protect indigenous knowledge against external appropriation. ‌Conclusion: Resolving the conflict between the monopolization and dissemination of knowledge necessitates a critical re-reading of the philosophical and regulatory foundations of intellectual property through the lens of social justice. Intellectual property operates as a regulatory tool equipped with social obligations rather than an absolute private entitlement. To align the legal framework with equitable standards, specific structural reforms are imperative. The scope of fair use must be redefined by incorporating systematic standards, such as evaluating the commercial nature of the use, the significance of the portion utilized, and the impact on the original market. Transparent executive regulations must be established to facilitate compulsory licenses, prioritizing essential medicines. Implementing an equitable compensation system for the utilization of prior works is essential to maintain innovation incentives while facilitating public access. Adopting complementary policies, including tax incentives for preferential pricing and the integration of shared governance and open-access models, will mitigate existing structural inequalities. Transitioning to this holistic paradigm is an urgent necessity to ensure sustainable legitimacy and practical efficacy, transforming intellectual property into a responsible institution committed to collective human advancement. نوشتار حاضر به بررسی نسبت میان «عدالت اجتماعی» و «حقوق مالکیت فکری» می‌پردازد و می‌کوشد تا نشان دهد که این نظام صرفاً سازوکاری اقتصادی برای رفع شکست بازار و انگیزش نوآوری نیست، بلکه نهادی اجتماعی با پیامدهای توزیعی، فرهنگی و انسانی عمیق است. روش پژوهش از نوع تحلیلی کیفی و مبتنی بر مطالعات کتابخانه‌ای است. چهارچوب نظری مقاله بر دو نظریه مطرح در سنت لیبرال، یعنی عدالت به‌مثابه انصاف جان رالز و عدالت استحقاقی رابرت نوزیک، و سپس نظریه‌های عدالت اجتماعی و قابلیت‌محور استوار است. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که اولاً، ملاحظات عدالت اجتماعی نه امری حاشیه‌ای، بلکه در سرشت، مشروعیت و غایت حقوق مالکیت فکری نهفته‌اند. ثانیاً، میان عدالت اجتماعی و سود اجتماعی رابطه وابستگی عملکردی وجود دارد؛ به گونه‌ای که نابرابری‌های ساختاری ناشی از انحصارهای فکری، کارایی بلندمدت و مشروعیت هنجاری این نظام را تضعیف می‌کند. ثالثاً، بر اساس تحلیل تطبیقی دو نظریه رالز و نوزیک، رویکرد رالزی (با تأکید بر اصل تفاوت و برابری فرصت‌ها) ظرفیت بیشتری برای توجیه محدودیت‌های حقوق مالکیت فکری (مانند مدت حمایت معقول، مجوزهای اجباری و استفاده منصفانه) در راستای منافع عمومی و به‌ویژه اقشار کم‌بهره فراهم می‌آورد. بر این مبنا، مقاله چارچوبی متشکل از سه مؤلفه «دسترسی عادلانه، شمول‌گرایی و توانمندسازی انسانی» را به‌عنوان معیارهایی درونی برای سنجش و اصلاح نظام حقوق مالکیت فکری پیشنهاد می‌دهد. جستار پیش‌روی، با تمرکز بر نظام حقوقی ایران، پیشنهادهایی عملی برای اصلاح قوانین موجود و نیز اتخاذ سیاست‌های مکمل، نظیر الگوبرداری از مدل‌های دسترسی آزاد و حکمرانی اشتراکی ارائه می‌دهد. برآمد نهایی این نوشتار آن است که حل تعارض میان «انحصار» و «اشاعه» دانش در نظام مالکیت فکری، مستلزم بازخوانی مبانی فلسفی و تنظیم‌گرانه مالکیت فکری در پرتو عدالت اجتماعی است؛ رویکردی که می‌تواند هم‌زمان مشروعیت هنجاری، کارایی اقتصادی و پایداری حکمرانی این نظام را سامان بخشد. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78248_7859ac02b47dae490ba85f0daeda6bbe.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 The Obligation to Provide Pre-Contractual Information: A Comparative Study of the 2016 French Contract Law Reforms and Iranian Law تعهد به ارائه اطلاعات پیش قراردادی در حقوق جدید فرانسه و حقوق ایران 1875 1914 78220 10.30497/law.2026.249971.3993 FA مصطفی هراتی استادیار، گروه حقوق خصوصی و بین‌الملل، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه ادیان و مذاهب، قم، ایران. 0000-0001-6954-8443 Journal Article 2026 02 13  ‌Context & Objective: In classical contract law, the pre-contractual phase was largely marginalized and viewed as an unregulated domain based on the theoretical assumption of absolute rational and informational equality between negotiating parties. Under this framework, silence regarding crucial information was considered a permissible manifestation of contractual freedom. However, structural economic transformations have demonstrated that informational parity is frequently an illusion, and consent formed in ignorance lacks the normative quality necessary to legitimize a contract. Consequently, contemporary legal doctrine has shifted toward contractual justice, recognizing that contractual freedom possesses legal value only when exercised within a balanced informational environment. A primary manifestation of this shift is the identification of the obligation to provide pre-contractual information, designed to counteract information asymmetry and guarantee informed consent. Following the 2016 civil code reforms, French law explicitly acknowledges this duty under Article 1112-1. Conversely, Iranian law lacks a general rule regarding the pre-contractual duty to inform. Nevertheless, legal mechanisms such as tadlīs (intentional deception), harmful silence, and civil liability, alongside jurisprudential foundations like the rules of ġurūr (misleading leading to liability), lā ḍarar (the principle of no harm), and the prohibition of akl māl bi-al-bāṭil (consuming wealth unjustly)—which represent one of the most important principles of Islamic contract law—provide the capacity to protect informed consent. The objective is to explain the theoretical foundations of this duty and examine its position, function, and sanctions within both legal systems. ‌Method & Approach: A comparative analytical approach and a doctrinal methodology are utilized. The theoretical foundations of the duty to inform in the pre-contractual stage are explained, followed by an examination of its position and function within the new French law and Iranian law. ‌Findings: The 2016 French civil code reforms transformed the pre-contractual duty to inform into a general, explicit statutory rule under Article 1112-1. French law penalizes intentional silence regarding essential information that determines the other party's consent, provided the uninformed party is legitimately ignorant. The French doctrine establishes a clear boundary between permissible silence and liability-inducing silence, enforcing this duty through pre-contractual civil liability for damages and the annulment of the contract if the withheld information vitiates consent. Conversely, Iranian law operates without a general, independent legislative rule regarding this pre-contractual duty. Protection against information asymmetry in the Iranian system relies on traditional institutions such as tadlīs, harmful silence, and general rules of civil liability. Since tadlīs traditionally requires active deceptive operations, it struggles to encompass intentional silence, limiting its capacity as a comprehensive protective rule. Despite this absence in the general theory of contracts, specific Iranian domains demonstrate progressive regulatory shifts, such as the Electronic Commerce Law of 2003 and the Securities Market Law of 2005, which impose explicit pre-contractual disclosure obligations. Both legal systems align in their normative objectives to protect contractual justice and ensure transactional balance. The fundamental divergence lies entirely in their level of legislative formulation and the institutionalization of this obligation. ‌Conclusion: A normative analysis demonstrates that recognizing and developing a cohesive pre-contractual duty to inform within Iranian law is viable and does not contradict traditional jurisprudential foundations. Existing principles dictate that acquiring wealth through the deliberate exploitation of a negotiating partner's legitimate ignorance is legally impermissible. The pre-contractual duty to inform represents a necessary evolution from absolute formal autonomy to responsible autonomy, ensuring that contractual freedom does not facilitate informational exploitation. To institutionalize this obligation within Iranian law, a dual strategy is required. First, the judicial system must actively interpret existing concepts, such as civil fault and the implicit necessity of good faith, to penalize intentional, harmful silence. Second, targeted legislative reform should establish a general, flexible rule that mandates the disclosure of determinative information and sets proportional sanctions. This structural development will transition the Iranian system from relying on fragmented, reactive protections to establishing institutionalized, preventive contractual justice. مرحله پیش قراردادی در حقوق قراردادهای معاصر، دیگر صرفاً مقدمه‌ای بی‌اثر تلقی نمی‌شود، بلکه به‌عنوان مرحله‌ای مستقل و واجد آثار حقوقی، نقش تعیین‌کننده‌ای در شکل‌گیری رضایت طرفین ایفا می‌کند. یکی از مهم‌ترین جلوه‌های این تحول، شناسایی «تعهد به ارائه اطلاعات پیش قراردادی» است که با هدف مقابله با عدم تعادل اطلاعاتی و تضمین رضایت آگاهانه شکل گرفته است. حقوق جدید فرانسه با اصلاحات قانون مدنی در سال ۲۰۱۶، این تعهد را به‌طور صریح و ساختارمند در قالب ماده 1-1112 به رسمیت شناخته و برای نقض آن ضمانت اجراهای مشخصی پیش‌بینی کرده است. در مقابل، حقوق ایران فاقد قاعده‌ای عام و مستقل در خصوص تعهد اطلاع‌رسانی پیش‌ قراردادی است، اما نهادهایی چون تدلیس، سکوت زیان‌بار و مسئولیت مدنی، در کنار مبانی فقهی مانند قاعده غرور، لاضرر و منع اکل مال به باطل، ظرفیت تحلیل و حمایت از رضایت آگاهانه را فراهم می‌سازند. این نوشتار با رویکردی تحلیلی تطبیقی، ضمن تبیین مبانی نظری تعهد اطلاع‌رسانی در مرحله پیش‌ قراردادی، به بررسی جایگاه و کارکرد آن در حقوق جدید فرانسه و حقوق ایران می‌پردازد و نقاط اشتراک و افتراق دو نظام را آشکار می‌سازد. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که هرچند دو نظام حقوقی از حیث هدف، یعنی حمایت از عدالت و تعادل قراردادی همسو هستند، لکن تفاوت اساسی آن‌ها در سطح تقنین و نهادینه‌سازی این تعهد است. در پایان، مقاله می‌کوشد با ارائه تحلیلی هنجاری، امکان شناسایی و توسعه تعهد اطلاع‌رسانی پیش ‌قراردادی در حقوق ایران را بدون تعارض با مبانی فقهی و اصول حاکم بر حقوق قراردادها نشان دهد. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78220_7d7e61615cc2e2996d2840c781fa483b.