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<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>A Conceptual and Foundational Analysis of the 'Deemed Contract' in Islamic Law and the Iranian Legal System</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>تحلیل مفهومی و مبنایی «قرارداد حکمی» در فقه امامیه و نظام حقوقی ایران</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1165</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1198</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77651</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2025.247404.3668</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>سیدمصطفی</FirstName>
					<LastName>سعادت مصطفوی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار، گروه حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده معارف اسلامی و حقوق، دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>عاطفه</FirstName>
					<LastName>ذبیحی بیدگلی</LastName>
<Affiliation>استادیار، گروه فقه و مبانی حقوق اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
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				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>18</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The concept of a “deemed contract” has emerged from instances where the legislator, departing from the conventional requirement of mutual consent, imposes the effects of a contractual relationship upon parties that may never have intended to enter into such a contract. This phenomenon operates in two distinct scenarios, both evident in Islamic jurisprudence and Iranian law: first, when an existing contract terminates—through expiration of its term, rescission, or other legal grounds—yet the legislator continues to apply the contractual effects beyond the point of termination; and second, when no actual agreement exists but a contractual relationship is artificially imposed by legal mandate. In both situations, the legislative intervention overlays a “deemed contract” upon an “underlying relationship” that may have neither the formal structure nor the voluntariness of an authentic contract.&lt;br&gt;     From a theoretical standpoint, the notion of deemed contracts stands in tension with the principle of autonomy of will, a cornerstone of contractual theory in both Islamic and Iranian legal systems. The premise that a contract’s legitimacy and consequences are derived from the agreement of the parties would seem to leave little room for the legislator to create contractual obligations unilaterally. Nonetheless, historical and contemporary legal sources do evidence legislative practices by which these obligations are artificially continued—or deemed to exist anew—despite the absence of explicit or continuing consent. This suggests a countervailing principle whereby the legal system permits or even requires the preservation or creation of contractual effects in order to serve broader social objectives, safeguard public interests, or protect the rights of vulnerable parties.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Against this backdrop, the central research question of the study is as follows: What are the conceptual foundations, justifications, and legal mechanisms that allow the legislator to impose a deemed contract on an existing or a non-existent contractual relationship, and how does this legislative intervention reconcile with established principles of autonomy of will in Islamic and Iranian contract law?&lt;br&gt;     This question seeks to bridge the theoretical gap between the foundational emphasis on mutual consent in Islamic legal doctrine and the practical phenomenon where contractual effects arise in the absence of a bona fide agreement. By pinpointing the rationale, scope, and operation of deemed contracts, the research aims to elucidate whether they represent a necessary exception to the principle of autonomy of will or an overreach that risks undermining parties’ freedom to structure their relationships.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Based on preliminary observations of legal texts and juristic opinions, this study posits the following hypothesis: Deemed contracts in Islamic law and the Iranian legal system are legitimized by jurisprudential and statutory principles that permit the extension or imposition of contractual effects in pursuit of broader legal objectives, such as preserving social welfare, upholding fairness, and ensuring legal certainty. This hypothesis suggests that, while the core principle of contractual autonomy remains intact, there exist recognized exceptions whereby the legislator’s overriding will is used to preserve or create legal outcomes that promote societal or individual interests.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The research follows a doctrinal methodology, engaging in an in-depth examination of primary sources of Islamic law (the Qur’an, Sunnah, and authoritative juristic treatises) alongside the key provisions of Iranian legislative texts and relevant judicial precedents. This analysis is complemented by an inductive approach, starting with concrete examples of deemed contracts across different statutory contexts, and gradually extracting the underlying legal principles and theoretical justifications.&lt;br&gt;     The framework of the study can be outlined in several stages:&lt;br&gt;     Conceptual Clarification: Identification and classification of the various forms of deemed contracts, drawing on both classical Islamic jurisprudence and modern Iranian law.&lt;br&gt;     Jurisprudential Foundations: Exploration of the legal maxims and jurisprudential arguments (e.g., necessity, prevention of harm, or public interest) that may authorize or mandate the creation or continuation of contractual effects in the absence of genuine agreement.&lt;br&gt;     Legislative and Judicial Analysis: Systematic review of statutory provisions and relevant court decisions to illustrate how and under what conditions deemed contracts have been recognized and enforced.&lt;br&gt;     Comparative Evaluation: Where useful, references to parallel doctrines in other legal systems may be employed to highlight the universal or unique aspects of Iran’s legislative approach in the context of Islamic legal principles.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The core results of this study illustrate that the notion of a deemed contract is not merely an exceptional or ad hoc legal construct but rather a concept with solid jurisprudential underpinnings that has been systematically recognized and applied in both Islamic and Iranian law. Through examining various legislative instances and scrutinizing relevant jurisprudential texts, it becomes clear that there is a consistent pattern of legal reasoning by which legislators and jurists justify the imposition of contractual effects on relationships that lack the conventional hallmarks of consent and mutual intention.&lt;br&gt;     A key insight gleaned from the analysis is that deemed contracts can arise under two main circumstances: (i) when an actual contract has ceased due to rescission or expiration, yet legal effects are prolonged by the legislator; and (ii) when no authentic agreement has been concluded, yet the legislator fabricates a contractual relationship. In either case, the pivotal aspect lies in the legislator’s perceived need to achieve certain legal or societal objectives—such as protecting public order, preventing harm, or safeguarding third-party interests—even at the cost of overriding party autonomy.&lt;br&gt;     From a jurisprudential standpoint, the study identifies six principal foundations that are instrumental in justifying a deemed contract. These include reliance on appearance, equity and justice, the rule of no-harm [La-zarar], public order, the principle of Ta’zeer (understood here in a civil liability context), and public interest [Maslaha]. Collectively, these foundations highlight the multifaceted manner in which legal systems balance the principle of autonomy with broader concerns about fairness, social stability, and the protection of rights. For instance, reliance on appearance often emerges when third parties justifiably assume that a transactional arrangement continues to exist, thereby preventing unjust outcomes. Similarly, the rule of no-harm [La-zarar] and equity considerations come into play when abruptly terminating or refusing to recognize a contractual effect would result in disproportionate injustice or damage.&lt;br&gt;     These findings underscore the functional role of deemed contracts as a protective mechanism. Rather than abandoning parties to the potential injustices that can arise from doctrinal rigidity, legislators employ the device of a deemed contract to ensure a more balanced outcome. However, one potential concern identified is the risk of overreaching by the legislator, wherein continual reliance on deemed contracts may erode the fundamental principle of party autonomy. The study posits that a prudent approach would involve legislative intervention only when the social or individual welfare at stake is sufficiently compelling.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The concluding observations of this research affirm that deemed contracts, rooted in established jurisprudential and statutory principles, serve as more than isolated legal anomalies. Instead, they constitute a recurring doctrinal rule in Islamic law and the Iranian legal system, wherein the legislator, guided by various jurisprudential bases, extends contractual effects to scenarios lacking the usual consensual framework. In many instances, the legislator’s ruling is premised on criteria of sufficient breadth and generality to qualify as a legal rule—an overarching standard that can be invoked in a range of circumstances to protect or advance societal and individual interests.&lt;br&gt;     The evidence presented shows that the deemed contract meets the characteristics of a general legal rule: it possesses a binding force across cases, underscores an orderly social fabric, and is supported by an array of authoritative foundations. Among these foundations are reliance on appearance (ensuring that third-party assumptions are not undermined), equity and justice (aligning outcomes with principles of fairness), no-harm principle [La-zarar] (averting harm and ensuring proportional responses to wrongdoing), public order (maintaining societal stability), Ta’zeer (in its broad sense of enforcing liability for harmful conduct), and the principle of public interest [Maslaha]. Each of these conceptual underpinnings has sufficient explanatory power to justify transforming a non-contractual or expired contractual relationship into a deemed contract when the circumstances demand it.&lt;br&gt;     Additionally, the study highlights that the legislator’s imposition of a deemed contract is most defensible when it aligns with these core jurisprudential justifications—namely, promoting fairness, preventing harm, preserving social order, and upholding the legitimate expectations of third parties. Where these objectives are absent or tangential, reliance on a deemed contract is more likely to conflict with the foundational premise of free will and consent that animates contract law generally.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">مطابق با قواعد عمومی قراردادها، رابطه اصحاب قرارداد بر پایه اراده ایشان شکل می‌گیرد و هر قرارداد صرفاً زمانی طرفین خود را ملزم و ملتزم به مفاد خود می‌نماید که اراده صحیح متعاقدین در تشکیل و تداوم آن قرارداد دخالت داشته باشد؛ خواه به اصالت یا نیابت. با این همه، در منابع فقهی و حقوقی در مواردی چند مشاهده می‌شود که در بیان احکام ناظر به‌برخی اعمال حقوقی، از تعبیر «در حکمِ ...» استفاده شده است که حاکی از ترتب آثار نهاد حقوقی دیگر بر موضوعی، خلاف اراده و مفاد تراضی طرفین آن است؛ درحالی‌که به لحاظ مفهومی، ماهیت دوم دقیقاً منطبق بر نهاد مذکور نیست تا به‌حسب قاعده و به‌تبع تطبیق دایره موضوعی آن‌ها، بتوان آن دو را در احکام و آثار مشترک دانست. به عبارت دیگر، قانونگذار بر خلاف اراده حقیقی طرفین، وجود قرارداد را فرض نموده و ماهیتی قراردادی را در حکم ماهیتی دیگر دانسته و آثار ماهیت دوم را بر اولی مترتّب ساخته است. پژوهش حاضر با روش توصیفی تحلیلی در صدد بررسی مفهوم و مبانی این شیوه عملی قانونگذار و شارع در حقوق قراردادها، تحت عنوان ابداعی «قرارداد حکمی» است، که حسب مورد هم در فرض نبود رابطه قراردادی و هم در فرض انحلال رابطه قراردادی قابل تصور است. مبتنی بر یافته‌های پژوهش، به‌قرینه احراز قواعدی شامل عمل به‌ظاهر، انصاف و عدالت، قاعده لاضرر، نظم عمومی، قاعده تعزیر و مصلحت، به‌عنوان مبانی قرارداد حکمی، قاعده توسط قانونگذار یا دادرس قابل اعمال خواهد بود.</OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Liability for Paying Blood Money in Non-Homicidal Crimes and in Cases of Offender Inaccessibility in Islamic Law: Validating the Sequential Liability of the Offender, the ʿĀqilah, and the Public Treasury</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>مسئول پرداخت دیه در جنایات کمتر از نفس در فرض عدم دسترسی به جانی؛ اعتبارسنجی ضمان ترتیبی جانی، عاقله و بیت‌المال</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1199</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1234</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77706</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2025.247461.3673</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>یزدان</FirstName>
					<LastName>طاهرآبادی</LastName>
<Affiliation>گروه فقه و حقوق جزا، مؤسسه عالی فقه و علوم اسلامی، قم، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>26</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The doctrine of liability for blood money [&lt;em&gt;Diyya&lt;/em&gt;] in Islamic law has traditionally been centered around the concepts of intentional, quasi-intentional, and unintentional offenses, with well-established jurisprudential rules concerning cases of murder. However, the matter becomes more legally and ethically complex in cases of offenses less than murder—such as physical injuries or amputations—especially when the perpetrator becomes unavailable. In such cases, where the execution of &lt;em&gt;Qi&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ṣā&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ṣ&lt;/em&gt; (retaliation) is practically impossible, the question of who bears the financial responsibility for &lt;em&gt;Diyya&lt;/em&gt; becomes of paramount importance.&lt;br&gt;     While juristic consensus among Shia scholars provides a tiered order of liability—starting with the perpetrator, followed by the &lt;em&gt;ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt; (certain relations of the offender who are responsible for payment of blood money in non-intentional offences), and ultimately the &lt;em&gt;Bait al-Māl&lt;/em&gt; (public treasury)—the application of this model to offenses less than murder has not been consistently addressed in legal codification. Notably, the Islamic Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1991) recognized this classical order in cases of murder but remained silent in cases of lesser offenses. By contrast, the 2013 Penal Code omitted the &lt;em&gt;ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt; from the chain of responsibility altogether, assigning liability first to the perpetrator and then, if necessary, to the public treasury.&lt;br&gt;     This paper seeks to address the significant legal and jurisprudential gap in the treatment of non-homicidal offenses when the perpetrator is unavailable. &quot;Unavailability&quot; herein refers to a broad set of circumstances in which the perpetrator, though identified, is inaccessible—due to death, flight, captivity, or geographical isolation—thus necessitating an alternative mechanism for the delivery of justice to the victim.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The central research question guiding this study is:&lt;br&gt;     To what extent should the classical Islamic jurisprudential framework of financial liability—comprising the perpetrator, &lt;em&gt;ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt;, and &lt;em&gt;Bait al-Māl&lt;/em&gt;—be applied to offenses less than murder in cases where the perpetrator is unavailable, and how consistent is the current legislative approach of the Iranian Islamic Penal Code with this framework?&lt;br&gt;     This question further expands into sub-inquiries, such as:&lt;br&gt;     What is the evidentiary basis in Islamic sources (particularly Hadith) for assigning financial responsibility in non-homicidal offenses?&lt;br&gt;     Why did the Iranian legislature omit the &lt;em&gt;ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt; in the 2013 Penal Code despite its inclusion in classical jurisprudence and the 1991 Code for homicide cases?&lt;br&gt;     What legal or policy rationales underlie the shift in legislative approach, and do they align with juristic doctrine?&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The Islamic Penal Code of Iran, particularly in its 2013 iteration, does not fully align with the established Shia juristic consensus on the matter of &lt;em&gt;Diyya&lt;/em&gt; responsibility in cases of non-homicidal offenses involving an unavailable perpetrator. Specifically, the exclusion of the &lt;em&gt;ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt; represents a divergence from the traditional three-tiered framework of liability that includes the perpetrator, &lt;em&gt;ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt;, and the public treasury.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This study employs a qualitative, doctrinal methodology rooted in traditional Islamic legal reasoning (&lt;em&gt;Ijtihād&lt;/em&gt;-based). Primary sources include classical Fiqh literature, Qur’anic exegesis, and relevant Hadith compilations, with a particular emphasis on the opinions of prominent Shia jurists across various centuries. Secondary sources include academic commentaries, comparative analyses of different versions of the Islamic Penal Code, and legal interpretations issued by recognized juristic bodies.