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 The Influence of Penal Populism on Community Punishments: A Critical Analysis of Judicial Blogging نگاهی به مجازات‌های اجتماعی از منظر عوام‌گرایی کیفری؛ درنگی در پدیده قاضی‌بلاگری 1915 1954 78227 10.30497/law.2026.249538.3940 FA نرجس ملکی دانشجوی دکتری حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران. 0009-0009-5159-552X علی‌مراد حیدری دانشیار، گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران. 0000-0001-5456-3990 Journal Article 2025 11 28  ‌Context & Objective: The expansion of social media has facilitated the growth of online content creation across various professions, recently encompassing the judicial sector. Judicial blogging is a novel phenomenon where judges publish verdicts, hearing details, and legal opinions on dedicated profiles, actively engaging with public commentary. A frequently scrutinized subject of these shared decisions involves community punishments, which serve as alternatives to traditional imprisonment. While the community-oriented nature of these alternative sentences inherently enables populist tendencies, the extensive media exposure of judicial decisions constitutes a primary catalyst for the broader manifestation of penal populism. Penal populism in this context denotes an approach where justice mechanisms prioritize public sentiment and popularity over evidence-based legal doctrines. Consequently, a fundamental critique of judicial blogging is the emergence of a populist approach in the adjudication of community punishments. The primary objective of this research is to rigorously examine the influence of penal populism on the issuance of community punishment verdicts, focusing specifically on judicial blogging, and investigating how this public-facing activity affects the core principles governing the judicial process. ‌Method & Approach: To address the research objectives, the study utilized a qualitative content analysis methodology to evaluate the digital footprint of the targeted subjects. Content analysis serves to determine the presence, meaning, and relationships of specific themes within qualitative data structures, encompassing language, music, and imagery. The sampling involved the selection of dedicated Instagram pages belonging to five active Iranian blogging judges. Within these profiles, specific posts directly pertaining to the issuance of community punishments were systematically identified. Subsequently, the content of these targeted posts was subjected to rigorous thematic evaluation. This analytical process encompassed a comprehensive review of the primary visual materials, the accompanying textual captions, quantifiable metrics of audience approval, and the qualitative data derived from the postscripts and direct comments submitted by the online audience. ‌Findings: The analysis reveals that judicial blogging concerning community punishments actively fosters an environment conducive to penal populism, leading to significant procedural deficiencies within the justice system. A primary finding is the contradiction between this practice and the principle of judicial independence. By exposing verdicts to public scrutiny, judges become susceptible to public opinion, where audience approval dictates decision-making and shifts the focus from legal merit to public validation. This dynamic results in the dominance of emotional responses over rational jurisprudence, distancing the judicial process from professional expertise. Furthermore, many publicized, innovative community punishments lack fundamental deterrent capabilities. Sentences designed to garner social media praise often resemble rewards, failing to impose tangible costs on offenders and emboldening others to commit similar infractions. The study identifies a problematic diversion of judicial resources; maintaining an active social media presence consumes substantial time that should be dedicated to meticulous case review. Educational objectives are frequently compromised to attract audiences, leading to the publication of professionally inappropriate content, such as analyzing colloquial music to explain offenses under taʿzīrāt (discretionary punishments in Islamic Panel Code of Iran). Additionally, scientific legal critique is routinely overshadowed by superficial audience commentary focusing on the judge's physical appearance. Finally, numerous published verdicts blatantly conflict with existing legal statutes by mandating financial expenditures rather than physical or intellectual labor. ‌Conclusion: The intersection of judicial duties and social media blogging poses a severe threat to the integrity of the criminal justice system by facilitating the intrusion of penal populism into formal adjudication. While the legislative intent behind community punishments was to reduce prison populations and promote social rehabilitation, the lack of precise statutory definitions has allowed judicial discretion to evolve into legally unfounded, theatrical sentencing designed for public consumption. These performative verdicts fundamentally compromise the realization of justice, undermine criminal deterrence, and violate the core principle of the legality of crimes and punishments. Although judicial authorities attempt to encourage alternative sentencing through official festivals, the specific manifestations promoted by blogging judges frequently lack legal justification and necessary supervisory mechanisms. To preserve judicial independence, it is imperative for the legislature to explicitly clarify the legal texts governing community punishments. Concurrently, the judicial apparatus must strictly enforce professional conduct standards, expressly prohibiting judges from engaging in blogging activities related to their profession to safeguard the legal system from the destabilizing effects of penal populism. امروزه با گسترش شبکه‌های اجتماعی و استفاده از فضای مجازی، پدیده بلاگری از جمله فعالیت‌هایی است که توسط افراد گوناگون در حال افزایش است. یکی از مشاغلی که به‌مرور پا در این عرصه نهاده است، قضاوت است؛ بدین صورت که دادرسان محاکم، آراء صادره، جلسات رسیدگی، نظرات و تجربیات خود را در صفحات اختصاصی خود منتشر کرده و با بازخوردها و اظهارنظرهای مخاطبین مواجه می‌شوند. در این میان یکی از آرائی که در این صفحات به‌کرّات دیده می‌شود و واکنش زیادی را هم از سوی مردم به‌دنبال دارد، احکام راجع به مجازات‌های اجتماعی است. هر چند ماهیت عامه‌پسند مجازات‌های اجتماعی و تحسین عمومی، و مآلا صدور این‌گونه کیفرها به جای زندان، به‌خودی‌خود زمینه عوام‌گرایی را فراهم می‌آورد، لکن رسانه‌ای شدن آراء قضایی، از عوامل مهمی است که می‌تواند زمینه بروز عوام‌گرایی کیفری در سطحی وسیع‌تر را فراهم نماید؛ از این روی، یکی از ایراداتی که به پدیده قاضی‌بلاگری وارد است، بروز رویکرد عوام‌گرایانه در آراء مربوط به مجازات‌های اجتماعی است. در این پژوهش، صفحه اینستاگرامی پنج نفر از قاضی‌بلاگرها انتخاب گردیده، پست‌ها و پی‌نوشت‌های ایشان با روش تحلیل مضمون مورد بررسی واقع شده‌ است. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که قاضی‌بلاگری در زمینه مجازات‌های اجتماعی با ایجاد زمینه‌های عوام‌گرایی کیفری، با ایراداتی هم‌چون مخالفت با استقلال قضایی و تحقق عدالت، غلبه احساس بر عقل و دوری از خبره‌گرایی، نداشتن جنبه بازدارندگی و تجرّی دیگران و امثال‌ذلک مواجه است. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78227_39c6336dafc41f453552eb4bc2cd1a79.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Convicts' Acquiescence to Judgments: The Necessity of Restricting Prosecutorial Appeals in the Criminal Procedure of Iran ضرورت تحدید حق تجدیدنظرخواهی دادستان در تسلیم به رأی شدن محکومان کیفری 1955 1986 78245 10.30497/law.2026.249642.3954 FA وحید دادگستر دانشجوی دکتری حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق قضایی، دانشگاه علوم قضایی و خدمات اداری، تهران، ایران. 0009-0009-4376-8849 فرید محسنی استاد، گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق قضایی، دانشگاه علوم قضایی و خدمات اداری، تهران، ایران. 0009-0000-5622-6998 Journal Article 2025 12 14  ‌Context & Objective: Acquiescence to judgment (submitting to a trial court's verdict and waiving the right to appeal in exchange for a mandatory sentence reduction) is a prevalent leniency mechanism in the Iranian criminal justice system. According to Article 442 of the Iranian Criminal Procedure Code, convicts who waive or withdraw their appeal against taʿzīr (a punishment determined at the discretion of the Islamic judge and lesser than the fixed ḥadd penalty) sentences before the judgment becomes final are entitled to mitigation, provided neither the prosecutor nor the private complainant appeals the decision. Despite the apparent simplicity of this statutory provision, its implementation reveals hidden legal complexities, as evidenced by the issuance of four precedent-setting judgments by the Supreme Court of Iran. A fundamental procedural challenge within this framework is the ambiguous role and operational conduct of the public prosecutor. Due to statutory brevity and doctrinal silence on this specific issue, prosecutorial intervention often depends on the personal preferences of judicial authorities rather than objective legal criteria. The primary purpose of this research is to define the logical boundaries of the prosecutor's right to appeal in such scenarios. Consequently, the main research question asks what the legitimate approach of the public prosecutor should be when confronting criminal convicts who submit to their initial judgments. ‌Method & Approach: This research employs an applied, doctrinal methodology alongside a descriptive-analytical approach to investigate the prosecutor's role in the appellate process. The study systematically interprets relevant provisions of the Iranian Criminal Procedure Code and evaluates various legal arguments, scholarly doctrines, and opposing viewpoints regarding the necessity and extent of prosecutorial appeals. ‌Findings: The investigation reveals three primary findings regarding the restriction of prosecutorial appeals. First, the pursuit of offenders through prosecutorial appeals against initial convictions must be measured, proportionate, and aligned with the principle of prosecutorial discretion rather than mandatory prosecution. When defendants submit to their initial convictions, the prosecutor's right to appeal should be inherently limited to serve broader strategic objectives, including the reduction of procedural stages, adherence to the principle of reasonable time in criminal proceedings, victim protection through the swift restoration of damages, the facilitation of convict rehabilitation, and the reduction of the penal population in prisons. Second, a protective, differential approach governs the leniency mechanism in the context of child and juvenile delinquency. The prosecutor is generally prohibited from appealing juvenile court judgments under the pretext of disproportionate sentencing, thereby insulating the juvenile's acquiescence to judgment from prosecutorial disruption. Third, the current legal framework necessitates substantial legislative revision concerning specific offenses. The findings emphasize that the legislature must establish an absolute prohibition on prosecutorial intervention regarding convicts' submission to judgments in forgivable crimes, taʿzīr crimes against chastity—which are subject to the Islamic criminal policy of concealment and non-investigation—and degree-seven taʿzīr offenses, where judicial leniency is inherently prioritized. ‌Conclusion: The legal implications of this study confirm that the overarching framework for prosecutorial appeals, in circumstances where the defendant complies with the initial trial court conviction, must be rigidly founded upon the principle of minimal intervention. While the right to a second hearing and the avoidance of judicial errors remain fundamental to fair trial standards, unchecked prosecutorial appeals undermine the efficiency and rehabilitative potential of the acquiescence mechanism. A minimalist prosecutorial approach acts as an essential procedural balance, transforming the public prosecutor from an unrestrained authority into a judicial manager who effectively harmonizes public interest with individual rights and liberties. To legally codify this minimal intervention and resolve existing judicial inconsistencies, the legislature must intervene directly. The study concludes by proposing a specific statutory amendment to Article 442 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This proposed addendum would explicitly nullify the prosecutor's right to appeal when a convict submits to the verdict in forgivable crimes, chastity offenses, degree-seven taʿzīr crimes, and all sentences issued by juvenile courts, thereby guaranteeing the procedural integrity and intended leniency of the acquiescence mechanism. تسلیم به رأی شدن، یکی از رایج‌ترین معاذیر قانونی تخفیف مجازات است. محکومان کیفری با اسقاط حق اعتراض یا استرداد درخواست تجدیدنظرخواهی نسبت به کلیه محکومیت‌های تعزیری تا پیش از قطعیت حکم، مشروط به عدم‌ اقدام دادستان یا حسب‌ مورد شاکی خصوصی، شایسته بهره‌مندی از این نهاد ارفاقی هستند. علی‌رغم ظاهر روان ماده‌ ۴۴۲ قانون آیین دادرسی کیفری، زوایای پنهان و پیچیده‌ای در تسلیم به رأی شدن وجود دارد. گواه این ادعا، صدور چهار رأی وحدت رویه در این زمینه است که‌ نشان از اهمیت و جایگاه ویژه این مفهوم «سهل و ممتنع» در نظام آیینی ما دارد. در این مقوله، یکی از چالش‌های اساسی، نحوه عملکرد دادستان است. موضوعی که به‌ لحاظ اجمال قانون و سکوت دکترین، بیش از آن که تابع ضوابط حقوقی باشد به سلیقه مقامات‌ قضایی گره خورده‌ است. سؤال اصلی مقاله آن است که رویکرد مدعی‌العموم در مواجهه با تسلیم به رأی شدن محکومان کیفری چیست؟ در این نوشتار، با روش توصیفی تحلیلی و از نوع کاربردی، یافته‌های پیش‌رو حاصل شد: (1) تعقیب مجرمین از طریق تجدیدنظرخواهی دادستان نسبت به آرای محکومیت، می‌بایست به‌صورت سنجیده و متناسب باشد و در صورت تسلیم شدن متهمان نسبت به محکومیت نخستین، می‌بایست حق اعتراض دادستان محدود گردد. (2) رویکرد افتراقی حمایت‌گرا نسبت به کودکان و نوجوانان، معارض قانون در این نهاد ارفاقی حاکم است. (3) بازنگری و اصلاح قانون در حیطه جرایم قابل‌گذشت، منافی عفت و تعزیری درجه هفت، بر مدار ممنوعیت دادستان از هرگونه دخالت نسبت به این موضوع، می‌بایست مورد تقنین واقع گردد. ماحصل جستار این است که چارچوب پژوهش‌خواهی دادستان، با وصف تمکین متهم به رأی محکومیت بدوی، باید بنا بر اصل مداخله حداقلی باشد. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78245_11fb61ec5f974dca9f9edb2ba3a8eabc.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Mechanism for Protecting Developing Ideas as an Intellectual Asset in Iranian Law: Foundations and Methods سازوکار حمایت از ایده در حال توسعه به‌مثابه مال فکری در حقوق ایران: مبانی و روش‌ها 1987 2024 78221 10.30497/law.2026.249580.3946 FA محمد نظام‌الملکی دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد حقوق مالکیت فکری، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. 0009-0005-8542-2185 جعفر نظام‌الملکی دانش‌آموخته دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. 0000-0003-3386-0624 Journal Article 2025 12 05  ‌ Context & Objective: In the knowledge-based economy, a developing idea represents a highly vulnerable intellectual asset positioned midway between a mere abstract concept and a fully realized, registrable innovation. While it serves as the critical foundation for technological and commercial advancement, the traditional intellectual property system operates on the fundamental principle of the non-protection of ideas, thereby excluding these intermediate assets from exclusive legal rights. This regulatory void disproportionately affects sectors requiring extensive research and development periods, exposing inventors to the risk of misappropriation prior to commercialization and consequently stifling the incentive to innovate. The primary objective of this research is to critically evaluate and challenge the traditional theoretical foundations that deny legal protection to developing ideas. Furthermore, it seeks to explore how a tailored protection mechanism for this specific legal entity can be justified and implemented within the Iranian legal system. This research addresses the economic and strategic necessity of protection and poses the central question of whether existing legal frameworks can adequately safeguard these assets or if a novel, exceptional legal regime is required to foster a secure environment for early-stage innovations.  ‌Method & Approach: The research strictly employs a doctrinal methodology combined with a critical analytical approach. It systematically evaluates existing legal literature, statutory provisions, and jurisprudential principles to deconstruct the traditional paradigms of intellectual property law.  ‌Findings: The analysis demonstrates that a developing idea fundamentally differs from a mere abstract thought; it is defined by three distinct elements: it is innovative and potentially valuable, it remains in the formative stage and thus falls outside existing legal protections, and it possesses concrete applied and commercial potential resulting from significant preliminary investment. Traditional justifications for non-protection, such as the public interest argument and restrictive interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence, are systematically refuted. Specifically, doctrines like ḥurmat kitmān al-ʿilm (the religious prohibition against concealing essential knowledge) and the obligation to disseminate learning apply primarily to religious or vital public knowledge, not to commercially driven developing ideas. Furthermore, the application of Locke's labor theory supports protection, as these ideas are the direct product of substantial intellectual effort. Consequently, the developing idea aligns perfectly with the five fundamental characteristics of an intellectual asset: it holds potential economic value, is non-material, originates from mental effort, exhibits originality, and possesses sensory perceivability through preliminary documentation or prototyping. Despite this compatibility, an assessment of current Iranian legal frameworks reveals profound inadequacies. The trade secrets model structurally conflicts with the developing idea's inherent need for information exchange and collaborative testing, prioritizing absolute secrecy over developmental sharing. Similarly, the unfair competition model proves practically ineffective due to the heavy evidentiary burden required to establish subjective fault, negligence, and direct causation in cases of misappropriation.  ‌Conclusion: To ensure the continuous flow of innovation and mitigate the risks associated with early-stage disclosure, it is vital to establish an exceptional and conditional legal mechanism for the protection of developing ideas. Rather than creating a wholly distinct legal entity, this mechanism should be integrated as a specialized subset within existing intellectual property frameworks. The protection granted must be strictly temporary, bridging the gap only until the innovation achieves full registrability. Furthermore, the allocation of rights must be highly specific: the innovator should retain absolute moral rights, while material rights must be limited to negative rights—specifically the legal capacity to prevent unauthorized third-party exploitation—and the granting of priority rights for future registration. Finally, to ensure efficiency and technical accuracy, the evaluation and verification of these developing ideas should be delegated to specialized intellectual property offices or academic technology parks, explicitly removing the initial assessment burden from general courts to prevent systemic legal delays. در اقتصاد دانش‌بنیان، ایده در حال توسعه به عنوان یک دارایی فکری آسیب‌پذیر، حد فاصل میان ایده صِرف و نوآوری نهایی، نیازمند حمایت است؛ حال آنکه نظام سنتی مالکیت فکری بر اساس اصل «عدم حمایت از ایده»، مانع این حمایت شده و انگیزه نوآوری را تضعیف می‌کند. این پژوهش به شیوه تحلیلی انتقادی و با هدف نقد این مبانی سنتی و اثبات قابلیت حمایت از این نهاد متمایز، ابتدا ماهیت ایده در حال توسعه را بر اساس مؤلفه‌های نوآورانه، بالقوه ارزشمند و دارای پتانسیل تجاری تبیین می‌کند و سپس، ضمن به چالش کشیدن مبانی سنتی عدم حمایت، نشان می‌دهد که ایده در حال توسعه با ویژگی‌های مال فکری انطباق دارد. با این وجود، ارزیابی مدل‌های حمایتی موجود در حقوق ایران، از جمله اسرار تجاری و رقابت غیرمنصفانه، حاکی از آن است که این مدل‌ها به دلیل تعارض ساختاری (نیاز به تبادل در برابر محرمانگی) و دشواری اثبات تقصیر، برای حمایت از این ایده ناکارآمد هستند. بر این اساس، پژوهش حاضر استدلال می‌نماید که برای تضمین جریان نوآوری، تدوین یک سازوکار حمایت استثنایی و مشروط حیاتی است؛ این سازوکار باید در قالب‌های موجود مالکیت فکری، با اعطای حمایت موقت و حقوق خاص (شامل حقوق معنوی کامل و حقوق مادی سلبی)، متناسب با ماهیت بینابینی ایده در حال توسعه، اجرا شود. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78221_eccc00be33dfd0d07bb462958effd287.