&lt;br&gt;     The analytical framework is structured around the evaluation of legal responsibility through the tripartite lens of:&lt;br&gt;     Perpetrator liability – based on ownership of property and moral culpability;&lt;br&gt;&lt;em&gt;     ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt; liability – derived from tribal and familial obligations in classical Islamic society;&lt;br&gt;&lt;em&gt;     Bait al-Māl&lt;/em&gt; liability – reflecting the state&#039;s residual responsibility for delivering justice when other sources are unavailable.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The study’s analysis reveals that the traditional hierarchical model of responsibility—beginning with the perpetrator, followed by the &lt;em&gt;ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt;, and ultimately the &lt;em&gt;Bait al-Māl&lt;/em&gt;—is not substantiated in the case of offenses less than murder when the perpetrator is unavailable. A close examination of the jurisprudential sources and Hadith evidences demonstrates that the term &quot;al-Damm&quot; (blood), often cited in support of this order, refers specifically and definitively to cases of murder. Its extension to non-homicidal offenses such as bodily injury or amputation lacks sufficient textual and contextual support. The research finds that applying the same evidentiary base used for murder to non-murder cases introduces significant jurisprudential ambiguity.&lt;br&gt;     Furthermore, the legislative shift in the Islamic Penal Code of 2013—removing the &lt;em&gt;ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt; from the chain of responsibility and retaining only the perpetrator and the public treasury—was critically assessed. The study concludes that while the 2013 Code attempts to provide legal clarity, its foundation remains unsubstantiated in Islamic jurisprudence. Even the inclusion of the public treasury as a secondary liable party lacks a firm juristic basis in the context of non-murderous crimes.&lt;br&gt;     Hence, the proper legal conclusion in both jurisprudential and statutory contexts is that the responsibility for paying &lt;em&gt;Diyya&lt;/em&gt; in such cases should rest solely with the perpetrator, regardless of his availability, with no obligation extended to either the &lt;em&gt;ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt; or the &lt;em&gt;Bait al-Māl&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This research concludes that the traditional model of sequential liability—perpetrator, &lt;em&gt;ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt;, and &lt;em&gt;Bait al-Māl&lt;/em&gt;—cannot be justifiably applied to offenses less than murder in cases where the perpetrator is unavailable. The Hadiths cited by jurists are either ambiguous or explicitly limited to cases of murder, and their application to non-homicidal offenses lacks jurisprudential integrity. Consequently, the Iranian legislature’s adaptation of this hierarchical responsibility model, both in its earlier recognition (1991) and later modification (2013), fails to align with sound Islamic legal reasoning.&lt;br&gt;     The findings affirm that neither the &lt;em&gt;ʿĀqilah&lt;/em&gt; nor the public treasury should bear any responsibility in such cases. Rather, the perpetrator alone must be held accountable for the payment of &lt;em&gt;Diyya&lt;/em&gt;, reinforcing the individual’s direct liability for harm caused, even in his absence.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">مسئول پرداخت دیه در جنایت مادون نفس، در فرض عدم دسترسی به جانی کیست؟ جستار حاضر درصدد است تا با روش اجتهادی، نظریه «ضمان ترتیبی جانی، عاقله و بیت‌المال» را که توسط عده کثیری از فقیهان امامیه در قتل عمد و شبه عمد در فرض فرار یا فوت جانی مقبول واقع شده است، در جنایات کمتر از نفس اعتبارسنجی کند. برای اثبات این نظریه در موضع اخیرالذکر، به عمومیت تعلیل فراز «لایبطل دم امرء مسلم» و «فلم یقدر علیه» در روایت مورد استشهاد تمسک شد که هیچکدام تمام نبود و عمومیت تعلیل فراز اول با پنج نقد، و تعلیل فراز دوم با سه نقد مواجه گردید. لذا رویکرد قانونگذار ایرانی در قانون مجازات اسلامی مصوب 1392 که در جنایت مادون نفس در فرض فرار یا فوت جانی، ابتدا خود جانی را ضامن دانسته و اگر وی مالی نداشت، بیت‌المال را مسئول پرداخت دیه دانسته، مخدوش است و بر بنیاد نتیجه این پژوهش، تنها خود جانی ضامن است و عاقله یا بیت‌المال اصولاً فاقد مسئولیت خواهند بود.</OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Validating the Synergistic Authority of Islamic Jurists’ Opinions in Discovering and Adopting the Sharia-Based Theory: A Study Based on the Views of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, with an Application to the Process of Deriving Criminal Theory</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>اعتبارسنجی هم‌افزایی آراء فقهی در کشف و اختیار نظریه شریعت‌محور، مبتنی بر دیدگاه‌های شهید صدر؛ با تطبیق آن در فرایند کشف نظریه کیفری</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1235</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1272</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77712</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2025.246885.3613</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>غلامحسین</FirstName>
					<LastName>الهام</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار، گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>سیدمسعود</FirstName>
					<LastName>مرتضوی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دکتری حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>27</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Civilizations, fundamentally, manage their social and individual dimensions through structured and systemic frameworks spanning various spheres such as education, economy, religion, judiciary, and family. Within Islamic civilization, it is posited that the comprehensiveness of Islamic Sharia inherently possesses the capacity to guide contemporary human life and civilization comprehensively. Therefore, the identification and implementation of Islamic systems and frameworks constitute a critical foundational step towards actualizing religious governance within Islamic societies.&lt;br&gt;     Prominent among Islamic thinkers addressing this area is Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935-1980), whose theoretical and practical contributions to jurisprudential theorization significantly shaped contemporary Islamic thought. Al-Sadr explicitly identifies the lack of coherent social systems as a critical issue plaguing modern humanity, positing Islamic systems as the solution to achieving social felicity. His significant jurisprudential innovation lies in distinguishing &quot;&lt;em&gt;fiqh al-ahkam&lt;/em&gt;&quot; (jurisprudence of specific legal rulings) from &quot;&lt;em&gt;fiqh al-nazariyyat&lt;/em&gt;&quot; (jurisprudence of broader theoretical frameworks). This distinction, relatively novel within Shi‘a jurisprudence, facilitates theoretical exploration and development across diverse societal domains.&lt;br&gt;     Al-Sadr’s theoretical framework visualizes an Islamic society structured upon foundational epistemological and ontological principles, informing specific social domains—economics, politics, culture, health—through overarching religious obligations and prohibitions. Beneath these guiding principles lie detailed jurisprudential rulings. &lt;em&gt;Fiqh al-nazariyyat&lt;/em&gt; specifically addresses the intermediate tier, encompassing general policy directions and systemic principles necessary for managing society in accordance with Sharia.&lt;br&gt;     Integral to al-Sadr’s jurisprudential framework is the concept herein termed &quot;Synergistic Authority of Islamic Jurists’ Opinions,&quot; a theory essential to transitioning from &lt;em&gt;fiqh al-ahkam&lt;/em&gt; to &lt;em&gt;fiqh al-nazariyyat&lt;/em&gt;. Under this paradigm, jurists can utilize methodologically sound rulings from fellow jurists to supplement their own interpretations, generating a comprehensive and cohesive body of jurisprudence. Despite its significance, this approach, though implicitly integrated within broader methodological discussions, has yet to receive an explicit designation or comprehensive exploration in al-Sadr&#039;s works.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This research investigates a fundamental jurisprudential inquiry: What constitutes the evidentiary grounds for validating or rejecting the credibility of synergistically combining juristic opinions in the discovery and formulation of jurisprudential theories, particularly within the theoretical domain identified by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr as &lt;em&gt;fiqh al-nazariyyat&lt;/em&gt;? More specifically, the research explores whether the synergistic authority approach provides a robust jurisprudential methodology suitable for theorizing within Islamic criminal law, especially concerning the sensitive area of Limits imposed by God punishments.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The central hypothesis underpinning this study is that the synergistic authority of Islamic jurists&#039; opinions, as methodologically elaborated by al-Sadr, enjoys general credibility and can serve as a foundational pillar for jurisprudential theorization across diverse societal sectors. By enabling jurists to systematically integrate and build upon each other&#039;s rulings, this methodology significantly enhances the scope and reliability of jurisprudential theorization. It is hypothesized that the synergistic authority approach is not merely supplementary but foundational, offering a necessary and legitimate method for deriving coherent and comprehensive Islamic legal theories.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This research employs a doctrinal and inductive methodological framework, deeply rooted in jurisprudential theory and Islamic legal scholarship. Initially, it delineates the conceptual scope and theoretical status of the synergistic authority theory within al-Sadr&#039;s broader intellectual structure. Following this doctrinal clarification, the study adopts an inductive analytical approach, examining relevant textual sources from al-Sadr&#039;s jurisprudential writings and related Islamic jurisprudential literature. Primary texts analyzed include al-Sadr’s foundational works and secondary scholarly interpretations of his jurisprudential methods.&lt;br&gt;     Furthermore, this study introduces an illustrative application of the synergistic methodology within criminal law theory, specifically addressing Islamic jurisprudential approaches to Limits imposed by God penalties. This practical framework provides a testbed for evaluating the method’s operational viability and highlights the theoretical intricacies involved in synergistically deriving jurisprudential theories.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This study carefully examined the concept of the &quot;Synergistic Authority of Islamic Jurists’ Opinions,&quot; a methodological innovation attributed implicitly to Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, evaluating its theoretical justification and practical implications within jurisprudential theory-building. Through rigorous analysis, five distinct arguments emerged as supportive of the validity and efficacy of employing synergized juristic opinions both in the discovery phase (identifying underlying jurisprudential principles) and the adoption phase (implementation within a social governance framework).&lt;br&gt;     Initially, the research addressed epistemological considerations, emphasizing that genuine attribution of any theoretical construct to Sharia fundamentally requires a robust epistemic threshold—certainty (&lt;em&gt;Qat‘&lt;/em&gt;). The mere aggregation of juristic opinions without achieving this epistemic certainty, although methodologically useful, remains insufficient for definitive Sharia attribution. Therefore, the study underscored the necessity of integrating epistemological strategies such as &quot;minor closure&quot; (&lt;em&gt;Insidad Saghir&lt;/em&gt;), a jurisprudential technique distinct from major closure (&lt;em&gt;Insidad Kabir&lt;/em&gt;), which sanctions reliance on probabilistic reasoning (&lt;em&gt;Zann&lt;/em&gt;) in limited jurisprudential domains. Minor closure effectively allows jurists to cautiously circumvent otherwise inaccessible epistemic pathways by endorsing highly reliable juristic opinions as valid supplementary proofs, thereby enhancing certainty through cumulative inductive reasoning.&lt;br&gt;     The research further analyzed the role of the jurist&#039;s guardianship authority (&lt;em&gt;Wilayat al-Faqih&lt;/em&gt;) in reinforcing the legitimacy of synergistic juristic opinions, especially in their adoption within social systems. Although absolute guardianship remains a contentious theoretical stance among various Islamic scholars, this study identified sufficient jurisprudential backing—within the intellectual legacy of al-Sadr and subsequent scholarship—to affirm that the guardianship principle provides robust grounds for adopting synergistically derived jurisprudential theories into governance and policy frameworks. In scenarios where certainty remains elusive, the authoritative capacity vested in the jurist enables pragmatic yet principled adoption of synergized opinions to ensure coherent social system governance aligned with Islamic ethical and legal standards.&lt;br&gt;     Moreover, the research discussed the &quot;probable agreement&quot; (&lt;em&gt;Ittifaq Muhtamal&lt;/em&gt;) argument, clarifying its specific utility in the context of theory adoption rather than initial theoretical discovery. This subtle distinction underscores the epistemological caution within al-Sadr’s framework, delineating clear boundaries between theoretical exploration (discovery) and practical jurisprudential application (adoption). The probable agreement, while persuasive, cannot independently sustain theoretical discovery absent stronger epistemic corroboration.&lt;br&gt;     The study rigorously addressed significant critiques of the synergistic methodology, particularly the potential confusion between traditional jurisprudential ruling (&lt;em&gt;fiqh al-ahkam&lt;/em&gt;) and jurisprudential theorization (&lt;em&gt;fiqh al-nazariyya&lt;/em&gt;). Two primary counterarguments were articulated: first, highlighting essential distinctions between these two categories of jurisprudence, and second, re-framing debates to focus precisely on the epistemic foundations and legitimacy of juristic synthesis rather than peripheral or methodological misconceptions.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Through an extensive exploration of the synergistic authority concept, this research provided substantial theoretical validation for integrating multiple juristic opinions as a credible methodology in jurisprudential theorization. It was established that genuine theoretical attribution to Sharia mandates achieving a threshold of certainty, either through inductive reasoning combined with minor closure or through legitimate juristic guardianship authority. Thus, the epistemic credibility of synergized opinions emerges not merely from convenience or expediency, but from deep-seated jurisprudential principles.&lt;br&gt;     Resolving major epistemological and methodological objections, the synergistic authority model effectively addresses fundamental inconsistencies previously encountered in jurisprudential theorization, particularly discrepancies arising from isolated juristic interpretations. By systematically harnessing collective juristic wisdom, this approach expands interpretive capacities, facilitating a coherent integration of juristic insights into comprehensive Islamic legal theories.&lt;br&gt;     Practically, adopting the synergistic method empowers the Islamic jurist-ruler (&lt;em&gt;Wali al-Faqih&lt;/em&gt;) with a legitimate jurisprudential strategy to consolidate and standardize governance rulings across political, economic, social, and penal domains.&lt;br&gt;     Applying the synergistic method to criminal law notably elucidates deeper jurisprudential and policy objectives underlying Limits imposed by God. Clarifying these objectives offers significant jurisprudential advancements, resolving interpretive ambiguities while practically guiding legislative and policymaking processes. This enhanced understanding critically informs and refines the design and enactment of complementary &lt;em&gt;ta’zir&lt;/em&gt; (discretionary) punishments, enriching the overall Islamic penal system with coherence and robust epistemological support.&lt;br&gt;     Thus, the validation of the synergistic authority not only resolves theoretical complexities inherent in jurisprudential theorization but also significantly enhances practical legislative efficacy.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">به‌واسطه سرعت بیش از پیش تحولات اجتماعی، بسط سریع ساختارهای تمدنی غرب در قاطبه فرهنگ‌ها، و همچنین وقوع انقلاب اسلامی ایران، نگرش کلان به احکام شرعی و استخراج خطوط مشی اسلام در ساحات مختلف اجتماعی، اهمیتی دوچندان یافته است. با این حال، استنباط روش‌مند این نظریات به‌گونه‌ای که هم قابلیت انتساب به اسلام را داشته و هم به‌لحاظ اصولی حجیت داشته باشد، نیازمند نوآوری فقهی است. یکی از فقهای معاصر که هم روش خود را در استخراج نظریه تبیین کرده و هم در امتداد آن به‌صورت عینی اقدام به نظریه‌پردازی نموده، شهید آیت‌الله سیدمحمدباقر صدر است. هم‌افزایی آراء فقهی یا بهره‌گیری هم‌زمان از آراء فقیهان مختلف در طراحی و اختیار نظریه، یکی از عناصر روشی نظریه‌پردازی ایشان است. این پژوهش که مبتنی بر روش توصیفی تحلیلی صورت پذیرفته، درصدد سنجش قلمرو اعتبار ادله این نظریه اصولی با عنایت به آراء موافق و مخالف آن است، و در راستای عینیت‌بخشی به این الگو، اقدام به تطبیق فرضی آن در قلمرو سیاست حاکم بر حدود نموده است. بر پایه یافته‌های این پژوهش، پنج دلیل کاشفیت معرفت‌شناختی، انسداد صغیر، استقراء احکام شرعی، موافقت احتمالی با واقع، و نهایتاً اختیار ولی فقیه، هر کدام با قیودی خاص مثبت وجوهی از هم‌افزایی آراء فقهی است. اثبات حجیت این روش می‌تواند یکی از اصلی‌ترین موانع نظریه‌پردازی فقهی را، از جمله در حوزه نظریه مجازات برطرف سازد. هم‌چنین تطبیق این روش در فرایند کشف نظریه اهداف مجازات‌های حدی، در شناسایی جایگاه و فهم چالش‌های فرایند کشف و اختیار نظریه شریعت‌محور راهگشا خواهد بود.</OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Analysis of the Relationships Among the Components of Joint-Stock Companies Based on the Estimân (Trusteeship) Theory</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>تحلیل روابط ارکان شرکت‌های سهامی بر اساس نظریه استیمان</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1273</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1304</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77518</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2024.246604.3568</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>محمد</FirstName>
					<LastName>امامی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانش‌‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده معارف اسلامی و حقوق، دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>محسن</FirstName>
					<LastName>اسماعیلی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار، گروه حقوق خصوصی و اسلامی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>07</Month>
					<Day>02</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The legal landscape governing relationships among the constituents of joint-stock companies in Iranian law remains notably incomplete, lacking a cohesive theoretical grounding. Conventional approaches often treat commercial companies as exceptions to the general rules of civil law and Islamic jurisprudence, thereby perpetuating a fragmented understanding of their internal dynamics. Existing analyses fail to draw upon a cohesive jurisprudential framework, leaving critical gaps in the conceptualization of these commercial entities. To address this deficiency, the present study introduces and applies the &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;(Trusteeship) theory, rooted in Shiite jurisprudence, as a unifying system of reference. By anchoring the internal relationships of joint-stock companies in this jurisprudential paradigm, the research aims to integrate legal and Islamic principles, thereby offering a more coherent and theoretically grounded approach to understanding the intricate interplay among shareholders, directors, and other key stakeholders.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The central inquiry guiding this study is: How can the relationships among the various components of joint-stock companies in Iranian law be justified, structured, and explained based on the &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;(Trusteeship) theory within Shiite jurisprudence?&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This research posits that by applying the &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;theory as an underlying jurisprudential framework, the interactions and obligations among the shareholders, directors, and other elements of joint-stock companies can be both consistently defined and normatively justified. The hypothesis suggests that the &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;theory, when properly interpreted and adapted, will yield a more stable and transparent legal environment that aligns with both Islamic jurisprudential principles and the broader objectives of corporate governance.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This study employs a doctrinal legal methodology, drawing on primary and secondary sources. It scrutinizes legal texts, jurisprudential treatises, commercial codes, and scholarly commentaries.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The findings of this study demonstrate that conventional theories employed to explain the internal relationships within Iranian joint-stock companies—such as the director-as-agent model, legal representation, and the doctrine of directors as corporate organs—suffer from significant theoretical and practical shortcomings. These established frameworks have long been challenged by the evident conceptual gaps and contradictions they generate, particularly when attempting to reconcile the role of directors, shareholders, inspectors, and the legal personality of the company itself.&lt;br&gt;     A key discovery arises from the application of the &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;(Trusteeship) theory to these corporate relationships. Unlike existing approaches, the &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;theory does not rely on treating commercial companies as exceptions to general civil and jurisprudential principles. Instead, it positions the company as a legal entity capable of independently selecting and entrusting various components—directors, the general assembly, and inspectors—with the fulfillment of designated responsibilities. Under this theory, trusteeship emerges as the central conceptual framework: the company, as a legal entity, entrusts its directors with the management of corporate affairs, and in turn, shareholders entrust the company (and not the directors directly) with their investments and participation. This approach alleviates the persistent critiques that arise under other models.&lt;br&gt;     For example, previous interpretations faced difficulty justifying why the selection of directors by a majority of shareholders would also bind minority shareholders, or why the death or incapacity of a shareholder does not terminate a director’s tenure. The &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;theory resolves these issues by shifting the focus from individuals—shareholders and their fractional interests—to the corporate legal personality as the source of authority. Directors and other key players are not chosen as agents of specific shareholders; instead, they are trustees of the company as a unified, volitional legal person. Similarly, the validity and continuity of a director’s mandate are not tethered to any single shareholder’s personal status but rather to the existence and operational viability of the company itself.&lt;br&gt;     This perspective also effectively addresses criticisms aimed at the agency theory and legal representation doctrine. Critics have noted that these models struggle to explain the retention of authority in the face of shareholder turnover or personal changes. The &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;theory sidesteps this issue by clearly delineating that it is the company, as an enduring legal entity, which delegates authority. Thus, the termination of a director’s role is logically tied to the legal entity’s insolvency or dissolution, not to the life events of a particular shareholder.&lt;br&gt;     In addition, where legal representation models introduce complexities associated with exceeding authority or irrevocability, the &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;theory brings clarity. Instead of a statutorily imposed representative whose bounds may be vague or inflexible, the theory envisions trustees selected based on the company’s own volition and governing documents, ensuring that their authority is both contextually defined and practically enforceable. This alignment between jurisprudential principles and corporate reality suggests that the &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;theory is not merely an alternative model, but a more coherent and holistic framework better suited to the evolving nature of commercial companies in Iran.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The conclusion of this research affirms the pressing need for a cohesive and jurisprudentially grounded theory to govern the relationships among the various components of joint-stock companies in Iranian law. Existing conceptual models have proven unable to neatly reconcile the intricacies of these commercial entities, leaving directors’ roles ambiguous and the corporate personality under-theorized. In turn, scholars and practitioners have struggled to rely on a firm legal-analytical foundation, often resorting to fragmented and ad hoc explanations.&lt;br&gt;     The &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;theory directly addresses these deficiencies. It frames directors, inspectors, and the general assembly as trustees of the corporate entity, and the company itself as a trustee for its shareholders. This conceptual shift eliminates the perceived necessity of treating commercial companies as anomalies within civil law and Islamic jurisprudence. Instead, it enables a clearer, more principled approach: the company, as an independent legal entity, exercises its will by selecting trustees who manage, oversee, and guide its affairs. The authority and responsibilities of these trustees derive not from an uncertain nexus of shareholder mandates or legal fictions, but from the stable conceptual ground of trusteeship drawn from Shiite jurisprudence.&lt;br&gt;     This solution transcends the limitations of the agency, representation, and corporate organ doctrines. Where agency theory struggles to explain the universal binding of minority shareholders, the &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;theory attributes the appointment of directors to the company’s own legal person. Where representation and organ theories fail to justify the ramifications of a shareholder’s death or incapacity, the &lt;em&gt;Estimân &lt;/em&gt;theory points to the corporate entity’s enduring role as principal and trustee. The alignment between legal practice and jurisprudential principles renders this model resilient to common critiques, further validating its superiority.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">علیرغم گذشت ده‌ها سال از تصویب قانون تجارت در ایران، هنوز شرکت‌های تجاری به‌واسطه عدم تکیه بر نهادهای فقهی دارای جایگاه حقوقی قابل اتکایی نشده‌اند. از جمله آثار ناشی از این نقیصه، فقدان تحلیل دقیق از روابط ارکان مختلف شرکت‌های تجاری با یکدیگر است. سؤال پژوهش حاضر از این قرار است که روابط ارکان مختلف شرکت‌های سهامی به‌عنوان مهم‌ترین قسم شرکت‌های تجارتی با یکدیگر چگونه و بر چه بنیادی در فقه اسلامی و حقوق ایران قابل توجیه است؟ پندار نگارندگان این است که «قاعده استیمان» در فقه امامیه، موضعی است که برای این تحلیل باید به سراغ آن رفت. در پژوهش حاضر، ضمن بررسی نظریات گوناگون ارائه شده از قاعده استیمان، و بررسی اشکالات وارده بر آن‌ها، و با ذکر این مقدمه که شرکت‌های تجاری و مدنی دو نهاد متمایز و غیرقابل‌مقایسه می‌باشند، این برآیند حاصل گشت که در شرکت‌های سهامی، سهامداران با عقد یک قرارداد امانی و ابراز اعتماد به شخصیت حقوقی شرکت، وی را امین خود قرار می‌دهند و سپس شرکت، ارکان اداره خود را به‌عنوان امین خود بر می‌گزیند. این تحلیل از روابط شرکت‌های تجاری، به نظر متناسب‌ترین تحلیل در فقه و حقوق ایران و البته یک تحلیل راهگشا برای گشودن برخی گره‌های موجود در حقوق شرکت‌ها است، که ‌می‌تواند برای اصلاحات قانونی، مدنظر قانون‌گذار قرار گیرد.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">شرکت تجاری</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">شرکت سهامی</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_77518_4608a1c2d0854a30d871bcb0696c9cdf.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Artificial Intelligence as an Arbitrator: Formulating the Legal and Ethical Challenges of Applying Artificial Intelligence in the Arbitration Process</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>هوش مصنوعی در مقام داور؛ صورت‌بندی چالش‌های حقوقی و اخلاقی کاربست هوش مصنوعی در فرایند داوری</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1305</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1330</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77555</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2025.247407.3669</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>محمدامین</FirstName>
					<LastName>اسمعیل‌پور</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانش‌آموخته دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه علم و فرهنگ، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0007-0410-8026</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>18</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies has significantly impacted the practice of arbitration, prompting legal scholars and practitioners to reassess fundamental principles of dispute resolution. In particular, the application of AI as an arbitrator—rather than merely as a supportive tool—has raised complex legal and ethical questions. While traditional dispute resolution methods rely on human adjudicators to evaluate evidence, the increased efficiency and predictive capabilities of AI have made it an appealing alternative for arbitration tribunals aiming to reduce costs and time. However, the notion of granting an AI system autonomous authority challenges established arbitration norms, such as impartiality, fairness, and accountability.&lt;br&gt;     Current debates in AI-related scholarship demonstrate both optimism and caution. On one hand, AI’s capacity for rapid data processing and pattern recognition could enhance the arbitral process by streamlining the review of voluminous documentation and evidence. On the other hand, scholars point to inherent limitations of AI, notably the risk that algorithmic decision-making systems might reproduce biases present in their training data and operate opaquely, undermining the transparency crucial for a fair legal process. As the sophistication of AI grows, some commentators wonder whether machines could evolve into entities comparable to human intelligence—capable of recognizing emotional nuances or developing self-awareness—while others contend that these prospects remain largely theoretical.&lt;br&gt;     Within this context, the distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic (connectionist) AI is pivotal. Symbolic AI systems rely on predefined rules that explain how they generate conclusions, providing a measure of transparency well suited to legal settings. In contrast, non-symbolic AI operates through inductive reasoning, often employing neural networks that “learn” from large datasets but offer limited insight into the reasoning process. This divergence raises practical and ethical questions when AI is tasked not merely with assisting in evidence evaluation but also with taking on a more autonomous role as the primary decision-maker.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This study centers on a core inquiry: What legal and ethical challenges arise when AI is deployed as an arbitrator or in a supportive capacity for evaluating arbitration evidence? Specifically, it seeks to determine how AI-driven decision-making processes align with the foundational principles of arbitration—neutrality, procedural fairness, and due process—and whether current legal frameworks can address questions of liability and accountability. The question encompasses both the advanced scenario of fully autonomous AI arbitrators and the more common reality of AI tools aiding human arbitrators. By examining these distinct yet interrelated roles of AI, the research aims to clarify how emerging technologies might fit (or fail to fit) within existing arbitration norms.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The central hypothesis posits that while AI in an assistive capacity can efficiently streamline arbitration procedures—reducing costs and shortening timeframes—its role as an independent arbitrator may present profound challenges that compromise the integrity of the arbitral process. Specifically, the research hypothesizes the following:&lt;br&gt;     Ethical and Legal Vulnerabilities: If AI functions with minimal human oversight, biases, discrimination, and a lack of transparency may contravene essential arbitration principles of fairness and equality.&lt;br&gt;     Liability and Accountability Complications: Assigning responsibility for AI-generated decisions in arbitration remains unsettled, particularly when no human agent actively supervises the system’s determinations.&lt;br&gt;     Potential for Beneficial Complementarity: When integrated responsibly—under appropriate human guidance—AI can enhance the accuracy of evidence analysis without forfeiting the essential legal safeguards that human judgment provides.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This research adopts a doctrinal methodology, focusing on an analytical review of existing legal instruments, ethical guidelines, and scholarly commentaries related to AI application in dispute resolution. By examining key arbitration laws, codes of ethics, and relevant court precedents, the study will identify areas in which AI fits seamlessly into established norms, as well as those in which regulatory gaps persist.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The research findings indicate that AI can significantly enhance the efficiency and objectivity of arbitration proceedings when deployed in an assistive capacity. Specifically, AI-driven tools excel at sorting large volumes of data, identifying relevant evidence, and conducting preliminary legal analysis with speed and precision. By minimizing human error and offering consistent results, AI systems reduce the likelihood of inconsistencies and procedural delays, thus lowering costs and expediting the resolution process. Moreover, parties involved in arbitration benefit from a more transparent workflow, as symbolic AI systems can provide explanations for their reasoning through predefined rules. This explainability aligns well with procedural fairness, offering clarity on how a conclusion or recommendation is reached.