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 A Comparative Legal Analysis of Banking Confidentiality under Iranian and Swiss Law مبانی و چالش‌های حقوقی حفظ رازداری نسبت به اسرار بانکی در حقوق ایران و سوئیس 2025 2060 78239 10.30497/law.2026.249312.3909 FA محمدرضا ایران‌نژاد دانشجوی دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران. فرهاد پروین دانشیار، گروه حقوق خصوصی و اقتصادی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران. نجادعلی الماسی استاد، گروه حقوق خصوصی و اسلامی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2025 10 27  ‌Context & Objective: The commitment to banking confidentiality is a fundamental principle within the global banking industry, emphasizing the duty of banks, acting in a fiduciary capacity, to protect the financial and identity-related privacy of their clients. As drivers of economic growth and capital attraction, financial institutions must prioritize secrecy. However, modern banking ecosystems introduce significant challenges to maintaining this privacy. In jurisdictions such as Switzerland, this duty is reflected in strict legislative frameworks where even inadvertent breaches are subject to criminal sanctions. Conversely, the Iranian legal system lacks a specific, unified statute governing confidentiality and its corresponding enforcement guarantees, relying instead on scattered legal foundations. The multiplicity of state entities authorized to access client information and a lack of transparency regarding jurisdictions have historically marginalized banking secrecy in Iran. This study investigates the legal foundations, sources, and multifaceted challenges of maintaining banking secrecy through a comparative legal analysis of the Iranian and Swiss jurisdictions. ‌Method & Approach: The research employs a doctrinal legal methodology to analyze the statutory texts, regulatory frameworks, and legal principles governing banking confidentiality in both jurisdictions. To supplement the doctrinal analysis and consolidate practical insights, the study utilizes structured interviews to gather the perspectives of twenty recognized subject-matter experts. This panel consists exclusively of current and former senior executives from the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iranian National Tax Administration, the General Inspection Office, the Supreme Audit Court, the broader banking network, and the Financial Intelligence Unit. ‌Findings: The comparative analysis reveals stark contrasts in legislative architectures. Switzerland maintains a robust legal regime rooted in its Civil Code, Penal Code, and Article 47 of the Federal Banking Act, which explicitly criminalizes breaches of banking secrecy. In contrast, Iranian jurisprudence relies on fragmented provisions, including Article 25 of the Constitution, Article 648 of the Islamic Penal Code, the Electronic Commerce Law, and the Central Bank Law. None of these provide a comprehensive framework defining banking secrecy, its scope, or precise penalties for its breach. The study identifies several primary challenges, notably the inherent conflict between individual privacy and state supervision. Additional challenges include insufficient enforcement mechanisms for unauthorized disclosures in Iran, the pressure of international sanctions and reporting obligations to international bodies, and the tension between attracting capital and meeting transparency requirements. Furthermore, systemic vulnerabilities in Iran often result in unauthorized data exposure during legally mandated disclosure procedures, risking a severe loss of public trust and subsequent economic instability. Iranian experts unanimously confirmed the inadequacy of current domestic laws, highlighting the absence of specialized criminalization. ‌Conclusion: While absolute banking secrecy is globally shifting toward greater transparency to combat financial crimes, limitations on this duty must strictly align with public interest without disproportionately compromising privacy. Switzerland successfully balances these competing interests, retaining its status as a global financial center by strictly limiting disclosures to specified legal and judicial exceptions. Conversely, the lack of a dedicated legal framework in Iran leads to inconsistent enforcement and arbitrary privacy breaches, facilitating capital flight and broader economic damage. To mitigate these risks, the Iranian legislature must draft and enact a comprehensive, unified statute defining the exact parameters, authorized access levels, and stringent penalties regarding banking secrecy. In the interim, incorporating explicit non-disclosure clauses into standard banking contracts is recommended as a practical safeguard against unauthorized disclosures. تعهد به رازداری و حفظ اسرار بانکی به‌عنوان یکی از اصول اساسی در صنعت بانکداری دنیا، از دیرباز مورد توجه بوده است؛ به‌گونه‌ای که مهم‌ترین وظیفه بانکداران به عنوان امین، حفاظت از حریم اطلاعات هویتی و مالی مشتریان است. در واقع، بانک ها و مؤسسات مالی به‌عنوان موتور محرک اقتصاد و عامل مؤثر در جذب سرمایه‌ها و رشد اقتصادی هر کشور، می‌بایست بیش از هر نهاد دیگری، رازداری را در سرلوحه امور قرار دهند. اما امروزه، با پیدایش بانکداری نوین و توسعه زیست بوم بانکداری، تعهد به رازداری و رعایت حریم خصوصی اطلاعاتی مشتریان با چالش‌های متعدد مواجه است. در برخی کشورها هم‌چون سوئیس، به‌دلیل اهمیت موضوع، نقض سهوی این تعهد نیز دارای ضمانت اجرای کیفری است و به‌طور خاص، جرم‌انگاری شده است. اما در ایران، علی‌رغم وجود مبانی حقوقی و قوانین پراکنده در باب رازداری، قانون خاصی که ناظر بر این وظیفه، و ضمانت اجرای نقض آن در شبکه بانکی باشد به‌چشم نمی‌خورد. گفتنی است، سوئیس به‌دلیل پایبندی به اصول رازداری و ایجاد محدودیت‌های قانونی برای افشای اطلاعات بانکی - حتی برای مقامات مالیاتی - به‌یکی از مهم‌ترین مراکز مالی دنیا تبدیل شده است. در ایران، به‌دلیل تعدد نهادهای قانونی مجاز برای دسترسی به اطلاعات بانکی مشتریان و فقدان شفافیت لازم در حوزه صلاحیت‌ها، اختیارات و سطوح دسترسی، همواره موضوع رازداری و حفظ اسرار بانکی به‌عنوان اصول حرفه‌ای، مغفول بوده است. محققین در این نوشتار، با بهره‌گیری از روش توصیفی تحلیلی و جمع‌بندی نظر خبرگان این حوزه از طریق مصاحبه ساختاریافته، با رویکرد تطبیقی، به بررسی موضوع می‌پردازند. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78239_a5580a298167dc6a2ca0a37a4146a716.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Legal Framework for the Promulgation of Business Regulations in Iran موازین حقوقی انتشار مقررات حاکم بر محیط کسب‌وکار در ایران 2061 2110 78228 10.30497/law.2026.250295.4054 FA محمد صادقی دانش‌آموخته دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشگاه مفید، قم، ایران. 0000-0002-3445-7549 محمدرضا مرادیان نیری دانشجوی دکتری حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2026 05 11  ‌Context & Objective: The promulgation of regulations, functioning in parallel with the promulgation of statutes, constitutes a pivotal element in recognizing and securing the rights of stakeholders within the business environment. Within the Iranian legal system, the enactment of the Law on Continuous Improvement of the Business Environment and its subsequent decrees initiated a formal legal structuring of this domain. However, profound ambiguities persist due to structural and linguistic complexities, the temporal and spatial dispersion of regulations, and the absence of a clear doctrinal articulation regarding the exact nature and consequences of failing to publish regulatory norms. Inadequate or fragmented publication generates severe information asymmetry among market actors, fosters regulatory monopolies that enable corruption, and compromises the fundamental economic rights of citizens who rely on timely access to legal mandates. The primary objective is to elucidate the foundations, specific criteria, and standards of regulatory promulgation governing business activities. Consequently, the inquiry seeks to reconstruct the institutional and normative framework of the Iranian legal system, specifically addressing whether the mandate to publish regulations holds intrinsic legal subjecthood or serves merely as an informational mechanism. Furthermore, it aims to assess the legal sanctions applicable to non-publication or defective publication, evaluating the mechanisms available to compensate stakeholders and enforce state accountability. ‌Method & Approach: The inquiry employs a doctrinal methodology, navigating a dialectical path positioned precisely at the intersection of economic law and administrative law. A descriptive-analytical approach is utilized, relying extensively on targeted library resources and statutory analysis to unpack the conceptual underpinnings of regulatory dissemination. ‌Findings: Effective regulatory governance in the business sector necessitates rigorous adherence to five core criteria: meaningful stakeholder participation through public consultation, comprehensive and accessible information dissemination, timely publication incorporating mandatory implementation grace periods, clear and unambiguous legal drafting devoid of excessive technicality, and a robust regime of diverse, multi-layered sanctions. Under current Iranian legislation, specifically Article 30 of the Law on Continuous Improvement of the Business Environment, a regulation deployed without adhering to the prescribed digital publication standards does not fall under the category of absolute nullity. Instead, it is classified under a state of ʿadam-e nofūz (lack of legal penetration, signifying a suspended state of enforceability and validity that restricts the regulation from binding third parties until statutory publication conditions are retroactively fulfilled). While the normative framework theoretically conditions the enforceability of business rules on their registration in a centralized digital database, substantial discrepancies remain between codified law and executive practice. Institutional weaknesses, fragmented data infrastructure, non-compliance with prescribed consultation periods, and an absence of explicit administrative, civil, or penal sanctions for bureaucratic delays currently restrict the practical efficacy of these transparency mechanisms, leaving the burden of enforcement largely on post-facto judicial interpretation. ‌Conclusion: The promulgation of economic regulations transcends symbolic administrative formalities; it constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for the substantive validity of legal norms and the realization of market predictability. This necessity is deeply anchored in the broader doctrine of the rule of law and the fundamental Islamic jurisprudential principle of qobḥ-e ʿeqāb belā bayān (the repugnance of punishment without prior declaration, dictating that legal obligations cannot be enforced or penalized without prior, clear, and public communication). Although the Iranian legal framework has conceptually advanced by shifting from the traditional monopoly of the official gazette to linking the legal enforceability of business regulations to mandatory registration and public digital dissemination, the system remains nascent in its administrative execution. To bridge the critical gap between normative design and practical application, it is imperative to establish stringent institutional oversight mechanisms, institutionalize proactive stakeholder engagement, enforce specific civil and administrative liability regimes against regulatory bodies for publication delays, and mandate plain-language drafting. Without these structural reforms, the procedural requirement of promulgation risks being reduced to an ineffective administrative ritual, thereby failing to secure economic stability, prevent rent-seeking, and protect the legitimate expectations of market participants. «انتشار مقررات» به‌موازات «انتشار قوانین» در فرایند وضع و اجرا، از جمله عناصر محوری در شناسایی حقوق ذی‌نفعان به‌شمار می‌آید. در ایران‌، با تصویب قانون بهبود مستمر محیط کسب‌وکار یا مقررات وابسته و مرتبط، گام‌هایی برای صورت‌بندی حقوقی این حوزه برداشته شده است. با این‌حال، به‌سبب پیچیدگی‌های ساختاری و زبانی، و پراکندگی مکانی و زمانی مقررات و نیز فقدان تبیین روشن از ماهیت و آثار عدم انتشار، هم‌چنان ابهام‌های جدی در این زمینه باقی است. پژوهش پیشا‌روی با روشی توصیفی‌ تحلیلی، از پی دیالکتیکی در میانه حقوق اقتصادی و حقوق اداری، درصدد است که نخست، مبانی، معیارها و ضوابط «انتشار مقررات» در محیط کسب‌وکار را تبیین و بررسی کند و از خلال این بستر تحلیلی، با جست‌وجو در قوانین و مقررات حاکم، به برشماری و بازسازی چارچوب نهادی و هنجاری نظام حقوقی ایران در نسبت با تنظیم‌گری انتشار مقررات نایل شود. سپس، با استناد به مقررات قانونی جاری، ضمانت‌اجراهای عدم انتشار یا انتشار ناقص مقررات را تحلیل کرده تا از رهگذر این مهم که انتشار مقررات منصرف از مقوله‌هایی چون ابلاغ بوده و این مقوله، در فرایند تدوین و تصویب مقررات از ارزش خاصی برخوردار است، نظام حقوقی انتشار مقررات حاکم بر کسب‌وکار در ایران را به وضوح و تمایز ارزیابی نماید. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78228_91aee38e9237f2cefac124a1aabd5f6a.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Licensing Moratorium on Payment Service Providers in the Iranian Legal System تحلیل حقوقی توقف صدور مجوز شرکت‌های ارائه‌دهنده خدمات پرداخت؛ واکاوی رأی هیئت تجدیدنظر شورای رقابت 2111 2136 78230 10.30497/law.2026.249640.3952 FA محمدصادق فراهانی پسادکتری حقوق فناوری، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران. 0000-0002-9881-1463 محمد هاشمی دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده معارف اسلامی و حقوق، دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام، تهران، ایران. 0009-0005-5785-6816 Journal Article 2025 12 13  ‌Context & Objective: The expanding role of payment service providers in the global financial ecosystem and the increasing reliance of digital transactions on their infrastructure necessitate a rigorous review of regulatory policies. Over a decade ago, the Central Bank of Iran restricted the payment market to twelve companies, effectively halting the issuance of new licenses. This policy created a static market structure, prompting a formal complaint to the Iranian Competition Council, which initially ruled the moratorium as anti-competitive. However, the Board of Appeal overturned this decision, raising fundamental questions about market regulation. The objective of this research is to evaluate the legal validity of the Central Bank of Iran's cessation of licensing for payment service providers. Specifically, the central research question investigates how this licensing moratorium and the subsequent appellate ruling are interpreted under the competition rules within the Iranian legal system. ‌Method & Approach: This research is conducted using a doctrinal methodology integrated with a legal-institutional analysis model. It systematically examines the legal, economic, and regulatory dimensions of the Central Bank's licensing moratorium. The study analyzes the administrative decisions and the Board of Appeal's ruling strictly within the framework of domestic competition laws, statutory anti-monopoly provisions, and the constitutional mandates governing the national market. ‌Findings: The analysis reveals that the Central Bank's prolonged refusal to issue new licenses constitutes a violation of statutory duties, particularly Article 7 of the Law on the Implementation of the General Policies of Article Forty-Four of the Constitution of Iran, which expressly prohibits denying business licenses under the pretext of market saturation. Furthermore, the regulatory mandate stipulating that banking institutions must hold a minimum of fifty-one percent of the shares in any payment service provider restricts the market entry of independent firms and institutionalizes a discriminatory advantage for established credit institutions. The evaluation of the Board of Appeal's ruling demonstrates fundamental flaws. Procedurally, the board accepted the Central Bank's appeal well beyond the mandatory twenty-day statutory deadline. Substantively, the board failed to address the Central Bank's direct contravention of binding Cabinet approvals aimed at eliminating monopolies, improperly justifying the restrictive practices by citing broad prudential regulatory concerns. ‌Conclusion: The monopoly engineered by the Central Bank's licensing moratorium lacks valid legal justification and practically results in market obstruction, the entrenchment of existing corporate dominance, and the perpetuation of anti-competitive behavior. The Board of Appeal's decision to overturn the Competition Council's initial ruling is devoid of sufficient legal foundation. To genuinely enforce anti-monopoly legal requirements and restore healthy competition within the national payment ecosystem, it is necessary to amend the prevailing executive regulations. Specifically, the regulatory framework must be reformed to eliminate the mandatory fifty-one percent bank ownership requirement. Abolishing this structural barrier will facilitate the participation of independent investors and align the Central Bank's regulatory architecture with its statutory obligations. گسترش نقش شرکت‌های ارائه‌دهنده خدمات پرداخت در زیست‌بوم مالی کشور و وابستگی روزافزون تراکنش‌های الکترونیکی به زیرساخت‌های این شرکت‌ها، بررسی سیاست‌های تنظیم‌گری در این حوزه را به ضرورتی اجتناب‌ناپذیر تبدیل کرده است. تصمیم بانک مرکزی مبنی بر توقف صدور مجوز برای تأسیس شرکت‌های جدید، از جمله سیاست‌هایی بود که آثار مستقیم آن بر رقابت، ورود بازیگران جدید و ساختار بازار، نیازمند ارزیابی دقیق و مبتنی بر قواعد حقوق رقابت شد. اهمیت این پژوهش از آن جهت پدید آمد که خلأ تحلیل منسجم از منظر حقوق رقابت در خصوص این تصمیم، امکان تفسیر نادرست آن و شکل‌گیری رویه‌های محدودکننده را افزایش می‌داد. بر همین اساس، مسأله اصلی پژوهش چنین طرح شد که «توقف صدور مجوز شرکت‌های ارائه‌دهنده خدمات پرداخت از سوی بانک مرکزی، از منظر قواعد رقابت در نظام حقوقی ایران چگونه تفسیر می‌شود؟» این پژوهش با روش توصیفی تحلیلی با الگوی تحلیل حقوقی نهادی انجام شد و در آن تلاش گردید ابعاد حقوقی، اقتصادی و تنظیم‌گری تصمیم مذکور بررسی و در چارچوب قوانین و مقررات حوزه رقابت تحلیل شود. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان داد که شرط تملک حداقل ۵۱ درصد از سهام شرکت‌های ارائه‌دهنده خدمات پرداخت توسط بانک‌ها، نه‌تنها امکان حضور بازیگران جدید و مستقل را در بازار محدود کرده، بلکه زمینه ایجاد مزیت تبعیض‌آمیز برای مؤسسات اعتباری را فراهم آورده است. تحلیل رأی هیئت تجدیدنظر نیز حاکی شد که، علی‌رغم محرز بودن برخی مؤلفه‌های ایجاد محدودیت رقابتی، هیئت مذکور به‌طور کامل به ابعاد حقوقی و اقتصادی شرط سهامداری توجه نکرده و استدلال‌های آن از انسجام لازم برخوردار نیست. بر این اساس، نتیجه پژوهش نشان داد که اصلاح بند ۱ ماده ۱۵ ضوابط اجرایی و حذف الزام به تملک حداقل ۵۱ درصد سهام، شرط لازم برای بازگرداندن رقابت سالم در بازار پرداخت و اجرای حقیقی الزامات قانونی در حوزه منع انحصار محسوب می‌شود. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78230_7f2cb39823a2eed9c8bacb67e1ded16a.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Conditional Contract in Iranian Law: A Review Based on the Severability of a Contract from its Effects in Imami Jurisprudence and French Law تحلیل احکام و مبانی «عقد معلق» در حقوق ایران، بر اساس امکان یا امتناع واسازی عقد از آثار آن در فقه امامیه و حقوق فرانسه 2137 2166 78242 10.30497/law.2026.249386.3921 FA عطاءالله بیگدلی استادیار، گروه حقوق، دانشکده علوم اجتماعی و فرهنگی، دانشگاه جامع امام حسین علیه‌السلام، تهران، ایران. 