&lt;br&gt;     However, the discussion reveals critical concerns regarding the use of AI as a fully autonomous arbitrator. Chief among these is the risk of bias, which arises when AI algorithms are trained on datasets containing discriminatory patterns. In such instances, prejudices embedded in the data may be amplified by AI-driven decisions, compromising the foundational principles of equality and impartiality in arbitration. Even in advanced neural network architectures, the “black box” nature of machine learning often obscures the rationale behind outcomes, challenging the transparency that is crucial for maintaining the credibility of the arbitral process. Furthermore, assigning liability for AI-based decisions remains a gray area: if an AI system misjudges or violates fundamental legal rights, determining whether fault rests with developers, owners, or arbitration institutions proves complex.&lt;br&gt;     An additional consideration is the gap between formal legal reasoning and AI’s computational logic. Judicial or arbitral reasoning frequently involves normative judgment, subjective interpretation, and contextual evaluation—factors not easily distilled into a finite set of rules or training patterns. This gap is particularly stark when the arbitrator’s role extends beyond the mechanical application of law to include moral or equitable considerations, where rigid, data-driven mechanisms may falter. Thus, while the research underscores the utility of AI in procedural and administrative tasks, it also highlights inherent limitations when AI is expected to embody the nuanced reasoning typically associated with human arbitrators.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;In light of these findings, the study concludes that AI can play an instrumental role in assisting arbitration tribunals by swiftly evaluating evidence within clear, predefined parameters. Where the arbitrator’s role is largely passive—focused on applying established rules rather than exercising broad discretion—AI’s objective and rule-based functionality proves advantageous. It can reduce time and expense, offering a more streamlined resolution process. However, the aspiration to replicate the depth of judicial reasoning or to strive for substantive justice through AI alone remains unfulfilled. Legal judgments often rest on interpretive and moral determinations that cannot be uniformly codified into a single algorithmic framework, rendering current AI technology inadequate for this higher-level adjudicative function.&lt;br&gt;     Moreover, reliance on AI as an independent arbitrator raises legal and ethical complexities, including the potential for bias or discrimination, insufficient transparency in decision-making processes, and challenges to the principle of arbitrator independence. These issues become especially pronounced when AI’s “learning” is shaped by datasets that reflect existing societal prejudices, potentially skewing outcomes in ways that undermine fundamental fairness. The absence of a robust liability framework further complicates matters, as arbitrating parties, developers, and institutional sponsors may dispute responsibility for any damages arising from erroneous AI-driven decisions.&lt;br&gt;     To address these concerns, this paper recommends several measures. First, the limitations of AI in evidence evaluation should be clearly defined at the outset, ensuring that disputing parties understand both the advantages and risks. Second, developers and owners of AI systems must register their algorithms with relevant regulatory bodies and disclose any modifications to enhance transparency and accountability. Third, clear liability standards should be established to determine who bears responsibility if AI malfunctions or produces unjust outcomes—whether that liability rests with developers, owners, or the arbitration institutions themselves. Finally, governments and arbitral bodies should collaborate to formulate guidelines and require mandatory insurance coverage, ensuring that any damages arising from AI’s application in arbitration can be compensated. By taking these steps, arbitration systems can incorporate AI responsibly, striking a balance between technological innovation and the enduring principles of legal fairness.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">ظهور گونه‌های مختلف مدل‌های زبانی بزرگ نظیر اقسام هوش مصنوعی، حوزه‌های متعدد حقوقی را تحت‌تأثیر خود قرار داده است که «داوری» نیز از آن مصون نبوده است. جایگاه هوش مصنوعی در مقام «داور» و به‌هنگام ارزیابی ادله طرفین داوری، می‌تواند به‌عنوان صلاحیت مساعدتی و چه‌بسا به‌صورت مستقل مورد بررسی قرار گیرد. نوشتار حاضر با روش توصیفی تحلیلی بر آن است تا به تبیین و صورت‌بندی دقیق چالش‌های حقوقی و اخلاقی به‌کارگیری این فناوری نوین در مقام داور و یا کاربست آن در دیوان‌های داوری بپردازد. یافته‌ها حاکی است که‌ این فناوری، علی‌رغم تمام دستاوردهایی که می‌تواند برای فرایند داوری به‌همراه داشته باشد، در اموری همچون استدلال حقوقی، رعایت بی‌طرفی و پذیرش عمومی، با چالش‌های اساسی مواجه است. البته، کاربست هوش مصنوعی در صلاحیت مساعدتی دیوان‌های داوری به‌عنوان ابزار تسهیل‌گر، با چالش‌های اساسی پیش‌گفته مواجه نخواهد بود، چه‌اینکه صرفا تحلیلی از داده‌ها یا مدارکی را در اختیار داور انسانی قرار می‌دهد و اتخاذ تصمیم داورانه با عامل انسانی خواهد بود. علیرغم چالش‌های مطروحه در مقاله، در انتها پیشنهاد شده است چنانچه هوش مصنوعی در فرایند داوری به‌کار گرفته شد، بدواً چالش‌ها و محدودیت‌های هوش مصنوعی به استحضار طرفین داوری برسد و ضمناً به‌منظور جبران خسارات احتمالی ناشی از عملکرد هوش مصنوعی در این فرایند، دولت‌ها و دیوان‌های داوری تمهیدات بیمه‌ای لازم را جهت جبران خسارات مذکور در نظر بگیرند.</OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>An Analysis of the Criteria for Determining Adolescents’ Intellectual Growth and Maturity in Iran’s Judicial Criminal Policy</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>واکاوی معیارهای تشخیص رشد و کمال عقل نوجوانان در سیاست جنایی قضایی ایران</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1331</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1372</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77667</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2025.247510.3679</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>سعید</FirstName>
					<LastName>قائدی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دکتری حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق قضایی، دانشگاه علوم قضایی و خدمات اداری، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0000-5622-6998</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>فرید</FirstName>
					<LastName>محسنی</LastName>
<Affiliation>استاد، گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق قضایی، دانشگاه علوم قضایی و خدمات اداری، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0000-5622-6998</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>مرتضی</FirstName>
					<LastName>راسته</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، واحد چالوس، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، چالوس، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-8710-1677</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>صمد</FirstName>
					<LastName>چوبینه</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دکتری حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، واحد تهران مرکز، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0000-5622-6998</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>01</Month>
					<Day>04</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The intellectual growth and maturity of adolescent offenders hold critical importance in shaping fair and effective judicial responses within Iran’s criminal justice system. While Iran’s Islamic Penal Code of 2013 introduced noteworthy reforms by differentiating between adult and juvenile offenders, Article 91 leaves room for ambiguity in determining “criminal maturity.” Consequently, judicial authorities have often resorted to subjective standards or followed the findings of forensic commissions without clear procedural guidelines. This lacuna undermines both the consistency of court decisions and the credibility of juvenile justice. Recognizing these challenges, the present study focuses on identifying and categorizing objective criteria that can inform a more coherent legal framework for assessing adolescents’ intellectual growth and maturity, thereby strengthening Iran’s juvenile justice policies.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This article aims to address a central question: What are the most suitable and practically applicable criteria for ascertaining the intellectual growth and maturity of adolescent offenders in Iran’s criminal justice system, particularly in light of Article 91 of the Islamic Penal Code? By refining the existing standards, the study seeks to offer insights that enhance the consistency and transparency of juvenile court proceedings.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The core hypothesis posits that current legislative and judicial frameworks in Iran do not provide sufficiently clear or comprehensive guidelines for determining adolescents’ intellectual growth and maturity. As a result, significant variability emerges in judicial decisions, creating inequities in sentencing and sometimes jeopardizing the rights and welfare of juvenile offenders. The study further hypothesizes that drawing upon both Islamic jurisprudential principles and international human rights instruments can help form a balanced set of objective criteria, ultimately rectifying present inconsistencies.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Employing a doctrinal research method and extensive library-based inquiry, this study systematically examines the statutory provisions of the Islamic Penal Code, related guidelines, and relevant Islamic jurisprudential texts. In addition, it analyzes human rights conventions and comparative legal models to extract functional benchmarks for assessing adolescent maturity. Case analyses from the Legal Medicine Organization’s forensic evaluations and judicial verdicts illuminate existing practices and point to the gaps in current policy. The research framework thus marries theoretical perspectives with empirical observations to propose a structured typology of indicators—from cognitive awareness of wrongdoing to emotional and psychosocial development—that courts can use when adjudicating cases involving juvenile offenders.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The findings of this study reinforce the view that Iran’s existing legal and judicial mechanisms do not sufficiently articulate concrete criteria for determining the criminal maturity of offenders under the age of 18. By examining documented case files, court rulings, and forensic assessments, the research reveals a high degree of variance in judicial practice. Despite the Islamic Penal Code’s intention to align domestic norms with both Islamic jurisprudential principles and international obligations, judges often face ambiguities due to a lack of standardized guidelines. In practice, the reliance on Article 91’s broad stipulation—where courts “may consult the Legal Medicine Organization or use any other appropriate means”—has led to inconsistent procedures.&lt;br&gt;     Moreover, the “Guideline for Determining the Intellectual Growth and Maturity of Individuals Under the Age of 18,” introduced in 2023, centralizes the role of the Legal Medicine Organization’s forensic commission but remains silent on supplementary indicators necessary for an objective assessment. As a consequence, judges in Juvenile Criminal Court One either strictly adhere to forensic opinions without considering contextual or psychological evaluations or disregard these opinions based on alternative, sometimes personal, criteria.&lt;br&gt;     Through a doctrinal analysis of relevant legal texts, cross-referencing scholarly commentaries in Islamic jurisprudence and international human rights documents, this research shows that a multi-dimensional framework is urgently required. Factors such as psychological evaluations, personality assessments, behavioral reports, the defendant’s understanding of legal prohibitions, and cognitive indicators during and after the commission of the offense offer a more comprehensive basis for establishing intellectual maturity. Integrating these factors not only curbs the risk of arbitrary sentencing but also aligns judicial outcomes with the rehabilitative ethos central to juvenile justice. Overall, the results underscore the need for greater legislative specificity and a collaborative approach, wherein legal, forensic, and psychosocial perspectives collectively shape the determination of an adolescent offender’s criminal maturity.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The enactment of Article 91 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013 represents a dual effort to honor Islamic legal traditions and fulfill international human rights obligations. On paper, this provision champions a progressive approach by recognizing that individuals who have reached puberty but remain under 18 may lack the requisite intellectual maturity to bear full criminal responsibility—particularly for crimes punishable by &lt;em&gt;Hadd &lt;/em&gt;[prescribed punishment] or &lt;em&gt;Qisas &lt;/em&gt;[retaliation]. In practice, however, the absence of explicit criteria has paved the way for inconsistent and, at times, discretionary rulings.&lt;br&gt;     Although the note to Article 91 allows courts to consult the Legal Medicine Organization or employ other reasonable methods, this guidance remains too broad to ensure uniformity. Equally, the 2023 guideline on determining criminal maturity, which relies almost exclusively on forensic commission opinions, has not resolved the ambiguity. Judges frequently issue verdicts that either hinge solely on forensic input or contravene these findings without substituting any clear, objective standard.&lt;br&gt;     In light of these lacunae, it becomes evident that a purely theoretical review of Islamic jurisprudence and human rights doctrines will not suffice. Practical benchmarks—ranging from psychological profiling and social worker evaluations to witness statements, the defendant’s comprehension of wrongdoing, and investigatory findings—must be systematically incorporated into the adjudicative process. The study concludes that when such objective measures are thoroughly utilized, many juvenile defendants lack the intellectual growth and maturity necessary to justify the imposition of &lt;em&gt;Hadd &lt;/em&gt;or &lt;em&gt;Qisas &lt;/em&gt;penalties. By embedding these guidelines into routine judicial practice, Iran’s juvenile justice policy can move closer to ensuring both fairness and consistency in cases involving adolescent offenders.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">قانون مجازات اسلامی مصوب 1392، در راستای انطباق با آموزه‌های رایج فقهی و با الهام از اسناد بین‌المللی حقوق بشری، و متأثر از ملاحظات جرم‌شناختی، جایگاه ویژه‌ای به‌منظور افتراقی‌سازی الگوی پاسخ‌دهی ماهوی به رفتار ارتکابی نوجوانان در نظر گرفته است، که می‌توان به پیش‌بینی رشد و کمال عقل بالغ کمتر از هجده سال در جرایم مستوجب حد و قصاص در ماده 91 این قانون اشاره کرد. قانون‌گذار ایرانی در این ماده، بر لزوم ایجاد پیوندی میان ارتکاب رفتار مجرمانه و شمول مجازات‌های حد و قصاص تحت عنوان «رشد کیفری» تأکید کرده است. با این همه، چگونگی تشخیص رشد و کمال عقل نوجوانان مطابق سیاست کیفری ایران مغفول مانده و نیازمند تعیین و تبیین معیارهای علمی و ارائه گزاره‌های راهنما است تا از تفسیرهای کلی و سلیقه‌ای که می‌تواند به صدور احکام متهافت و ناهماهنگ بیانجامد و انسجام و اثربخشی سیاست جنایی را مختل سازد، احتراز شود. نوشتار حاضر با روش توصیفی تحلیلی، از یک‌سو به دنبال ارائه رهنمودهای عینی چگونگی احراز رشد کیفری متهم نوجوان است و از سوی دیگر، با واکاوی دقیق، نحوه و کیفیت استناد محاکم به این معیارها را پاسخ می‌دهد. یافته‌های پژوهش حاکی از آن است که معیارهایی همچون استعلام از مراجع ذی‌ربط (پزشکی قانونی، مراکز درمانی و بالینی و مراجع قضایی)، آزمودن، پرونده شخصیت، شهادت شهود، طراحی رفتار مجرمانه و نحوه ارتکاب آن، درک ماهیت و حُرمت جرم ارتکابی و معاینه محل و تحقیقات محلی، رهنمودهایی است که کاربست موثر و فراگیر آن‌ها می‌تواند به تنوع برداشت‌ها و اتخاذ رویه‌های گوناگون، پیش‌بینی ناپذیر و تابع بخت و اقبال، خاتمه داده و کارآمدی سیاست جنایی را در موضع بحث حاضر رقم زند.</OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Legal Challenges in the Regulatory Framework for Emerging Virtual Technologies in Iran</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>چالش‌های حقوقی نظام تنظیم‌گری فناوری‌های نوظهور مجازی در ایران</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1373</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1408</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77702</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2025.247604.3690</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>سیدحسین</FirstName>
					<LastName>هاشمی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دکتری حقوق عمومی، دانشکده معارف اسلامی و حقوق، دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>سیدمحمدمهدی</FirstName>
					<LastName>غمامی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار، گروه حقوق عمومی و بین‌الملل، دانشکده معارف اسلامی و حقوق، دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>01</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The rapid advancement of technology in the 21st century has brought forth profound transformations in social, economic, and governance structures globally. Iran has not been immune to these changes, experiencing significant shifts within its societal and governmental frameworks due to technological progress, especially in cyberspace and its associated branches. Emerging technologies—ranging from artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) to blockchain, virtual reality, and quantum computing—exhibit an inherently dynamic, flexible, and indeterminate nature. These characteristics distinguish them markedly from traditional sectors governed by centuries-old legal paradigms. As such, regulation in the field of emerging technologies requires rethinking traditional approaches, emphasizing the protection of privacy, the creation of safe digital environments, the management of content, and the promotion of ethical standards.&lt;br&gt;     Globally, various regulatory trends are evident: many countries are moving towards risk-based frameworks that seek not to restrict innovation but to manage technological risks responsibly. Concurrently, there is an increasing emphasis on international collaboration, ethical oversight, and multistakeholder engagement in shaping technology governance. Institutions such as the European Union and the United Nations have advanced initiatives aiming to harmonize regulatory standards for emerging technologies.&lt;br&gt;     However, Iran faces unique challenges in this regulatory context, rooted in its centralized governmental structure, socio-cultural diversity, economic limitations induced by international sanctions, and traditionalist legal theories. These challenges contribute to regulatory fragmentation, lack of coherence, and slow adaptation to technological advances. Consequently, there is a pressing need to develop a transparent, robust, and adaptive regulatory framework capable of fostering innovation while safeguarding public interests and aligning with global standards.&lt;br&gt;     This article seeks to identify and analyze the key legal and institutional obstacles impeding Iran’s regulatory effectiveness in the domain of emerging technologies, aiming to contribute to both scholarly discussions and practical reforms in the Iranian legal system.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The central research question guiding this study is:&lt;br&gt;     &quot;What are the legal challenges facing the regulatory system for emerging technologies in Iran?&quot;&lt;br&gt;     This core inquiry will be broken down into several sub-questions throughout the study, including:&lt;br&gt;     To what extent does the current Iranian legal framework address the regulation of emerging technologies?&lt;br&gt;     What structural, cultural, and political factors contribute to the challenges in regulating new technologies within Iran?&lt;br&gt;     How does Iran’s regulatory approach compare with international best practices?&lt;br&gt;     What reforms could strengthen Iran’s regulatory system to promote innovation while ensuring public welfare?&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This research operates under the following primary hypothesis:&lt;br&gt;     &quot;Iran’s regulatory system for emerging technologies is fragmented and lacks coherence, resulting in ineffective governance that hampers technological innovation and fails to adequately address societal risks associated with digital transformation.&quot;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The research adopts a doctrinal legal research method complemented by comparative analysis and qualitative content analysis.&lt;br&gt;     The study will employ theories of regulatory governance, risk regulation, and legal responsiveness to frame its analysis. Concepts such as &quot;adaptive regulation,&quot; &quot;sandbox regulation&quot; (as used in fintech industries), and &quot;ethical technology governance&quot; will guide the exploration of innovative legal frameworks suitable for emerging technologies.&lt;br&gt;     Stakeholder Analysis: Attention will be given to the roles of different actors—government bodies, private sector innovators, academia, civil society organizations—in shaping and influencing regulatory development. Interviews or secondary analysis of statements, policy papers, and media coverage will be used to gauge stakeholder perspectives when applicable.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The findings of this research reveal significant structural and substantive challenges within Iran’s regulatory system concerning emerging virtual technologies. The most salient result is the fragmented and incoherent regulatory landscape, characterized by the isolated establishment of multiple regulatory bodies without a structured delineation of their interrelationships or their integration into the broader governance framework. This disjointed regulatory structure has produced ambiguity, jurisdictional conflicts, and inefficiencies that undermine both private sector innovation and the safeguarding of public interests.&lt;br&gt;     In practice, numerous governmental and supra-governmental bodies—including the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Cabinet, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, the Communications Regulatory Authority, and others—exercise overlapping or conflicting authority over cyberspace-related matters. These institutions often operate in silos, with minimal coordination and an absence of clear legal mandates defining their competencies, resulting in regulatory duplication, gaps, and inconsistent policy implementation.&lt;br&gt;     Furthermore, the regulatory mechanisms lack a networked model that connects sectoral regulators with the country&#039;s main branches of government—the executive, legislative, and judiciary. Without formalized channels for inter-regulatory dialogue and coordinated decision-making, regulatory bodies act independently, leading to a disjointed legal environment that hinders coherent policymaking, strategic planning, and effective enforcement.&lt;br&gt;     An additional result concerns the absence of complementary regulatory institutions that could support a more robust governance framework. Specifically, the Iranian system lacks:&lt;br&gt;     Oversight regulators to ensure compliance and accountability across sectors.&lt;br&gt;     Diverse regulatory tools to tailor regulatory interventions appropriately to different technological fields.&lt;br&gt;     Intermediary regulatory bodies that could mediate conflicts between agencies.&lt;br&gt;     Scientific and research institutions specialized in technology law and policy to inform evidence-based regulation.&lt;br&gt;     Barriers to innovation and private sector development are further exacerbated by deficiencies in critical legal protections. The absence of comprehensive data protection legislation, limited safeguards for intellectual property rights in the digital realm, and restricted access to public information all contribute to a regulatory environment that is perceived as unpredictable and hostile to technological entrepreneurship.&lt;br&gt;     Moreover, Iranian regulatory policy does not sufficiently engage with stakeholder participation from the technology sector, civil society, or academia. In contrast to global trends that emphasize multistakeholder governance, Iran’s regulatory model remains largely top-down and state-centric, which limits the inclusion of valuable insights from non-governmental actors and diminishes regulatory legitimacy and effectiveness.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This study demonstrates that the current Iranian regulatory structure for governing emerging virtual technologies is deeply fragmented, incoherent, and inefficient. The proliferation of isolated regulatory bodies, unclear institutional mandates, and the absence of structured relationships between regulators and the main branches of government have created an environment marked by confusion, jurisdictional conflict, and regulatory inertia.&lt;br&gt;     Fundamentally, the Iranian legal system has yet to establish a coherent vision for the regulation of cyberspace that aligns with contemporary global practices emphasizing coordination, transparency, accountability, and stakeholder engagement. Without a comprehensive regulatory architecture, the grand function of regulation—the balancing of private innovation with public welfare—cannot be achieved.&lt;br&gt;     The research underscores that meaningful regulation of emerging technologies must be rooted in an interdisciplinary public law framework that integrates policymaking, ethics, scientific expertise, and participatory governance. Regulatory success depends not merely on the formation of isolated bodies but on the systematic design of rules, institutions, procedures, and tools that can respond flexibly to technological evolution.&lt;br&gt;     Among the most critical legal reforms needed are:&lt;br&gt;     The clear legal definition of regulatory mandates and competencies;&lt;br&gt;     The establishment of complementary institutions such as oversight regulators and intermediary bodies;&lt;br&gt;     The development of a diverse toolkit of regulatory instruments;&lt;br&gt;     The promotion of scientific, research, and educational infrastructure in technology law;&lt;br&gt;     The adoption of comprehensive data protection and intellectual property laws;&lt;br&gt;     And the institutionalization of stakeholder participation mechanisms.&lt;br&gt;     A reorganized and restructured regulatory system is not only vital for protecting public interests but also for supporting domestic innovation, attracting investment, and ensuring Iran’s competitiveness in the global technological ecosystem.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">هوش مصنوعی، اینترنت اشیاء، رایانش ابری، زنجیره بلوکی، رباتیک، واقعیت مجازی و افزوده، رایانش کوانتومی و... روزبه‌روز در سراسر جهان در حال گسترش است. تحولات سریع فناوری و تطورات الگوهای کسب‌وکار نوین، به‌ویژه در فضای دیجیتال، توسعه روزافزون فناوری‌های تخریب‌گر، غیرملموس بودن، پویایی و تغییر دائمی فضا، تحقق حاکمیت و اصول و قواعد حکمرانی به شکل مرسوم و سنتی آن را ناممکن کرده است. در چنین فضایی نمی‌توان به فرایندهای تقنین و اعمال قانون از طرق قضایی مطابق نظام تفکیک قوای سنتی و شکلی اتکای چندانی کرد. از سوی دیگر، تشکیل شوراها و کمیسیون‌های متشکل از بخش‌های دولتی، بدون توجه کافی به ارتقاء فرهنگ حقوقی، حاکمیت قواعد و هنجارهای ماهوی، شفافیت و مسئولیت‌پذیری کنشگران این زیست‌بوم وضعیت مذکور را پیچیده‌تر کرده است. نظام‌های حکمرانی با استفاده از الگوها و سازوکارهای جدید تنظیم‌گری و با ابزارهای متنوع آن، از سویی به‌دنبال حداکثرسازی توسعه این فناوری‌ها و از سوی دیگر حفظ و تضمین حقوق شهروندان و کنترل مخاطرات آن‌ها هستند. این مقاله با اتخاذ روش توصیفی تحلیلی، در پی پاسخ به این پرسش است که چالش‌های حقوقی نظام تنظیم‌گری فناوری‌های نوظهور مجازی در ایران چیست؟ برون‌داد پژوهش نمایان‌گر این است که تنظیم‌گری فناوری‌های جدید ایران غیرساختارمند، جزیره‌ای، نامنسجم و ناهماهنگ است، که از سویی ریشه در فقدان جایگاه مناسب برای تنظیم‌گران در نظام حکمرانی دارد، و از دیگر سو ناشی از محدودیت کسب‌وکارهای حوزه فناوری در دسترسی به اطلاعات، فقدان قوانین جامع حفاظت از داده‌ها و فقدان حمایت حقوقی از مالکیت فکری و هوش مصنوعی است. ازاین‌رو، تغییر چیدمان و آرایش نظام حقوقی از حیث قواعد، ساختارها، رویه‌ها و ابزارهای تنظیمی، از مهم‌ترین الزامات حقوقی پیش‌روی نظام تنظیم‌گری فناوری‌های نوظهور مجازی در ایران است.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">حکمرانی تنظیمی</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">فناوری‌های نوظهور</Param>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Feasibility of Judges’ Independent Reliance on the Constitution as the Sole Legal Basis in their Judgments in the Iranian Legal System</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>امکان‌سنجی استناد مستقل قضات به قانون اساسی در حقوق ایران</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1409</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1432</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77503</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2024.245960.3510</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>مهدی</FirstName>
					<LastName>فرهمند</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق قضایی، دانشگاه علوم قضایی و خدمات اداری، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0003-3667-1837</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>مصطفی</FirstName>
					<LastName>منصوریان</LastName>
<Affiliation>استادیار، گروه حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق قضایی، دانشگاه علوم قضایی و خدمات اداری، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>03</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Constitutions form the foundational legal framework of nations, establishing the principles that govern state affairs and defining the relationship between the government and its citizens. Adherence to constitutional provisions is crucial for protecting individual freedoms, upholding human dignity, and promoting political and social justice. A key mechanism in enforcing constitutional supremacy is the judiciary&#039;s ability to invoke constitutional provisions when adjudicating cases, especially those involving violations of constitutional rights.&lt;br&gt;     Globally, the extent to which courts rely on the constitution varies. In the United States and countries influenced by its legal system, judges frequently base their decisions directly on constitutional provisions, reinforcing the doctrine of constitutional supremacy. In contrast, many European countries with centralized constitutional review systems contest the practice of ordinary judges independently invoking the constitution. This divergence highlights differing views on the judiciary&#039;s role in constitutional interpretation and enforcement.&lt;br&gt;     In Iran, which follows a centralized model of constitutional oversight, there is significant debate about whether judges can independently rely on the constitution as the sole basis for their rulings. This study explores this issue, examining the legal and constitutional grounds that may permit or prohibit judges in the Iranian legal system from basing their decisions solely on constitutional principles.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The primary research question guiding this study is:&lt;br&gt;     Can judges in the Iranian legal system independently rely on the constitution as the sole and sufficient legal basis for their judicial decisions, rather than merely using it to reinforce their reasoning? Specifically, does the Iranian Constitution permit judges to issue rulings based solely on constitutional provisions without recourse to statutory laws?&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The study hypothesizes that under Article 166 of the Iranian Constitution, judges have the authority to independently base their rulings on constitutional principles. Article 166 stipulates that judicial verdicts must be well-reasoned and documented with reference to legal codes. The hypothesis asserts that constitutional provisions qualify as &quot;legal codes&quot; within the meaning of this article.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;To investigate the research question and test the hypothesis, this study employs a doctrinal legal research methodology, focusing on a critical analysis of constitutional texts, statutory laws, judicial practices, and scholarly interpretations within the Iranian legal system.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The analysis conducted in this study centers on whether judges in the Iranian legal system can independently rely on the constitution as the sole basis for their judicial decisions, particularly under Article 166 of the Iranian Constitution. The findings support the hypothesis that judges do possess this authority. This conclusion emerges from a critical examination of both the textual interpretation of constitutional provisions and the evaluation of counterarguments that challenge this authority.&lt;br&gt;     Firstly, the term &quot;principles&quot; in Article 166 is pivotal. The article mandates that judicial verdicts must be well-reasoned and documented with reference to &quot;principles and laws.&quot; The term &quot;principles&quot; can be reasonably interpreted to include constitutional principles. This interpretation is bolstered by the textual analysis of the constitution, where the broad language suggests an inclusive approach to legal sources that judges may reference. Even if one were to interpret &quot;principles&quot; as general legal principles rather than specifically constitutional ones, the constitution&#039;s supreme status in the legal hierarchy inherently grants it precedence. Given that constitutional provisions are the highest form of legal norms, they naturally qualify as foundational principles upon which judicial decisions can be based.&lt;br&gt;     Counterarguments suggest that the constitution&#039;s general nature renders it inapplicable without specific legislative elaboration. Critics argue that judges should rely solely on statutory laws for detailed guidance, relegating the constitution to a supportive role in legal reasoning. However, this study finds this argument unpersuasive. The distinction between judicial reliance on the constitution and the implementation of its provisions is significant. Judges can interpret and apply constitutional principles to specific cases without overstepping their mandates, especially when statutory laws are silent, ambiguous, or in conflict with constitutional mandates.&lt;br&gt;     Moreover, concerns about infringing upon the Iranian Guardian Council&#039;s authority to interpret the constitution are addressed. The Guardian Council holds the power to provide definitive interpretations of constitutional provisions, which are binding and general in nature. However, the judiciary&#039;s reliance on the constitution in individual cases does not necessarily encroach upon this jurisdiction. Judges are tasked with applying the law to the facts before them, and in instances where the Guardian Council has not provided a specific interpretation, judges can and should turn to the constitution to guide their decisions. This practice ensures that constitutional rights and principles are actively upheld within the judiciary, rather than remaining theoretical ideals.