0000-0003-1826-0639 Journal Article 2025 11 08  ‌Context & Objective: Legal systems validate contracts based on their foundational understanding of contractual agreements. In Iranian civil law, the legal validity and exact status of the conditional contract (ʿaqd-i muʿallaq, an agreement where the legal effect is contingent upon the occurrence of a future event) remain explicitly unaddressed and subject to enduring doctrinal disputes among legal scholars. The primary cause of this systemic ambiguity is legislative hesitation regarding critical philosophical foundations, including the precise definition of a contract, the permissible boundaries of contractual freedom, and the inherent nature of contracts as either customary instruments or divinely prescribed institutions. Consequently, the statutory provisions are drafted ambiguously, transferring this uncertainty directly into legal doctrine. This foundational inconsistency arises from a deep-rooted conflict between the two primary historical sources of the Iranian Civil Code: traditional Islamic jurisprudence and modern French law. The primary objective is to investigate the exact legal ruling governing conditional contracts in Iranian law, uncover the philosophical reasons behind the current statutory ambiguity, and explore viable theoretical and practical avenues for improving this disjointed legal framework. ‌Method & Approach: The research employs a doctrinal, library, and documentary methodology, engaging in a fundamental and critical analysis of data grounded in legal and jurisprudential themes. The investigative process involves a comprehensive review of classical and contemporary Islamic jurisprudential sources, alongside an extensive examination of modern French and Iranian legal doctrines. ‌Findings: The analysis reveals an irreconcilable foundational divergence between the two constituent sources of Iranian law. In Shi'a Imami jurisprudence (Fiqh), the conditional contract is deemed absolutely void, a position upheld by the consensus of traditional jurists. This invalidation is rooted in the perspective that contracts are tawqīfī (strictly prescribed religious frameworks where the divine legislator dictates the parameters). In this framework, the relationship between contract formation and its legal effect is viewed as a necessary, causal bond, meaning the contracting parties lack the free will to artificially separate the cause from its immediate effect. Conversely, in modern French law, the conditional contract is recognized as entirely valid. The French legal system treats the contract as a purely conventional and subjective construct born of the free will of autonomous individuals. Under the principle of freedom of contract, these independent wills possess the unrestricted authority to separate any component of the agreement. Due to its reliance on both contradictory paradigms, the Iranian legal system suffers from a structural disarray, preventing a coherent interpretation of conditional obligations. ‌Conclusion: Achieving a permanent resolution to the statutory contradictions surrounding conditional contracts is impossible until the Iranian legal framework establishes a unified theoretical foundation regarding the limits of free will and the essential nature of contractual agreements. Reconciling the strictly prescribed religious viewpoint with the modern liberal approach to contractual autonomy remains a profound structural challenge that precludes immediate legislative reform. However, to validate commercial agreements negotiated by individuals, an innovative interpretative mechanism must be utilized by the judiciary. When parties subject a legal effect to an external condition, judges must interpret their declarative intent in a manner that altogether avoids the formation of a problematic conditional contract. Specifically, the ambiguous contractual phrasing should be legally construed either as an unconditional "obligation to create a contract" in the future, or as a present, unconditional contract containing a "commitment to execute the terms" where only the physical performance is delayed. This interpretative strategy legally circumvents the doctrinal obstacles of the conditional contract while preserving the practical intentions of the contracting parties. در قانون مدنی ایران، حکم عقد معلق به‌صراحت مورد اشاره قرار نگرفته است، لذا حقوقدانان ایرانی در مورد صحت یا بطلان این عقد اختلاف‌نظر دارند و این اختلاف‌نظرها تا کنون حل نشده است. علت این ابهام، تردید قانون‌گذار در بنیادهای فلسفی مهمی چون «تعریف مفهوم عقد»، «حدود آزادی اراده متعاملین» و «توقیفی یا عرفی بودن ذات عقد» است. به‌عبارتی، قانون‌گذار خود موضع روشنی در مورد عقد معلق نداشته است، فلذا مواد قانونی نیز مبهم تدوین شده و این ابهام به دکترین نیز سرایت نموده است. اما چرا مقنن ایرانی موضعی روشن در این مورد اتخاذ نکرده است؟ علت این امر، وجود اختلافی بنیادین در منابع تدوین قانونی مدنی - یعنی فقه و حقوق فرانسه - در مورد عقد معلق است. عقد معلق عقدی است که متعاقدین، با اراده خود بین قصد درونی و ایجاد عقد یا بین آثار اجزاء عقد فاصله ایجاد می‌نمایند؛ مانند تفکیک بین جاری نمودن الفاظ و ایجاد عقد، یا بین ایجاد عقد و ایجاد اثر آن. در فقه امامیه، عقد معلق مطلقاً باطل است. علت، شرعی و توقیفی دیدن عقود و محدودیت آزادی اراده در فقه است. در حقوق فرانسه اما، عقد معلق مطلقاً صحیح است، زیرا عقد موجودی مطلقاً اعتباری و برساختی از سوی دو اراده آزاد است و اراد‌ه‌های آزاد می‌توانند بین هر قسمت از عقد جدائی اندازند. این جستار با تحلیل بنیادین و انتقادی داده‌ها بر اساس مضامین فقهی حقوقی، بدین نتیجه نائل آمده‌ است که تا نظام حقوقی ایران بر سر این بنیادها به مبنائی یکسان نرسد، امکان اصلاح مواد قانونی (روبنا) را نخواهد داشت. اما راه حل عملی و تصحیح عقودی که اشخاص منعقد می‌نمایند و تحقق اثری حقوقی را به امری مشروط می‌نمایند، تفسیر اراده متعاملین به‌نحوی است که عقد معلق تشکیل نشود، بلکه الفاظ آنان به «تعهد به ایجاد عقد» یا «تعهد به اجرای مفاد عقد» تفسیرگردد. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78242_94e3e4cbcb09438f2b2e8e72c9b9a783.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 A Review of the Concept, Principles, and Process Governing 'Legal Risk' Management Based on the International Standard ISO 31022, with Adaptation to the Iranian Legal System مروری بر مفهوم، اصول و فرایند ناظر بر مدیریت «ریسک حقوقی» مبتنی بر استاندارد بین‌المللی ISO 31022 با تطبیق در نظام حقوقی ایران 2167 2204 78251 10.30497/law.2026.250355.4066 FA محمدمهدی فتاحیان دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده معارف اسلامی و حقوق، دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام، تهران، ایران. 0009-0006-0296-2133 طاهر حبیب‌زاده استادیار، گروه حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده معارف اسلامی و حقوق، دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام، تهران، ایران. 0009-0000-0937-9780 Journal Article 2026 05 23  ‌Context & Objective: Legal risks, defined as the effects of legal uncertainties on organizational objectives, are among the most critical threats and opportunities facing modern entities. They manifest across contractual, compliance, regulatory, intellectual property, and third-party liability domains, possessing the potential to compromise organizational legitimacy, impose severe financial burdens, or concurrently create avenues for value generation. Despite the extensive history of general risk management in corporate governance, the specialized management of legal risks remains a nascent concept within the Iranian legal system, frequently overshadowed by traditional interpretations of corporate law. The primary objective of this study is to conceptualize legal risk and systematically explicate the principles and operational processes governing its management, utilizing the international standard ISO 31022 as a foundational framework. Furthermore, the research strictly examines the current status and placement of legal risk management within the Iranian legal framework. To achieve this, the study addresses four core questions regarding the exact definition and categorization of legal risk, its structural status in Iran, its fundamental operative principles, and the required procedural steps for mitigation. ‌Method & Approach: The research is conducted utilizing a descriptive-analytical methodology combined with a doctrinal legal approach. This framework allows for a comprehensive conceptualization of legal risk by examining its underlying nature and distinct categories. The methodology is applied to pursue three principal structural aims. First, it undertakes a theoretical exposition of legal risk, categorizing its primary operational types. Second, the doctrinal approach is utilized to evaluate the position of legal risk management within the Iranian legal system, drawing direct comparisons with established analogous mechanisms found in traditional Islamic jurisprudence and civil law. Third, the descriptive analysis is employed to delineate the nine core principles and the four-stage procedural framework of legal risk management—comprising identification, analysis, evaluation, and treatment—strictly based on the guidelines delineated in the international standard ISO 31022. Through this structured approach, the study evaluates domestic practices against international benchmarks to provide a systematic understanding of the subject matter. ‌Findings: The findings reveal that the current state of legal risk management within the Iranian legal system is predominantly characterized by a fragmented and reactive approach. At the conceptual level, there exists a pervasive conflation between the "legal management of risk"—utilizing legal instruments to mitigate general operational hazards—and the distinct discipline of "management of legal risk." Examples of the former are prevalent in traditional Iranian civil law, such as ḍamān (liability or guarantee) or the prohibition of ġarar (contractual uncertainty or excessive risk), which apply the law strictly as a tool rather than addressing inherent legal uncertainties. At the organizational level, legal departments predominantly assume a reactive stance, engaging only after disputes arise. Furthermore, at the normative level, a pronounced regulatory vacuum exists, lacking specific legislative mandates for comprehensive legal risk management systems. Despite this deficiency, the foundational principles of Iranian civil liability, particularly the concepts of taqṣīr (fault) and the duty to uphold reasonable conduct, establish a robust potential legal basis. Neglecting to establish an effective framework can therefore be construed as a failure to exercise reasonable care, potentially invoking civil liability. Concurrently, the implementation of ISO 31022 offers a viable corrective framework, providing nine structural principles and a structured four-stage mechanism to systematically manage legal exposures. ‌Conclusion: The paper concludes that legal risk management must transition from a reactive departmental function into an integrated pillar of corporate governance. Organizations are advised to implement personalized frameworks modeled on ISO 31022, restructure legal departments to ensure direct reporting to boards of directors, integrate technologies for continuous monitoring, and foster a pervasive culture of legal awareness. On a national scale, lawmakers must recognize legal risk management as an essential component of modern governance and enact legislation that incentivizes its adoption. Furthermore, the legislature should actively facilitate alternative dispute resolution mechanisms by providing explicit statutory recognition for online dispute resolution within commercial frameworks. Finally, regulatory bodies must evolve from issuing strictly prescriptive and retroactive sanctions toward adopting risk-based regulatory paradigms. By encouraging self-regulation and proactive compliance, the legal system can fundamentally reduce the societal costs of litigation, enhance corporate compliance mechanisms, and foster a highly secure environment for sustainable economic development. ریسک‌های‌حقوقی به‌عنوان اثر عدم‌قطعیت‌های حقوقی بر اهداف سازمان، در زمره مهم‌ترین ریسک‌هایی قرار دارند که می‌توانند مشروعیت فعالیت سازمان را مخدوش کرده، هزینه‌های حقوقی بر آن تحمیل یا حتی در مواردی فرصت‌هایی را جهت خلق ارزش برای سازمان ایجاد نمایند. این مقاله با هدف مفهوم‌شناسی «ریسک حقوقی» و تبیین اصول و فرایند ناظر بر مدیریت آن، بر مبنای استاندارد ایزو ۳۱۰۲۲، و بررسی جایگاه مدیریت ریسک حقوقی در سیستم حقوقی ایران نگارش یافته است. استاندارد مذکور، با ارائه چارچوبی جامع برای مدیریت ریسک‌های حقوقی، اصولی شامل یکپارچه‌سازی، رویکرد ساختاریافته و جامع، انطباق‌پذیری، شمول‌گرایی، پویایی، دسترسی به اطلاعات، عوامل انسانی و فرهنگی، بهبود مستمر و انصاف را به‌همراه فرایندی نظام‌مند، متشکل از شناسایی، تحلیل، ارزیابی و مقابله با ریسک ترسیم می‌کند که ثبات و پایداری سازمان را در فعالیت‌های حقوقی تضمین می‌کند؛ این نوشتار ضمن تبیین این مفاهیم، با روش توصیفی تحلیلی به جایگاه مدیریت ریسک حقوقی در سیستم حقوقی ایران می‌پردازد. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که این مفهوم در سیستم حقوقی ایران یک رویکرد واکنشی است که در حال دگرگون شدن است، در سطح نظری نیز با خلط میان مدیریت حقوقی ریسک و مدیریت ریسک حقوقی مواجه بوده، و در سطح قانونی نیز، با خلأ الزامات تنظیم‌گرایانه روبرو است. با این همه، مبانی مسئولیت مدنی، به‌ویژه مفهوم تقصیر و رفتار متعارف، بستر حقوقی بالقوه‌ای را برای پذیرش ضرورت پیاده سازی نظام مدیریت ریسک حقوقی در سازمان فراهم می‌کند. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78251_05f4379f37ce93f3cd995d2df1365397.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Application of Economic Analysis of Law in Islamic Legal Reasoning کاربست «تحلیل اقتصادی حقوق» در استنباط فقهی 2205 2230 78238 10.30497/law.2026.249157.3892 FA سجاد شهباز قهفرخی استادیار، گروه فقه و حقوق اسلامی، دانشکده هنر و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهرکرد، شهرکرد، ایران. Journal Article 2025 10 17  ‌Context & Objective: The interaction between law and economics utilizes microeconomic tools to evaluate the efficiency of legal rules and human behavior under the constraint of resource scarcity. Integrating the economic analysis of law into Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) requires identifying compatible indigenous frameworks. While extensive literature exists independently on both the economic analysis of law and the foundational jurisprudential concept of bināʾ al-ʿuqalāʾ (the established continuous practice and consensus of rational people irrespective of their religious affiliation), the systematic intersection of these two domains remains underexplored. The primary objective is to conceptualize how the findings of the economic analysis of law can be systematically incorporated into Islamic legal deduction. The central problem revolves around utilizing economic models of human behavior to propose optimal rules for regulating private relationships, evaluating the systemic effects of current legal frameworks, and maximizing the functional efficiency of these rules within the boundaries of established Islamic jurisprudence. ‌Method & Approach: A doctrinal legal methodology is employed to investigate the integration of economic principles into jurisprudential reasoning. The scope of the inquiry is strictly restricted to private contract law, explicitly excluding matters of criminal and public law to maintain analytical precision. The methodological execution relies on a focused case study approach, selecting three specific contemporary legal challenges within contract law. For each selected issue, the structural legal and economic dimensions are sequentially analyzed to evaluate the feasibility of aligning the outcomes of modern economic analysis with the established practice of rational people. ‌Findings: The integration of economic analysis with rational practice yields distinct legal outcomes across the three examined contractual issues. First, in the context of īfāʾ-i dayn (the precise fulfillment or discharge of a financial debt), economic analysis demonstrates that the time value of money fundamentally alters the subject matter of the legal obligation. Returning the mere nominal value of a monetary debt after severe inflation does not constitute fulfillment under rational practice; instead, rational actors inherently demand the preservation of purchasing power. Second, concerning taʿdīl-i qarārdād (the adjustment of a contract), long-term agreements subjected to severe, unforeseen inflation suffer a critical loss of economic equilibrium. Economic analysis identifies this structural imbalance as a tangible detriment, prompting rational practice to invoke the rule of lā ḍarar (the fundamental jurisprudential maxim prohibiting the infliction or reciprocation of harm). This rational recognition of financial harm justifies interventions such as judicial contract adjustment, mandatory renegotiation, or the granting of termination rights. Third, regarding the hierarchy of remedies upon a breach, traditional frameworks often prioritize forced ijrā-yi taʿahhud (the specific performance of an obligation) through judicial channels before permitting contract termination. Economic analysis reveals that mandating prior judicial enforcement generates excessive transaction costs and market inefficiencies. Rational practice consequently favors granting the aggrieved party an immediate, concurrent right of termination to bypass judicial friction, a stance further supported by jurisprudential rules aimed at maintaining market stability and preventing disruptions in commerce. ‌Conclusion: The data and behavioral models generated by the economic analysis of law function as concrete manifestations of the established practice of rational people. When economic analysis accurately reflects how rational actors navigate legal and financial realities, these behavioral norms operate either as independent legislative evidence to derive new legal rulings or as interpretative mechanisms that clarify the factual grounds and scope of existing jurisprudential rules. This methodological integration allows Islamic legal deduction to adapt dynamically to modern economic realities. However, the utilization of economic analysis must be cautiously balanced against broader legal tenets. Economic efficiency cannot be the sole determinant of legal validity; it must remain subordinate to the overarching intellectual foundations of Islamic law and fundamental principles of contract law, ensuring that the pursuit of efficiency does not compromise essential non-economic protections and equitable legal principles. «تحلیل اقتصادی حقوق» روشی نوین در تحلیل مباحث حقوقی است که برای کاربست آن در حقوق اسلامی باید به دنبال ظرفیت‌های بومی برآمد. تحلیل اقتصادی حقوق با استفاده از تحلیل رفتارهای اقتصادی بشر تلاش دارد تا بهترین قواعد را برای تنظیم روابط خصوصی پیشنهاد دهد و آثار قواعد حقوقی موجود را تحلیل کند، و از این طریق به افزایش رفاه و حداکثرسازی کارآمدی این قواعد کمک کند. نتایج حاصل از پژوهش‌های تحلیل اقتصادی حقوق را می‌توان به عنوان مصداق «بنای عقلا» مورد مطالعه قرار داد و از آن بهره‌ها برد. بنای عقلا یکی از ظرفیت‌های اصولی مهم و کاربردی در تحلیل موضوعات فقهی، بازشناسی ادله و شناسایی احکام جدید به‌خصوص در حوزه احکام امضایی است. در این نوشتار، به‌صورت خاص سه مورد از مسائل مطروحه در حقوق قراردادها موضوع مطالعه قرار گرفته است و در هر مورد، وضعیت این موضوعات از حیث تحلیل اقتصادی و امکان تطبیق هر یک با بنای عقلا بحث شده است. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78238_74b624c1dc827ffc33f1f7ec1c6b2c01.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 Nexus Between Condition and Contract in Imami Jurisprudence: A Review of Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Khoei's Theory رابطه شرط و عقد از دیدگاه محقق خویی 2231 2262 78247 10.30497/law.2026.249842.3979 FA سیدمحسن سلطانی استادیار، گروه حقوق، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه ملایر، ملایر، ایران. 0009-0000-2702-7041 Journal Article 2026 01 25  ‌Context & Objective: Analyzing the structural relationship between šarṭ (contractual stipulation or condition) and ʿaqd (contract) represents a fundamental prerequisite for deducing the substantive legal rulings governing contractual conditions within Imami fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). The advanced development of these principles in Imami jurisprudence has significantly influenced contemporary legal frameworks; for instance, the Iranian Civil Code derives its general contract rules predominantly from French civil law, whereas its specific provisions on conditions are drawn directly from Imami jurisprudence. Practically, the doctrine of conditions holds paramount importance as contracting parties utilize stipulations to strategically manage agreements to their advantage. Despite various existing scholarly perspectives—such as categorizing the condition as a real component of the contract, an implicit or subjective part, a restriction on mutual consent, or viewing the contract merely as an independent container for the condition—the precise legal nexus remains contested. The primary objective is to critically examine the unique and highly influential theory proposed by the contemporary Imami jurist Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Khoei (1899–1992) regarding this relationship, outlining how his perspective systematically diverges from mainstream jurisprudential thought and applies across diverse legal transactions. ‌Method & Approach: The paper is conducted strictly utilizing the doctrinal method. This specific approach involves a systematic and analytical examination of established jurisprudential texts, foundational legal rules, and the underlying theories governing contractual obligations to precisely isolate, interpret, and subsequently critique the distinct conceptual framework established by Ayatollah Khoei regarding the structural intersection of contracts and their associated conditions. ‌Findings: Ayatollah Khoei posits that the relationship between a condition and a contract manifests in two distinct operational forms: first, the