&lt;br&gt;     The discussion also highlights that judicial reliance on the constitution enhances the protection of individual rights and reinforces the principle of constitutional supremacy. By allowing judges to base their decisions solely on constitutional provisions, the legal system ensures that all laws and regulations are consistently measured against the highest legal standards. This approach prevents the possibility of statutory laws undermining constitutional guarantees and promotes a more cohesive and just legal system.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The term &quot;principles&quot; in Article 166 encompasses constitutional principles, affirming that judges can reference the constitution directly in their verdicts. Even if &quot;principles&quot; were interpreted to mean general legal principles, the constitution&#039;s superior status and specific provisions on various issues strengthen the case for its independent use in judicial decisions. The constitution, being a codified legal document, inherently permits judicial reliance unless explicitly excluded.&lt;br&gt;     Arguments suggesting that the constitution&#039;s general nature precludes its direct application are found to be unconvincing. Judicial reliance on the constitution is distinct from the legislative process of implementing its provisions. The absence of detailed legislation does not inhibit judges from applying constitutional principles to specific cases. Each constitutional provision addresses particular issues, often providing sufficient detail to guide judicial reasoning and uphold legislative intent.&lt;br&gt;     Furthermore, judges invoking the constitution do not infringe upon the Guardian Council&#039;s jurisdiction to interpret constitutional provisions. The Guardian Council provides general interpretations that are binding across all cases. However, judges retain the authority to apply these provisions to the cases before them, especially in situations where the Council has not addressed specific matters, or new evidence emerges that necessitates judicial consideration of constitutional principles.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">استنادپذیری قانون اساسی به‌عنوان عالی‌ترین سند قانونی لازم‌الاجرای کشور امری حائز اهمیت است؛ در غیر این صورت، حقوق و آزادی‌های مصرح مردم در قانون اساسی متروک شده و قانون اساسی به‌تدریج بی‌اعتبار می‌شود. اصل یکصدوشصت‌وششم قانون اساسی جمهوری اسلامی ایران مقرر داشته است: «احکام دادگاه‌ها باید مستدل و مستند به مواد قانون و اصولی باشد که بر اساس آن حکم صادر شده است»؛ علی‌هذا، پژوهش حاضر در صدد است با روش توصیفی تحلیلی به این پرسش پاسخ دهد که آیا قضات محاکم می‌توانند در مقام رسیدگی و صدور حکم، اصول قانون اساسی را به‌طور مستقل - و نه در مقام تقویت رأی - مستند آراء خود قرار دهند؟ یافته‌های پژوهش بیان‌گر آن است که دادرسان می‌توانند در رسیدگی قضایی به اصول قانون اساسی به‌عنوان تنها مستند رأی استناد نمایند و عدم استناد ایشان به قوانین عادی در این وضعیت، مخلّ لزوم مستندبودن احکام دادگاه‌ها به‌موجب اصل فوق‌الاشعار نیست.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">قانون اساسی</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">استنادپذیری قانون اساسی</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">مستندبودن آراء قضایی</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">اصول حقوقی</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_77503_b209bc1384be011782696995c5d4d798.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Legal and Moral Justifications of the Israeli Military Against the Axis of Resistance: A Just War Theory Perspective</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>تحلیل نقض اصل جنگ عادلانه در توجیهات حقوقی و اخلاقی ارتش رژیم صهیونیستی در مواجهه با گروه‌های مقاومت</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1433</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1470</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77471</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2024.246772.3595</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>علی</FirstName>
					<LastName>کریمی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد علوم سیاسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>محمدحسین</FirstName>
					<LastName>صفایی</LastName>
<Affiliation>استادیار، دانشگاه عالی دفاع ملی، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>04</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;In the contemporary international landscape, the ethical nature of warfare remains a pivotal concern for global leaders seeking to justify military actions to their constituencies and the wider world. Despite a structured framework of international laws—most notably the United Nations Charter, which delineates the conditions for peace and war among nations—moral justifications are frequently invoked to legitimize conflicts. Michael Walzer, a renowned moral philosopher, asserts that discussions about war invariably involve arguments grounded in the logic of a just war. Historical instances underscore this trend: during the Kosovo War (1998–1999), then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair described the conflict as &quot;a moral war based on values, not territorial ambitions.&quot; Similarly, U.S. President George W. Bush framed the Iraq War as a &quot;Moral War,&quot; seeking to morally justify military actions against Saddam Hussein&#039;s regime.&lt;br&gt;     This pattern extends to the Israeli leadership&#039;s rhetoric concerning military engagements with Palestinian groups. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as &quot;the most moral army in the world,&quot; asserting that their operations against Hamas are justified acts of self-defense against terrorism. Former Defense Minister Ehud Barak and politician Avigdor Lieberman have echoed this sentiment, emphasizing the IDF&#039;s commitment to ethical principles even amidst allegations of disproportionate force and civilian casualties. Despite these assertions, reports from human rights organizations and international bodies suggest that certain military actions have resulted in significant civilian harm, raising questions about compliance with international humanitarian law.&lt;br&gt;     The discrepancy between the proclaimed moral stance and the reported outcomes of military operations necessitates a critical examination of the ethical and legal justifications employed. This research aims to scrutinize the Israeli leadership&#039;s invocation of Just War Theory in the context of their military actions against Palestinian resistance groups, assessing the validity of their claims within the frameworks of international law and moral philosophy.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Despite numerous crimes in the occupied Palestinian territories, particularly in Gaza, the Zionist regime repeatedly claims the title of &quot;the most moral army in the world.&quot; This implies that all of the army&#039;s military operations have been solely for self-defense, consistently distinguishing between military personnel and civilians, and issuing necessary warnings to residents before attacking a residential area. This research, seeks to understand the logic of the regime&#039;s leaders in labeling their army as moral and ultimately aims to refute this claim.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The Israeli leadership&#039;s assertion of conducting moral warfare, grounded in Just War Theory, is unsubstantiated when evaluated against international legal frameworks and ethical standards. The hypothesis posits that the IDF&#039;s military operations against Palestinian resistance groups do not fulfill the criteria of just war as defined by international law and moral philosophy. Consequently, the repeated claims of moral justification serve more as a strategic rhetoric to legitimize actions that may constitute violations of international humanitarian law, rather than reflecting genuine adherence to ethical warfare principles.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This study employs a doctrinal and analytical research methodology to investigate the alignment between the Israeli leadership&#039;s justifications and established international legal and ethical standards. The doctrinal approach involves a comprehensive examination of international legal documents, including the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and rulings from the International Court of Justice, to delineate the legal parameters of just war and self-defense.&lt;br&gt;     The analytical framework is structured around Just War Theory, focusing on its key principles: jus ad bellum (the right to go to war) and jus in bello (the right conduct in war). Criteria such as legitimate authority, just cause, right intention, proportionality, distinction between combatants and non-combatants, and last resort are scrutinized in relation to the IDF&#039;s military operations.&lt;br&gt;     Primary sources include official statements from Israeli political and military leaders, the IDF&#039;s Code of Ethics, and statistical data on military operations and their impacts from credible organizations like the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, and UNICEF. Secondary sources consist of scholarly articles on international law, Just War Theory, and analyses of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.&lt;br&gt;     Data will be critically analyzed to assess whether the actions and policies of the Israeli military adhere to the principles of Just War Theory and international legal standards. The research will also explore the narratives constructed by Israeli leaders to justify military operations and how these narratives conflict with documented evidence of their conduct during conflicts.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The research critically examines the Israeli leadership&#039;s claims of conducting moral warfare within the frameworks of Just War Theory and international humanitarian law. The findings indicate a significant disparity between the professed ethical standards of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and their actions during military confrontations with Palestinian resistance groups.&lt;br&gt;     Violation of Just War Principles:&lt;br&gt;     Just Cause and Right Intention: While Israel frequently cites self-defense as the justification for military operations, the research questions the legitimacy of this claim. The principle of self-defense under international law requires an immediate and overwhelming necessity, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. However, the scale and frequency of Israeli military actions suggest a broader strategic objective beyond immediate self-defense, potentially aimed at territorial expansion and suppression of Palestinian self-determination.&lt;br&gt;     Proportionality: The principle of proportionality prohibits the use of force exceeding what is necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives. The research highlights that Israeli military responses often result in disproportionately high Palestinian civilian casualties compared to Israeli losses. For instance, during specific military operations, reports indicate that for every Israeli casualty, there are significantly higher numbers of Palestinian deaths and injuries, many of whom are civilians, including women and children.&lt;br&gt;     Distinction between Combatants and Non-Combatants: International humanitarian law mandates that parties to a conflict distinguish at all times between combatants and civilians. The IDF&#039;s operations in densely populated areas like Gaza have led to substantial civilian harm. Documented instances include airstrikes on residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and places of worship. Despite claims of targeting militant positions, the high rate of civilian casualties suggests a failure to adhere to the principle of distinction.&lt;br&gt;     Last Resort: Just War Theory posits that force should be used only after all peaceful alternatives have been exhausted. The ongoing blockade of Gaza, restrictions on movement, and lack of meaningful engagement in peace negotiations indicate that non-violent avenues are not being fully pursued. The continued expansion of settlements in the West Bank further undermines efforts toward a peaceful resolution.&lt;br&gt;     Humanitarian Law Violations:&lt;br&gt;     Blockade of Gaza: The Israeli-imposed blockade severely restricts the flow of goods, including essential humanitarian supplies. This blockade has been characterized by the United Nations and other international bodies as a form of collective punishment, prohibited under Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.&lt;br&gt;     Targeting of Medical and Humanitarian Personnel: Reports from organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières have documented attacks on medical facilities and personnel. Such actions violate the protections afforded to medical units and staff under international humanitarian law.&lt;br&gt;     Use of Disproportionate Force: The employment of advanced military technology and heavy weaponry in civilian areas raises concerns about the use of disproportionate force. Weapons with wide-area effects, when used in populated regions, increase the likelihood of civilian harm and infrastructure damage.&lt;br&gt;     Rhetoric vs. Reality:&lt;br&gt;     The Israeli leadership&#039;s consistent portrayal of the IDF as the &quot;most moral army in the world&quot; appears incongruent with documented actions on the ground. This rhetoric serves several functions:&lt;br&gt;     Justification of Actions: Framing military operations as moral and necessary for self-defense aims to legitimize actions in the eyes of the international community and domestic audiences.&lt;br&gt;     Delegitimization of Opponents: Equating Palestinian resistance groups with internationally recognized terrorist organizations like ISIS seeks to undermine their political legitimacy and justify harsh military responses.&lt;br&gt;     Deflection of Criticism: Emphasizing moral conduct helps deflect accusations of war crimes and human rights violations, shifting the narrative away from alleged misconduct.&lt;br&gt;     Implications for International Law:&lt;br&gt;     The research underscores the challenges in enforcing international humanitarian law when powerful states or entities engage in conduct that violates these norms. The lack of accountability mechanisms and the political dynamics within international bodies like the United Nations often hinder effective responses to such violations.&lt;br&gt;     Erosion of Legal Norms: Persistent violations without consequences can lead to the erosion of established legal norms, weakening the overall framework of international humanitarian law.&lt;br&gt;     Humanitarian Impact: The civilian population bears the brunt of the conflict, facing loss of life, injuries, psychological trauma, and destruction of essential infrastructure, leading to long-term societal impacts.&lt;br&gt;     Prospects for Peace: Continued military aggression and failure to address underlying issues, such as occupation and denial of rights, diminish the prospects for a sustainable and just peace.&lt;br&gt;     Broader Context:&lt;br&gt;     The research situates Israeli actions within a broader strategy that appears aimed at consolidating control over Palestinian territories. Policies such as settlement expansion, annexation plans, and legislative measures restricting Palestinian rights suggest objectives beyond immediate security concerns.&lt;br&gt;     Settlement Expansion: The continued growth of settlements in the West Bank violates international law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits an occupying power from transferring its civilian population into the territory it occupies.&lt;br&gt;     Displacement of Palestinians: Military operations and restrictive policies contribute to the displacement of Palestinians, altering the demographic composition of contested areas.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The Israeli military confrontations since 1948 reflect a pattern of behavior that challenges the regime&#039;s self-professed adherence to moral warfare and democratic values. The post-2000 conflicts with Palestinian resistance groups, characterized by high civilian casualties and humanitarian crises, highlight significant deviations from international legal and ethical standards.&lt;br&gt;     Israel&#039;s dual identity as a Western-style democracy and a Jewish state creates inherent contradictions, particularly in its treatment of Palestinian populations. While espousing principles of freedom and equality, the regime&#039;s actions suggest a prioritization of territorial expansion and maintenance of a Jewish majority state over the rights and welfare of Palestinians.&lt;br&gt;     The claims of conducting moral military operations are undermined by:&lt;br&gt;     Systematic Violations of International Law: Evidence of disproportionate force, targeting of civilians, and obstruction of humanitarian aid contradicts the principles of Just War Theory and international humanitarian law.&lt;br&gt;     Expansionist Policies: Actions such as settlement building and refusal to return to internationally recognized borders indicate an agenda of territorial annexation rather than defense.&lt;br&gt;     Lack of Genuine Peace Efforts: The failure to engage in meaningful negotiations, lift blockades, or recognize Palestinian self-determination suggests that military actions are not aimed at achieving lasting peace.&lt;br&gt;     The research concludes that the Israeli leadership&#039;s invocation of moral justifications serves more as a rhetorical device to legitimize military operations and mitigate international criticism than as a reflection of actual adherence to ethical warfare principles. The disparity between rhetoric and reality highlights the need for the international community to critically assess such claims and hold actors accountable for violations of international law.&lt;br&gt;     Addressing these issues requires:&lt;br&gt;     International Accountability: Strengthening mechanisms to enforce international humanitarian law and hold violators accountable, regardless of political alliances or power dynamics.&lt;br&gt;     Support for Palestinian Rights: Recognizing and upholding the rights of Palestinians to self-determination, security, and a viable state.&lt;br&gt;     Promotion of Genuine Dialogue: Encouraging negotiations based on mutual recognition and respect for international legal norms, aiming for a just and sustainable resolution to the conflict.&lt;br&gt;     Ultimately, achieving peace and justice in the region necessitates a departure from narratives that obscure realities on the ground and a commitment to actions aligned with ethical and legal obligations. The international community plays a crucial role in facilitating this process by demanding accountability and supporting efforts toward reconciliation and respect for human rights.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">تقابل‌های نظامی رژیم اشغال‌گر صهیونیستی از سال 1948 میلادی تاکنون، به دو دوره قابل تقسیم است؛ دوره اول، پیش از سال ۲۰۰۰ که شامل نبردهای سهمگین با ارتش کشورهای عربی هم‌چون سوریه، اردن و مصر بوده، و دوره دوم، پس از سال ۲۰۰۰ که شامل درگیری‌های داخلی با گروه‌های مقاومت بوده است. نبردهای دسته دوم اگرچه فیمابین رژیم صهیونیستی و جهاد اسلامی، حماس و حزب‌الله لبنان شکل گرفته است، امّا در میزان تلفات، وسعت آتش‌افروزی، مدت زمان جنگ، اسرای جنگی و میزان خسارات، کمتر از یک جنگ تمام‌عیار نبوده است. نظریه «جنگ عادلانه» که برآمده از منشور سازمان ملل متحد و حقوق بین‌الملل عرفی است، تأکید می‌کند که هر جنگی باید با اصل دفاع از خود شروع شود، از کشتار غیرنظامیان اکیداً پرهیز شود و پس از جنگ نیز مسئولیت رسیدگی به مجروحان و بازماندگان پذیرفته شود. شگفت اینکه، رژیم صهیونیستی علی‌رغم جنایات بی‌شمار در فلسطین اشغالی و به‌خصوص غزه، به‌کرات مدعی عنوان «اخلاقی‌ترین ارتش جهان» است، به‌این‌معنا که تمام عملیات‌های نظامی ارتش تنها در جهت دفاع از خود بوده، همواره بین نظامیان و غیرنظامیان تمایز قائل شده و پیش از حمله به یک منطقه مسکونی، هشدارهای لازم را به ساکنین ابلاغ می‌کند. این پژوهش، با روش توصیفی تحلیلی به دنبال فهم منطق سران رژیم در اخلاقی‌خواندن ارتش خود و در نهایت نقد این ادعا است. توسل این رژیم به اصل دفاع از خود نه‌تنها پذیرفتنی نبوده و ناقض حقوق بین‌الملل است، بلکه هدفی چون اخراج فلسطینیان را درپی‌دارد.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">حقوق جنگ</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">اخلاق جنگ</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">نظریه جنگ عادلانه</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">فلسطین</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">رژیم صهیونیستی</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_77471_ab1fdf2e3b7b9522daaada146d07d61e.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Examining the Judiciary’s Role in Promoting Justice, Security, and Social Rights: A Case Study of al-Mahdi al-Abbasi’s Caliphate (775–785 AD)</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>واکاوی نقش نهاد قضاء در تامین عدالت، امنیت و حقوق اجتماعی؛ مطالعه موردی خلافت مهدی عباسی (158-169 هـ .ق)</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1471</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1496</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77689</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2025.247900.3724</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>مسلم</FirstName>
					<LastName>میرزاوند</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانش‌آموخته دکتری تاریخ اسلام، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه لرستان، خرم‌آباد، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0002-1695-9649</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>سیدعلاءالدین</FirstName>
					<LastName>شاهرخی</LastName>
<Affiliation>استاد، گروه تاریخ و باستان‌شناسی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه لرستان، خرم‌آباد، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0001-9041-1281</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>داریوش</FirstName>
					<LastName>نظری</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار، گروه تاریخ و باستان‌شناسی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه لرستان، خرم‌آباد، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0001-8111-1866</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>مجتبی</FirstName>
					<LastName>گراوند</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار، گروه تاریخ و باستان‌شناسی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه لرستان، خرم‌آباد، ایران.‌‌</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-5447-8638</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>04</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The Abbasid era of Caliph al-Mahdi (158–169 AH / 775–785 AD) witnessed acute social crises, political factionalism, and rampant administrative corruption. Against this backdrop, the judiciary emerged as an establishing institution charged with enforcing Sharia and governmental regulations, arbitrating civil and criminal disputes, and embodying the principle of political equality before the law. Although individual rulings of famous &lt;em&gt;qā&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ḍīs&lt;/em&gt; have been studied piecemeal, the systemic contribution of the courts to public order and social rights during al-Mahdi’s reign remains under-explored. This article therefore situates the judiciary at the center of statecraft, interrogating how procedural innovations, enhanced oversight, and the Caliph’s direct patronage of judicial offices translated into tangible improvements in communal security and perceptions of justice.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The study asks: To what extent did the Abbasid judiciary—through its institutional design, procedural practices, and doctrinal orientation—promote sustainable justice, public security, and the protection of social rights during the caliphate of al-Mahdi? Subsidiary questions examine (a) whether judicial interventions mitigated specific categories of unrest, and (b) how judicial authority interacted with executive power when enforcing equality before the law.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;It is hypothesized that the judiciary functioned as a decisive instrument of governance, such that:&lt;br&gt;Consistent application of Sharia norms and administrative edicts reduced arbitrariness, thereby lowering incidences of social unrest.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Employing a historical-analytical design, the research triangulates narrative chronicles, juristic treatises, and archival fragments of judicial decrees preserved in later &lt;em&gt;fiqh&lt;/em&gt; compilations. Theoretical grounding draws on socio-legal scholarship that links legal legitimacy to state capacity, while a governance-security nexus model frames the judiciary as an intermediary variable between executive policy and societal order.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Qualitative content analysis shows a pronounced judicial insistence on &lt;em&gt;siyāsah shar&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ʿiyyah&lt;/em&gt;—the doctrine that governmental measures must be tethered to Islamic aims of justice and welfare. Case reports document judges voiding tax exactions deemed inequitable and overruling provincial governors who exceeded lawful punishment thresholds. Such decisions, while occasionally provoking tension with local authorities, reinforced perceptions of procedural fairness and curtailed opportunities for administrative corruption.&lt;br&gt;Second, the &lt;em&gt;Dīwān al-Ma&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ẓālim&lt;/em&gt; under al-Mahdi acted as a quasi-appellate forum. Its expanded sitting schedule, coupled with the Caliph’s personal attendance at selected sessions, signalled executive endorsement of judicial oversight. Citizens of diverse strata—merchants, &lt;em&gt;mawālī&lt;/em&gt;, and tribal notables—successfully prosecuted claims against state agents, illustrating the court’s function as an equalising institution. This visibility, in turn, augmented public trust: narrative sources remark on heightened willingness of litigants to seek legal redress rather than resort to self-help or factional retaliation.&lt;br&gt;Taken together, these findings corroborate the hypothesis that an empowered and comparatively autonomous judiciary operated as a stabilising pillar of early Abbasid governance. The data further nuance standard political histories by demonstrating that al-Mahdi’s drive for legitimacy relied not only on patronage and military strength but also on the institutionalisation of rule-of-law norms that tempered executive authority.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The evidence indicates that during 775-785 AD the Abbasid judiciary transcended a reactionary dispute-settlement role to become an architect of social order. By coupling strict doctrinal fidelity with pragmatic oversight of fiscal and administrative practice, judges reduced the incidence of public disorder, widened access to justice, and bolstered the moral credibility of the caliphal regime. The &lt;em&gt;Dīwān al-Ma&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ẓālim&lt;/em&gt; emerged as the emblem of this synergy, simultaneously addressing citizen grievances and disciplining state officials. In effect, judicial independence—though never absolute—proved sufficient to check local abuses, foster compliance with Sharia-grounded [Islamic jurisprudence] governance, and entrench the notion of political equality.&lt;br&gt;These outcomes illuminate broader debates on the relationship between law and security in pre-modern Islamic polities. They suggest that where judicial institutions harness both doctrinal authority and executive backing, they can function as powerful levers for societal pacification and rights protection. The Mahdian precedent thus offers a historical template for understanding how legal legitimacy can underpin—not merely adorn—durable political stability.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">دوره خلافت مهدی عباسی (158-169 هـ .ق) که بستری برای تحولات پیچیده سیاسی و اجتماعی واقع شده بود، به مدیریت کارآمد نهادهای حاکمیتی نیاز اساسی داشت. نهاد قضاء به‌عنوان یکی از مهم‌ترین نهادهای تأثیرگذار در تنظیم مناسبات اجتماعی، نقش به‌سزایی در حفظ نظم و امنیت اجتماعی دارد. رسیدگی به شکایات، کمک به مدیریت بحران‌ها، برخورد با ناهنجاری‌های اجتماعی و تضمین حقوق شهروندان، از جمله کارکردهای اساسی نهاد قضاء در این دوره تاریخی محسوب می‌شود. هدف اصلی پژوهش حاضر، تبیین نقش نهاد قضاء بر انتظام و امنیت اجتماعی، و شناسایی راهکارهای قضایی در مدیریت بحران‌های امنیتی، سیاسی و اجتماعی دوره پیش‌گفته است. همچنین، بررسی نحوه تعامل مقامات قضائی با دستگاه حکومتی و نقش ایشان در حل اختلافات اجتماعی و حقوقی نیز دور از نظر نگارندگان نبوده است؛ لذا پژوهش حاضر با روش توصیفی تحلیلی به این پرسش پاسخ می‌دهد که نهاد قضاء در دوره خلافت مهدی عباسی، چگونه در تأمین عدالت، امنیت و حقوق اجتماعی ایفای نقش کرده است؟ یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که با انتصاب قضات توانمند، رسیدگی عادلانه به شکایات و اختلافات، کنترل جرایم و دفع ناآرامی‌های اجتماعی، نهاد قضاء در حفظ و ثبات نظم عمومی این دوره موثر واقع شده است. ارتباط نزدیک قضات و دستگاه خلافت باعث تقویت ساختار سیاسی و قضایی حکومت عباسیان شده و نهاد قضاء به‌عنوان ابزاری مهم در تحکیم امنیت سیاسی این دوره عمل کرده است.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">نهاد قضاء</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">نظم عمومی</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">عدالت اجتماعی</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">عدالت قضایی</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://ilr.isu.ac.ir/article_77689_59d9ca2ab6dfe6759705bbda4c232ec5.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>A Feasibility Review of the Admissibility of Vague Claims in Islamic Jurisprudence</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>امکان‌سنجی قابلیت استماع دعوی مجهول</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1497</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1524</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77714</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2025.248027.3735</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>محمدرضا</FirstName>
					<LastName>کیخا</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار، گروه فقه و مبانی حقوق اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه سیستان و بلوچستان، زاهدان، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0003-3434-287x</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>مرضیه</FirstName>
					<LastName>فردوسی دولت‌شانلو</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دکتری فقه و مبانی حقوق اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه سیستان و بلوچستان، زاهدان، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-1753-1882</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>میلاد</FirstName>
					<LastName>دهقانی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دکتری حقوق خصوصی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، واحد مشهد، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، مشهد، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-2673-8316</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>08</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The principle of access to justice occupies a central place in both modern legal systems and classical Islamic jurisprudence. Within any structured legal order, especially in a civil society founded on rule of law, the ability of individuals—both natural and legal persons—to assert their rights through judicial processes is fundamental. Accordingly, the law not only recognizes the right to file claims but also institutionalizes procedural safeguards to ensure the fairness and integrity of litigation. Among these safeguards, the requirement that claims be clear and well-defined is pivotal. If such clarity is lacking, the legal system risks adjudicating disputes on ambiguous grounds, thereby compromising judicial certainty and undermining the enforceability of rulings.&lt;br&gt;     Islamic jurisprudence (&lt;em&gt;fiqh&lt;/em&gt;), particularly within the Shi&#039;a tradition, is no exception to this requirement. The classical jurists have elaborated on the essential elements of a valid claim, repeatedly emphasizing the necessity of its clarity. The prevailing view in Shi&#039;a legal doctrine holds that claims which are vague—those lacking specificity in terms of the object, quantity, or identifying features—are inadmissible and do not merit judicial consideration. Nevertheless, a minority view within Islamic jurisprudence challenges this assumption and suggests that in some circumstances, vague claims may still be worthy of review and adjudication, particularly when partial information emerges during the judicial process.&lt;br&gt;     The impetus for the present research stems from this jurisprudential divergence. Although contemporary Iranian civil procedure law aligns with the traditional requirement of claim clarity, this alignment has not extinguished academic or judicial interest in re-examining the boundaries of admissibility. This study seeks to explore the doctrinal roots and contemporary relevance of these divergent views, using a systematic and critical approach rooted in Islamic legal theory.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The central research question of this study is:&lt;br&gt;     To what extent can vague claims be considered admissible and subject to judicial review under Islamic jurisprudence, and under what conditions—if any—can such claims be substantiated and lead to a legal remedy?&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This study is premised on the hypothesis that the absolute inadmissibility of vague claims, as maintained by the majority of jurists, does not adequately reflect the dynamic nature of judicial inquiry in Islamic law. Rather, the hypothesis posits that certain categories of vague claims—particularly those wherein the claimant holds certainty of a right but lacks full descriptive detail—may be conditionally admissible.&lt;br&gt;     Furthermore, it is argued that the evolution of judicial processes and the recognition of partial evidence or clarification through procedural mechanisms (e.g., interrogation, testimony, or defendant’s admission) support a more flexible approach. This hypothesis does not negate the importance of clarity but challenges the absolutist interpretation that treats all vague claims as inherently defective. The research contends that when judicial review leads to incremental clarity, such claims may satisfy the epistemic and procedural standards required by Islamic jurisprudence.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This research employs a doctrinal and analytical methodology, grounded in the study of primary Islamic legal texts (including classical jurisprudential treatises), contemporary commentaries, and relevant statutory provisions in Iranian law. It engages in a comparative analysis between majority and minority positions among Shiite jurists, examining their textual evidences, reasoning patterns (&lt;em&gt;ta&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ʿlīl&lt;/em&gt;), and interpretive strategies (&lt;em&gt;ijtihād&lt;/em&gt;).&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This study critically examined the doctrinal positions of classical and contemporary Islamic jurists regarding the admissibility of vague claims. A thorough analysis of juristic texts revealed a clear doctrinal majority maintaining that clarity of the claim is a mandatory condition for judicial admissibility. According to this view, adjudication must be based on a clearly stated and identifiable claim; otherwise, the judgment itself lacks determinacy and becomes legally ineffective. This aligns with classical Islamic procedural principles that emphasize the necessity of &lt;em&gt;al-&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ʿilm&lt;/em&gt; (knowledge) for both litigants and judges in rendering fair rulings.