suspension of the principal contract upon the obligor's formal commitment to perform the condition; second, the suspension of the obligee's ultimate commitment to the contract upon the actual external realization of the condition. In a šarṭ-i fiʿl (condition of act, requiring a specific material or legal action) stipulated within a terminable contract such as a sale, standard customary perception incorporates both forms of suspension simultaneously. Conversely, when a šarṭ-i fiʿl is inserted into an inherently irrevocable contract like marriage, only the initial relationship applies. In the case of a šarṭ-i waṣf (condition of attribute, guaranteeing a specific quality of the subject matter), strictly the second relationship governs. Consequently, under this theoretical framework, a breach of an actionable condition grants the obligee the dual option to either terminate the underlying contract immediately or formally compel the obligor to perform the stipulation. Furthermore, this theory uniquely dictates that an impossible condition, an illegitimate condition, or a non-rational condition inherently remains valid; they do not void the underlying agreement but merely trigger a right of termination for the obligee if unfulfilled. Additionally, this framework renders the stipulation of a right of termination within an inherently permissible contract invalid. ‌Conclusion: While Ayatollah Khoei’s theory presents a cohesive approach to contractual conditions that yields significant legal implications for enforceability, breach, and the validity of otherwise problematic stipulations, it ultimately proves fundamentally unacceptable. The primary legal and doctrinal impediment to accepting this theory is that the overarching commitment to a finalized contract is dictated by immutable legal mandates. This binding commitment falls entirely outside the discretionary power of the contracting parties, meaning they lack the legal capacity to subjectively suspend their foundational commitment to an agreement upon external factors. Furthermore, from a practical and linguistic standpoint, the complex dual-suspension mechanism posited by Khoei—suspending either the contract itself or the commitment to the contract—directly contradicts standard ʿurf (custom or ordinary customary perception). The simplistic and direct mindset of ordinary individuals engaging in transactions does not conceptually perceive, intend, or construct such layered and intricate suspensions when establishing a standard condition within a contract. Therefore, the foundational premise of Khoei's theory contradicts both established mandatory legal principles and the customary reality of contract formation. تحلیل رابطه شرط و عقد، از مباحث بنیادین برای استنباط احکام شرط است. برخی شرط را جزء واقعی عقد، برخی جزء لبّی عقد، گروهی قید عقد و بعضی عقد را ظرف شرط دانسته‌اند. فقیه امامی معاصر، آیت‌الله سیدابوالقاسم خویی (ره) معتقد است که شرط می‌تواند دو نوع رابطه با عقد داشته باشد: (1) تعلیق اصل عقد بر التزام مشروط‌ٌعلیه به انجام شرط و (2) تعلیق التزام مشروطٌ‌له به عقد، بر تحقق شرط در خارج. حسب رأی ایشان، در «شرط فعلی» که در ضمن عقدی قابل فسخ مانند بیع گنجانده می‌شود، عرف هر دو رابطه را لحاظ می‌کند؛ اما در «شرط فعلی» که در ضمن عقد غیرقابل‌فسخ مانند نکاح درج شده است، تنها رابطه نخست و در «شرط وصف» فقط رابطه دوم حاکم است. یافته‌های نوشتار حاضر که به شیوه توصیفی تحلیلی نگارش شده است، نشان می‌دهد که نظریه محقق خویی تاثیری ژرف بر مسائل مرتبط با شروط دارد؛ به‌عنوان نمونه، طبق این نظریه در صورت تخلف از شرط فعل، مشروط‌ٌله اختیار دارد که عقد را فسخ کند، یا الزام مشروط‌ٌعلیه به انجام شرط را بخواهد. هم‌چنین بر اساس این نظریه، شرط نامقدور، شرط نامشروع و شرط غیرعقلایی صحیح است. هر چند مبنای محقق خویی در نگاه اول، کامل به نظر می‌رسد مع‌هذا قابل پذیرش نیست؛ زیرا التزام به عقد در اختیار طرفین نیست و جزء احکام غیرقابل‌تغییر است. وانگهی، بر خلاف ادعای مطروحه، ذهن بسیط عرفی، از شرط ضمن عقد تعلیق اصل عقد یا تعلیق التزام به عقد یا هر دو تعلیق را ادراک نمی‌کند. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78247_52055ec0730f3f6c0b98b8b32969a19a.pdf

دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی 2251-9858 27 3 2026 09 23 The Legitimacy of Hiba to a Fetus: Perspectives of Islamic Jurisprudential Schools and the Legal Orders of Selected Islamic Countries مشروعیت هبه به حمل از منظر مذاهب فقهی و قوانین کشورهای منتخب اسلامی 2263 2286 78254 10.30497/law.2026.248487.3801 FA محمدتقی مرادی دانش‌آموخته دکتری فقه و مبانی حقوق اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. 0009-0002-9789-4655 Journal Article 2025 06 12  ‌Context & Objective: Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) acknowledges commitments made in favor of a fetus, recognizing a contingent capacity to enjoy civil rights. According to Article 957 of the Iranian Civil Code, this capacity becomes fully established upon the live birth of the child. While specific legal rights such as inheritance, testamentary disposition, and acknowledgment are explicitly granted to the fetus in the Iranian legal framework, legislators have remained notably silent regarding the legal status of Hiba (an inter vivos gratuitous gift) directed to an unborn child. This legislative silence extends to the civil codes of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. Within the jurisprudential traditions, Imami jurisprudence lacks explicit rulings on this specific transaction, whereas the majority of Sunni jurisprudential schools, including the Shafi'i, Hanafi, and Hanbali traditions, have explicitly categorized it as an invalid contract due to the perceived absence of foundational validity conditions. The primary focus centers on resolving the doctrinal ambiguity surrounding this issue by addressing the fundamental legal question: Is the execution of Hiba to a fetus legally and jurisprudentially valid as a recognizable civil right? ‌Method & Approach: The investigation utilizes a doctrinal legal method. The approach systematically examines the foundational concepts of the transaction and critically analyzes the jurisprudential arguments surrounding the purported invalidity of the contract. The analysis evaluates the legal mechanisms and evidentiary bases that support the legitimacy of the transaction, drawing upon comparative assessments of classical Islamic jurisprudential texts and the contemporary civil legislation of selected Islamic jurisdictions. ‌Findings: The primary arguments advocating for the invalidity of the contract rest on four main jurisprudential objections. Opponents argue that the fetus lacks the capacity to execute qabūl (acceptance) and qabḍ (taking physical possession), which are considered essential elements of the transaction. Furthermore, the fetus is deemed fundamentally incapable of tamalluk (the capacity to acquire ownership) prior to birth. Critics also argue that the transaction inherently constitutes a suspended contract, conditional upon live birth, which violates the requirement for immediate certainty in standard contractual formulations. Finally, the unborn child is classified by some jurists as a legally non-existent entity. However, critical doctrinal analysis refutes these assertions. The requirement for acceptance and possession can be seamlessly fulfilled by the walī (legal guardian) acting as a legitimate substitute, directly mirroring the established legal mechanisms used for minors. The capacity for ownership is not absolutely precluded but is rather contingent and subject to a subsequent condition of live birth, identical to established mechanisms in inheritance. The objection regarding suspension is resolved by differentiating between the immediate decisiveness in the legal declaration and the valid suspension of the legal effect itself. Finally, the characterization of the fetus as non-existent is contradicted by its recognized wujūd ḥukmī (constructive or legal existence), which justifies its established rights to alimony and blood money. ‌Conclusion: General evidentiary sources, including the Quran, Sunnah, jurisprudential consensus, and the established customary practice of rational individuals and religious communities, collectively affirm the widespread and historical legitimacy of gifting to an unborn child. By employing tanqīḥ-e manāṭ (the legal methodology of extracting and applying the underlying rationale of a ruling), the validity of a testamentary will in favor of a fetus can be directly extended to inter vivos gifts, as both operate on the shared foundation of gratuitous transfer. The contract in favor of a fetus is legally and jurisprudentially sound, provided the child is born alive. Among the surveyed jurisdictions, the Algerian Civil Code, explicitly in Article 209, unequivocally codifies the validity of this transaction. در فقه اسلامی، از التزام به‌نفع حمل سخن گفته‌شده و مطابق ماده 957 قانون مدنی ایران، جنین از اهلیت تمتع متزلزلی نسبت به حقوق مدنی برخوردار است که این اهلیت متزلزل به‌محض زنده متولد شدن مستقر می‌شود، اگرچه پژوهشگران در مصادیق این حقوق مدنی اختلاف‌نظر دارند. در قانون مدنی ایران و کشورهایی هم‌چون مصر، عراق و سوریه، از هبه به حمل، سخنی به‌میان نیامده و فقه امامیه نیز از توجه به حکم آن خودداری کرده است. با این‌حال، فقه عامه در گزارش‌های متعددی به‌خاطر فقدان شرایط صحت هبه، آن را باطل دانسته است. این مقاله بدین سوال می‌پردازد که آیا هبه به حمل، به‌عنوان یکی از حقوق مدنی، صحیح است یا خیر؟ یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که هر چند برای بطلان هبه به جنین، به ادله‌ای همچون عدم امکان قبول و قبض توسط جنین، عدم امکان تملک توسط جنین، تعلیقی بودن هبه به جنین و معدوم بودن جنین استناد شده، امّا این استدلالات ناصواب است. برای تفصی از این اشکال‌ها، می‌توان همانند هبه به صغیر، با قائم‌مقام دانستن ولیّ، قبول و قبض را محقق ساخت؛ با مراعی دانستن مالکیت حمل، تملک جنین را پذیرفت؛ با کفایت تنجز در انشا و صحت تعلیق در مُنشأ، اشکال تعلیق را رفع کرد و النهایه با فرض موجود بودن جنین، وجود حکمی آن را کافی دانست. در مقابل، عموم ادله هبه هم‌چون کتاب، سنت، اجماع، سیره عقلا و متشرعه بر رواج هبه به حمل و اتصال قطعی این سیره به زمان معصوم علیه‌السلام، تنقیح مناط و هم‌چنین الغای خصوصیت از وصیت به نفع حمل، می‌توان هبه بر حمل را صحیح دانست. در کشورهای اسلامی، قانون مدنی الجزایر در ماده 209، هبه به جنین را در صورت زنده متولد شدن، صراحتاً صحیح دانسته است. https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_78254_40d716ee9040951f6cfdecf98d023011.pdf