&lt;br&gt;     However, a minority of contemporary jurists—particularly those who emphasize &lt;em&gt;ma&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ṣla&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ḥah &lt;/em&gt;(public interest) and procedural equity—challenge this rigid formulation. These scholars argue that substantive justice may require courts to consider vague claims, especially when they arise from genuine cases of real ignorance (&lt;em&gt;jahl&lt;/em&gt;) rather than litigation misconduct or carelessness. The study shows that these minority jurists rely heavily on overarching Islamic legal maxims, such as &lt;em&gt;lā &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ḍarar wa-lā &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ḍirār&lt;/em&gt; (no-harm principle) and the &lt;em&gt;sīrah &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ʿuqalā&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ʾ &lt;/em&gt;(conduct of the wise), as rational bases for softening procedural barriers.&lt;br&gt;     Empirical parallels from Iranian civil law, especially Articles 34, 56, 61, and 159 of the Constitution, were invoked to support the latter view. These articles frame the judiciary as a venue to actualize justice and affirm the unconditional right of all citizens to seek legal remedy. The study finds that these constitutional norms are conceptually compatible with the idea of hearing vague claims when the litigant can demonstrate certainty of harm or entitlement, even if they cannot describe the object or exact quantity in dispute.&lt;br&gt;     Moreover, it was noted that in many practical cases, vague claims gradually gain clarity during the litigation process. Cross-examination, defendant responses, and the use of circumstantial evidence often help reconstruct the necessary specifics. As such, immediate dismissal of vague claims not only inflicts procedural injustice but also deprives the plaintiff of their constitutional right to judicial review.&lt;br&gt;     The study also explores procedural tools that Islamic courts can deploy to resolve vague claims without compromising judicial integrity. These include invoking the defendant’s oath (&lt;em&gt;yamīn&lt;/em&gt;), facilitating compulsory reconciliation (&lt;em&gt;ṣul&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ḥ&lt;/em&gt;), or ruling in favor of the least possible claim when ambiguity cannot be fully resolved. These mechanisms, found within traditional Islamic judicial practice, offer flexible responses that mitigate the harms of vagueness without undermining legal precision.&lt;br&gt;     In sum, the findings demonstrate that while classical Islamic jurisprudence was cautious toward vague claims, Islamic legal theory is not inherently averse to their consideration—especially when balanced against principles of harm avoidance and judicial obligation. This opens a legitimate path for context-sensitive interpretation within modern judicial frameworks that remain faithful to Islamic legal heritage.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The prevailing doctrine among classical Islamic jurists affirms that vague claims are inadmissible, positing that the lack of specificity undermines both the judicial process and the enforceability of rulings. This view emphasizes that the judge’s mandate is to issue rulings based on well-defined claims. If the claim is vague, any resulting judgment is likewise ambiguous and legally defective.&lt;br&gt;     In contrast, this study has highlighted a compelling minority view—backed by rational and constitutional principles—that recognizes the admissibility of vague claims under specific circumstances. It argues that under Article 34 of Iran’s Constitution, every individual holds an unqualified right to judicial recourse, and judges are duty-bound to provide a hearing, even when the claim is imprecise. This interpretation is reinforced by the rational conduct of society (&lt;em&gt;sīrah &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ʿuqalā&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;ʾ&lt;/em&gt;), which holds that claims based on real, non-malicious uncertainty still merit attention.&lt;br&gt;     When a plaintiff demonstrates certainty in the occurrence of a harm (e.g., theft or unreturned loan) but cannot specify the exact item due to the passage of time or memory lapse, denying their claim amounts to procedural injustice. To resolve such cases, Islamic jurisprudence already provides a suite of mechanisms—defendant oath, compulsory reconciliation, and minimal ruling—that permit the court to deliver equitable outcomes even amid evidentiary ambiguity.&lt;br&gt;     Accordingly, this study concludes that realistic and sincere vague claims should be admitted, especially when grounded in the plaintiff’s certainty and corroborated through procedural clarification. The assumption that all vague claims are inherently frivolous is both legally and morally untenable. Islamic jurisprudence, with its ethical and rational foundations, supports the judiciary’s proactive role in uncovering truth and securing justice—even when confronted with imperfect claims.&lt;br&gt;     Thus, vague claims stemming from real ignorance—particularly where the defendant is known and the harm is certain—should be deemed legally admissible and subject to full judicial process, rather than dismissed at the outset.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">یکی از فروعات مهم اصل قابل استماع بودن دعوی در محکمه، «معلوم بودن» خواسته است. امّا به‌عنوان مثال گاه مدعی یقین به طلب مالی از دیگری دارد، ولی به هر علت خصوصیات و جزئیات آن را نمی‌داند. در قابل استماع و رسیدگی بودن این قسم از دعاوی، دکترین هم‌داستان نیستند؛ رویه قضایی و نیز برخی از فقیهان پشتیبان غیر قابل رسیدگی بودن این دعاوی می‌باشند، و گروهی نیز از ضرورت رسیدگی به دعوی مجهول سخن گفته‌اند. مقاله حاضر با روش توصیفی تحلیلی، مستندات قائلین به عدم امکان استماع دعوی مجهول را قابل مناقشه انگاشته است. چه، مبتنی بر قاعده لاضرر و بنای عقلا، و نیز فلسفه وجوب قضاوت، دعوی مجهول در برخی صور، قابل طرح در دادگاه است و بر دادرس لازم است که فصل خصومت کند.</OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه امام صادق علیه‌السلام</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌نامه حقوق اسلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-9858</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>4</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>A Review of the Role of the Expediency Discernment Council in the Effectiveness of Legislative Criminal Policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>مروری بر نقش مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نظام در کارآمدی سیاست جنایی تقنینی جمهوری اسلامی ایران</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1525</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>1554</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">77650</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30497/law.2025.247367.3662</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>امین‌اله</FirstName>
					<LastName>زمانی</LastName>
<Affiliation>استادیار، گروه حقوق جزا و جرم‌شناسی، دانشکده پیشگیری از وقوع جرم و اصلاح و تربیت، دانشگاه علوم قضایی و خدمات اداری، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>محمدحسن</FirstName>
					<LastName>باقری خوزانی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانش‌آموخته دکتری حقوق عمومی، دانشکده حقوق، الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، نجف‌آباد، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>06</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt; ∴ Introduction ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Criminal policy encompasses the strategies and measures adopted by governments to address behaviors that contravene social and legal norms. This policy is not limited to punitive measures but extends to preventive approaches, integrating economic, social, and cultural dimensions in crime control. As defined by the French scholar Madame Mireille Delmas-Marty, criminal policy includes &quot;the set of methods through which society organizes its responses to criminal phenomena,&quot; highlighting both reactive and proactive strategies in crime prevention.&lt;br&gt;     In the Islamic Republic of Iran, legislative criminal policy is a critical aspect of the broader criminal policy framework, guiding the enactment of laws, classification of offenses, and establishment of punitive measures. This legislative function is not solely within the domain of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) but involves other institutions, among which the Expediency Discernment Council holds a significant role.&lt;br&gt;     The Expediency Discernment Council functions as a pivotal institution in the Iranian legal and legislative system, with its primary responsibilities including the resolution of legislative conflicts between the Parliament and the Guardian Council and the formulation of general state policies. Given the Council’s authority to intervene in legislative matters, its influence on the formulation and implementation of criminal policy is substantial. By analyzing the extent of the Council’s role in shaping legislative criminal policy, this study seeks to assess its effectiveness in formulating systematic and coherent crime-control strategies.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Question ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This study seeks to address the following key research question:&lt;br&gt;     What is the role of the Expediency Discernment Council in the formulation and implementation of legislative criminal policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran?&lt;br&gt;     This central inquiry is further broken down into sub-questions:&lt;br&gt;     To what extent does the Council directly influence legislative criminal policy through its intervention in lawmaking processes?&lt;br&gt;     How does the Council’s role in resolving legislative disputes affect the consistency and coherence of criminal laws?&lt;br&gt;     Does the Council’s involvement contribute to the effectiveness of crime prevention strategies in Iran?&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Research Hypothesis ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The study is based on the following hypothesis:&lt;br&gt;     The Expediency Discernment Council serves two primary functions in Iran’s legislative criminal policy: legislative and supervisory.&lt;br&gt;     This hypothesis is derived from an analysis of the Iranian Constitution and the Council’s official functions. The legislative role of the Council is evident in its authority to propose and influence state policies and to resolve conflicts between the Parliament and the Guardian Council. Meanwhile, its supervisory role is reflected in its oversight of legislative developments to ensure alignment with broader national interests.&lt;br&gt;     Given these two functions, the study hypothesizes that the Council’s involvement in legislative criminal policy enhances the coherence and efficiency of crime-related laws while simultaneously acting as a regulatory body that ensures legislative decisions align with the broader interests of the state. However, the extent of its effectiveness remains an area for critical analysis.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Methodology &amp; Framework, if Applicable ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;This research adopts a descriptive-analytical approach combined with a doctrinal research method to examine the role of the Expediency Discernment Council in legislative criminal policy. The study relies on legal analysis, constitutional provisions, statutory laws, and relevant legal documents to evaluate the Council’s functions within the Iranian legislative system.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Results &amp; Discussion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The findings of this study highlight the pivotal role of the Expediency Discernment Council in shaping legislative criminal policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Council’s contributions extend beyond its primary function of resolving disputes between the Parliament and the Guardian Council, encompassing broader legislative and supervisory responsibilities that influence Iran’s approach to crime prevention, punishment, and legal reform.&lt;br&gt;     One of the most significant aspects of the Council’s role is its power to propose general state policies, which serve as legislative frameworks guiding criminal lawmaking. The policies formulated by the Council include major directives on criminalization, decriminalization, prison reform, and crime prevention, which have provided a foundation for legislative initiatives in Parliament. By issuing such guidelines, the Council effectively shapes Iran’s legislative response to evolving social and legal challenges.&lt;br&gt;     Additionally, the Council’s legislative interventions have resulted in the enactment of key legal instruments addressing criminal phenomena. Notable examples include the Anti-Narcotics Law, which outlines Iran’s strict approach to drug-related offenses, and the Law on Aggravated Punishment for Embezzlement, Bribery, and Fraud, which demonstrates the Council’s efforts in combating financial crimes. These laws illustrate how the Council&#039;s arbitration function not only resolves legislative impasses but also contributes to the development of comprehensive legal strategies to address criminal behavior.&lt;br&gt;     Beyond legislation, the Council plays a supervisory role in ensuring that enacted laws align with the overarching policies of the system. This supervision is conducted through substantive and procedural reviews:&lt;br&gt;     Substantive Review: The Council assesses whether laws passed by Parliament conform to Iran’s general state policies. This review includes examining whether legislative acts contradict overarching governance principles or deviate from the pre-established criminal policy guidelines.&lt;br&gt;     Procedural Review: The Council ensures that laws enacted in accordance with system policies are effectively implemented by judicial and executive bodies. This oversight mechanism helps maintain consistency in legislative application and prevents deviations in enforcement.&lt;br&gt;     Despite its significant influence, the Council’s role in legislative criminal policy is not without challenges. One major concern is the potential overreach of legislative authority, as the Iranian legal system primarily assigns lawmaking responsibilities to Parliament. While the Council&#039;s interventions may be necessary in cases of legislative deadlocks, clear and transparent criteria are needed to define the extent of its involvement in the legislative process.&lt;br&gt;     Furthermore, the effectiveness of criminal policy formulation would benefit from a more structured engagement with experts in criminology and legal reform, ensuring that legislative decisions are informed by empirical research and international best practices.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;‌ ∴ Conclusion ∴ ‌&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;The Expediency Discernment Council serves as a crucial institution in shaping legislative criminal policy in Iran. Its dual role—legislative and supervisory—grants it significant authority in defining legal responses to criminal phenomena. Through its policy recommendations, dispute resolution, and regulatory oversight, the Council has contributed to the formation and refinement of Iran’s criminal legal framework.&lt;br&gt;     However, certain limitations must be addressed to enhance the Council’s effectiveness in legislative criminal policymaking. Given that lawmaking is fundamentally the responsibility of Parliament, the Council’s intervention should be reserved for exceptional cases where legislative impasses threaten the coherence of the legal system. Establishing clear procedural criteria for intervention would help balance the legislative powers between the Council and Parliament.&lt;br&gt;     Additionally, strengthening the Council’s engagement with criminologists and legal experts would improve the quality of its legislative contributions, ensuring that Iran’s criminal policy framework is both systematic and adaptable to contemporary challenges. Furthermore, greater emphasis on developmental prevention policies, particularly in education and social reform, could help shift the focus of criminal policy from punitive measures to proactive crime prevention.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">سیاست جنایی تقنینی ناظر بر تحلیل رویکرد قوانین و مقرراتی است که برخورد با پدیده مجرمانه، اعم از جرم و انحراف را سازماندهی می‌کند. مقاله حاضر در صدد پاسخ به این سوال است که مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نظام با وظایف مصرح در اصول یکصد و دهم و یکصد و دوازدهم قانون اساسی جمهوری اسلامی ایران، چه نقشی در کارآمدی قوانین مرتبط با سیاست جنایی ایران داشته و دارد؟ یافته‌های این جستار که با روش توصیفی تحلیلی سامان یافته است، حاکی از این امر است که با دقت در وظایف و عملکرد این نهاد، مشخص می‌شود که مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نظام از دو منظر «تقنینی» و «نظارتی» بر قوانین و مقررات جنایی تاثیرگذار است. از جهت تقنینی، مجمع اقدام به ابتکار سیاست‌های کلی جنایی به عنوان منابع الزامی، و همچنین در برخی از موارد در راستای حل معضل و یا رفع اختلاف میان مجلس شورای اسلامی و شورای نگهبان،‌ قانون‌گذاری جنایی می‌کند. از جهت نظارتی نیز، بررسی مصوبات مجلس که دخیل در سیاست جنایی است، از جهت انطباق با سیاست‌های کلی جنایی بر عهده مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نظام است.</OtherAbstract>
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